Michigan Law Review
Volume 99

Issue 2

2000

Proactive Legislation and the First Amendment
Stuart Minor Benjamin
University of San Diego School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment
Commons, Internet Law Commons, Legislation Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States
Commons

Recommended Citation
Stuart M. Benjamin, Proactive Legislation and the First Amendment, 99 MICH. L. REV. 281 (2000).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol99/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

PROACTIVE LEGISLATION AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
Stuart Minor Benjamin*
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. T HE FIRST AMENDMENTT HRESHOLD ............................................... 284
II. EXAMPLES OF PREDICTIVE HARMS.................................................... 290
A. Turner ............................................................................................... 290
B.
Other Contexts .................................................................................. 292
III. SUPREME COURT RESPONSES TO P REDICTIVE HARMS .................. 299
IV. D ISTINGUISHING P REDICTIVE HARMS FROM OTHER
FINDINGS .................................................................................................. 303
V. A PRESUMPTION A GAINST P REDICTIVE HARMS ............................. 309
A. Which Harms? .................................................................................. 310
B.
Costs of Relying on Predictive Harms.... ...................................... 312
1. Current Constitutional Abridgement Versus Potential
Harm .......................................... . ....... ......... . . ...................... 313
2. Avoiding a Second-Best ............................................................ 314
C. Free Speech Considerations ............................................................ 315
VI. OVERCOMING THE P RESUMPTION ...................................................... 320
A.
Two Guideposts ............................ ..................................... , ........... 322
B.
Likelihood of Irreparable Harm ..................................................... 325
VII. WHAT ROLE SHOULD D EFERENCE P LAY? ....................................... 331
A. Institutional Competence ..... . ............................... .... . ....... . .. 332
..

.

..

.

.

.

.

..

...

1.
2.

.

.

.

.

...

...

Factfinding Capabilities ............................................................ 332
Beyond Factfinding ................................................................... 336

B.

Redundancy ................................................................................... . 343

C.

Objections ......................................................................................... 348

D.

Looking Directly at the Probabilities ............................................. 353

..

E.

Unprovable Harms .......................................................................... 356
VIII. APPLICATION TO THE OTHER P REDICTIONS .................................... 358
A. Predictions of Legislative Effectiveness and Fit ......................... .. 359
B.
Predictions of No Effective Alternatives ........................................ 360
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 363
.

* Associate Professor, University of San Diego School of Law; Visiting Associate Pro
fessor, University of Pennsylvania Law School (Fall 2000). B.A., Yale University, 1987; J.D.,
Yale Law School, 1991.
Ed. I would like to thank Larry Alexander, Steve Burbank,
Heather Gerken, Seth Kreimer, Raymond Ku, Marty Lederman, Mark Lemley, Jon Molot,
Jonathan Nuechterlein, Jeff Rachlinski, Arti Rai, Mike Ramsey, Mike Rappaport, John
Robertson, Dan Rodriguez, Ed Rubin, Howard Shelanski, Eugene Volokh, Phil Weiser, and
Ernie Young for helpful comments. I am grateful to the University of San Diego for a sum
mer research grant in support of this Article.
-

281

282

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 99:281

It is a commonplace that the world is changing rapidly, with whole
sectors of the economy being transformed. New forms of communica
tion, like the World Wide Web, e-mail, and satellite television, have
risen from obscurity to ubiquity in less than a decade. The speed of
these changes has led some to express concern about the ability of
governments to respond. The fear is that governments cannot keep up
with developments as they occur and thus get hopelessly behind.1 The
solution, according to some, is for the government to act proactively
- before a harm has arisen, so that the government can push devel
opments along the appropriate path and avoid problems before they
occur. Indeed, there have been many calls for such legislation.2
Concern about the government's ability to keep pace with market
place innovation is not new. James Landis, the central figure in the
structuring of administrative agencies in the New Deal era, argued
that unless legal constraints on agency action were reduced, the gov
ernment would not be as nimble as private actors and therefore would
find itself outmaneuvered and overwhelmed; he considered it essential
that government be organized to act with the same rapidity as indus
try, so that it could shape the course of events.3 More recently, some
have expressed fear (or hope, depending on their perspective) that the
rapid pace of technological developments will overwhelm the govern
ment's ability to respond to them.4
1. One of the criticisms of the government's antitrust suit against Microsoft, for exam
ple, is that the market is changing more quickly than the government can react, rendering
the case outdated before it is even completed. See, e.g. , Thomas W. Hazlett & George
Bittlingmayer, Befuddled by "Internet Time:" The Government's Pointless Lawsuit Against
Microsoft, WKLY. STANDARD, July 5/July 12, 1999, at 23, 25 ("For all its haste, [the Depart
ment of] Justice is still too late. As the case enters its second year, the government's original
complaint is ancient history . . . . "); Declan McCullagh, Why Exactly ls Microsoft on Trial
Again?, 4 INTELL. CAPITAL.COM (June 3, 1999), at http:/lwww.intellectualcapital.com/issues/
issue245/item5266.asp ("[T]he worst fears of government attorneys have come to pass: Their
well-publicized and career-boosting lawsuit, which focused largely on the Internet Explorer
vs. Netscape Navigator battle, seems to be growing more irrelevant every day.").
2. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE, AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 218-21,
223-28 (1999); Greg Y. Sato, Should Congress Regulate Cyberspace?, 20 HASTINGS COMM.
& ENT. L.J. 699, 718 (1998); Ilene Knable Gotts & Alan D. Rutenberg, Navigating the
Global Information Superhighway: A Bumpy Road Lies Ahead, 8 HARV. J.L. & TE CH. 275,
277-78 (1 995); Allen S. Hammond IV, Regulating Broadband Communications Ne1works, 9
YALE J. ON REG. 181 (1992); Dan Rosen, A Common Law for the Ages of Intellectual Prop
erty, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 769, 785 (1984); ANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL
REVOLUTION 203-07, 226-27 (1999); Harold Feld, Whose Line ls it, Anyway? The First
Amendment and Cable Open Access, 8 COMM LAW CONSPECTUS 23, 35-40 (2000).
3. See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 1-12 (1938).
4. See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, Chairman of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Compe
tition and Consumer Protection Concerns in the Brave New World of Electronic Money,
Remarks Before the United States Department of the Treasury Conference, Toward Elec
tronic Money & Banking: The Role of Government (Sept. 19, 1996), at http:/lwww.ftc.gov/
speeches/pitofsky/banking.htm (expressing concern that " [t]he government regulatory proc
ess has generally not been able to keep up with fast changing technological developments");
David G. Post, Governing Cyberspace, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 155 (1996) (suggesting that rapid
development of the global electronic network will overwhelm governments' ability to regu-
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One response to these considerations is that the government
should regulate an industry or technology while it is still in the forma
tive stages. For instance, Senator James Exon, the sponsor of the
Communications Decency Act,5 argued for his approach by focusing
on the future harms that the Internet presented, rather than the ones
that had already arisen (at a time when home Internet use was still
relatively unusual). Notably, he justified his position by stating: "The
information superhighway is, in my opinion, a revolution that in years
to come will transcend newspapers, radio and television as an informa
tion source. Therefore, I think this is the time to put some restrictions
or guidelines on it."6
Congress enacted the Communications Decency Act after the
harms to which it responded - the dissemination of pornography in a
manner available to minors - had already begun. On other occasions,
however, legislation is entirely proactive, in that it is passed before any
cognizable harm has materialized. In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.
v. FCC,1 for instance, the harms to broadcasters that justified the
must-carry statute (requiring cable companies to carry local broad
casters) had not occurred before the legislation was passed.8 Similarly,
the current debate on whether to require cable modem Internet pro
viders to open up their lines to competing Internet service providers
has arisen in anticipation of harms that have not yet occurred.9 In such
circumstances, government action may be particularly effective: The
government is likely to have significant leverage, as there is no en
trenched pattern that the legislation must attempt to redirect or undo.
But the potential costs are great, as it is impossible to know if the an
ticipated harm would actually have arisen such that the legislation
would be appropriate.
There is particular reason for concern when the relevant legislation
infringes upon speech interests, in light of the long-standing wariness
of anticipatory overreaction in the First Amendment context.10 And,
for better or worse, predictive legislation frequently will affect speech
late it); John Perry Barlow, A Cyberspace Independence Declaration (Feb. 9, 1996), at
http://www. eff.org/barlow (celebrating the alleged inability of government to regulate, or
keep up with, the Internet).
5. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). The Communications Decency Act
("CDA'') prohibited the knowing transmission of obscene or indecent messages to any re
cipient under 18 years of age, and the knowing sending or displaying of patently offensive
messages in a manner available to a person under 18. /d. § 223(a), (d).
6. Peter H. Lewis, Despite a New Plan for Cooling It Off, Cybersex Stays Hot, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 26, 1995, at Al (citing to a telephone interview with Sen. James Exon).
7. 512 U.S. 622 (1994) [hereinafter Turner I]; 520 U.S. 180 (1997) [hereinafter Turner
II].

8. See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 71 -82 and accompanying text.
10. See infra Part V.C.
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interests and therefore will implicate the First Amendment. As a re
sult, it is important to determine the appropriate judicial response to
legislation based on predictive harms that infringes upon First
Amendment interests. Thus far, this question has received little atten
tion. This Article focuses on this hitherto unaddressed issue, by asking
the question of how courts should respond to legislation that affects
First Amendment rights and is premised on predictive harms.
In this Article, I contend that First Amendment principles dictate a
presumption against legislation that is based on predictive harms, but
that the presumption will be overcome if a court independently de
termines that there is a likelihood of irreparable harm. Part I briefly
discusses the level of harm required to justify legislation that infringes
upon First Amendment rights. Part II turns to proactive legislation,
giving some examples of predictive harms. Part III describes the Su
preme Court's responses to legislative findings in the First Amend
ment context, and Part IV discusses the difference between predictive
harms and other legislative findings. Part V addresses the circum
stances under which there should be a presumption against legislation
predicated upon predictive harms and concludes that, when the First
Amendment is implicated, we should be wary about reliance on pre
dictive but provable harms. This formulation leaves open the question
of what might overcome this presumption. Part VI suggests that the
answer is a likelihood of effectively irreparable substantial harm. Part
VII then focuses on whether courts should defer to legislative predic
tions of such irreparable harm, concluding that, because we can have
confidence in neither courts' nor legislatures' predictions, the pre•
sumption against these predictive harms counsels against deference
and in favor of redundancy. Finally, Part VIII considers the applica
tion of this analysis to other predictions contained in legislation. The
,upshot is that a tempting option for governments - legislating before
harms arise - merits skepticism rather than acceptance.
I.

T HE F IRST A MENDMENT T HRESHOLD

Assuming that we want the government to head off problems be
fore they arise, who should do it? Courts are not great candidates. Not
only does it seem illegitimate (where do judges get the authority to
proactively manage the economy?), but also judicial involvement ai•
most always occurs after a long course of events has taken place. Fed
eral courts have to wait until there is an injury in fact, and courts gen
erally address only controversies brought to them by aggrieved
parties.11 By that time, the harms have already occurred, so avoiding
the problem in the first place is not an option.
11. Some states have procedures under which the highest judicial authority in the state
can issue an advisory opinion in response to a legislative or executive request for guidance
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Legislatures seem better equipped for proactive measures. They
.�an survey the landscape as they see fit, obtain information from any
source by a variety of means, hold hearings on any subject that inter"
ests them, and seek to influence the course of future events (i.e., leg
islate prospectively).12 Indeed, one of the hallmarks of legislation is
prospectivity.13 Legislatures are thus the natural institutions for proac
tive regulation.14
Legislatures might plausibly seek to legislate proactively - that is,
before the harms that they fear have actually arisen - in any of a
number of areas. They might, for example, perceive dangers in the
importation of cheaper foreign foods (say, sugar15) and thereby limit
those imports even before any farmer has been hurt by them. But one
pf the more tempting targets is the communications industries - the
industries that create, alter, or package words and symbols. The com
panies and individuals engaged in the manipulation of words and sym
bols include programmers (video and computer), production compa
nies, creators, editors, etc. They have helped to change society in
countless ways. Legislatures may therefore be tempted to regulate ac
tivities in this segment of the economy, and to do so before the next
wave hits (whatever that wave may be).
If legislatures act against companies that deal in petroleum rather
than words, their actions will likely raise few concerns. There is no
provision in the Constitution that prohibits statutory limitations on
ordinary business dealings, and the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses have been reasonably interpreted to give legislatures fairly
wide latitude. And if legislatures act via general legislation that applies
to all sectors of the economy (e.g., maximum hour laws), the fact that
this legislation happens to affect, say, newspapers and Internet comconcerning the constitutionality of a proposed act, but this dispensation with the Article III
prohibition on advisory opinions is still a far cry from judicial proactive regulation. See
ALBERT R. ELLINGWOOD, DEPARTMENTAL COOPERATION IN STATE GOVERNMENT 30-55,
252-53 (1918); James B. Thayer, Advisory Opinions, in LEGAL ESSAYS 42-46 (1908); Mel A.
Topf, The Jurisprudence of the Advisory Opinion Process in Rhode Island, 2 ROGE�
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 207, 213-14 (1997); Margaret M. Bledsoe, Comment, The Advisory
Opinion in North Carolina: 1947 to 1991, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1853, 1853-54 (1992).
12. See Kenneth Culp Davis, Facts in Lawmaking, 80

q 980).

COLUM.

L.

REV.

931, 931-32

13. See, e.g., Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (191 5);
Londoner v. City and County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
14. One might be tempted to nominate administrative agencies, which also act prospec
tively (when they are in a rulemaking capacity, see Londoner and Bi-Metallic again). But
administrative agencies get their marching orders from the statutes that create them, and the
First Amendment challenges addressed in this Article would attack the statutes themselves,
so the agencies' role for these purposes is derivative of the legislation, and therefore the leg
islature, that creates the regulatory scheme in the first place.
15. This example is not picked at random; the government does limit the importation of
sugar. See United States General Accounting Office, Sugar Program, at 12-13 (2000), http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/rc00126.pdf.
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panies because of their demanding work schedules will not raise First
Amendment concerns.16 But a legislature may want to do more than
that; it may want to pass legislation more specifically aimed at a par
ticular aspect of expressive activities, or at a particular company, just
as it could do to a particular aspect of extractive activities (e.g., oil
drilling), or to Exxon/Mobil. When a legislature acts specifically
against a speech-manipulation activity or company, its action likely
will, and should, raise serious First Amendment concerns.
Others have made this point at some length, and I will not recreate
their arguments here. But it does bear mentioning briefly the argu
ments against this position, and the arguments for it. The obvious ar
gument against it is that, though the legislation deals with speech
related companies, it should be seen as ordinary economic legislation
in order to avoid a revival of Lochner through the First Amendment.17
This argument will be strongest when the regulation appears to have
nothing to do with the expressive aspects of an industry or company;
even a maximum-hour law specifically applicable to Internet compa
nies might not be subject to heightened scrutiny. But when the regula
tion of speech, or a means of communicating speech, is involved, then
the counterarguments loom large. The textual basis for the distinction
is obvious enough: the Constitution provides special protections for
speech by virtue of the First Amendment, which treats speech differ
ently from other activities. The normative arguments, to grossly over
simplify, usually revolve around two related propositions - that

16. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) ("[G]enerally applicable
laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press
has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news."). But cf Turner I, supra
note 7, 512 U.S. at 640 (stating that "enforcement of a generally applicable law may or may
not be subject to heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment," and refraining from an
swering the question).
One application of this distinction is that courts have treated antitrust laws differently
from laws aimed at communications, even when the legislature has attempted to justify such
specific laws on antitrust grounds. See id. (rejecting the argument that the must-carry provi
sions should be subject to rational basis review as akin to antitrust legislation because the
provisions singled out cable companies and thus were not generally applicable); Associated
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1945) (applying generally applicable antitrust laws
to a company that engaged in core First Amendment activities). This distinction takes on
particular significance for purposes of this Article, because antitrust authorities sometimes
apply antitrust laws (particularly the Clayton Act) based on their predictions of future
harms. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 318 n.32 (1962) (describing the
forward-looking nature of the "incipiency" standard under the Clayton Act); United States
v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589 (1957) (same). Such predictions of
harm are not subject to the same rigorous scrutiny that, I argue in this Article, should be ap
plied to the predictions of harm in legislation that more narrowly focuses on speech-related
activities, because of the absence in antitrust law of the crucial underpinning of heightened
First Amendment scrutiny.
17. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting: Content-Based Regulation of Per
sons and Presses, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 57, 612-80 (distinguishing individuals from entities for
First Amendment purposes and arguing that structural regulation of media companies
should be treated as ordinary economic regulation).
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speech is a distinctive kind of good and that governments have an in
centive to limit it. As to the former, the idea is that speech is not an
ordinary commodity because it is not merely an end but also a means
of persuading others, and because it therefore has spillover benefits
that go beyond purchasers.18 And, in part because of the p ower of
speech, governmental actors who wish to remain in office wil1 have an
incentive to control it.19
The Supreme Court has embraced this position. For instance, in
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of
Revenue,20 the Court applied rigorous scrutiny to a use tax applicable
to publications, even as it conceded that there was no indication (apart
from the nature of the tax itself) of any censorial or otherwise imper
missible motive on the part of the legislature that enacted the tax.21
Thus the Court invalidated a tax that, were it applied to almost any
other form of economic activity, would have sailed through rational
basis review.22 The Court also treated otherwise ordinary regulation as
subject to heightened scrutiny in the 1994 case Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. FCC ( " Turner /").23 That case involved a challenge to
sections of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competi
tion Act of 199224 that required cable television systems to devote a
specified portion of their channels to local broadcast television sta
tions. One of the government's main defenses of these sections
(known as the "must-carry" provisions) emphasized the market power
18. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech and Unfree Markets, 42 UCLA L. REV. 949,
959-64 (1995); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-15, at 890-904
(2d ed. 1988); Steven G. Gey, The Case Against Postmodern Censorship Theory, 145 U. PA.
L. REV. 193, 267-80 (1996); Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 878-87 (1963).
19. Daniel Farber suggests a slightly different normative justification, namely that in
formation is likely to be undervalued by both individuals and the political system because it
is a public good subject to the free rider problem. He argues that we do, and should, respond
to this undervaluation of information by providing special constitutional protections for it.
See Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First Amend
ment, 105 HARV. L. REV. 554 (1991).
20. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
21. Id. at 580.
22. See also Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (striking down a sales
tax imposed on newspapers with a circulation of more than 20,000 copies per week and
holding that, although newspapers may not enjoy immunity from general taxation, a tax
aimed more specifically at them failed rigorous review under the First Amendment); see
generally Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945) ("[T]he usual presumption sup
porting legislation is balanced by the preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the
indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment.").
23. Turner I, supra note 7, 512 U.S. at 622. Turner I is so denominated becaU:se, after the
case was decided, a three-judge district court issued an opinion on remand. Turner Broad. v.
FCC, 910 F. Supp. 734 (D.D.C. 1995). That opinion was affirmed by the Supreme Court in
an opinion referred to as Turner II, supra note 7, 520 U.S. at 180.
24. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 ("Cable Act of 1992") (codified in scattered sec
tions of 47 U.S.C. (1994)).
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of cable operators and argued that "the must-carry prov1s1ons are
nothing more than industry-specific antitrust legislation, and thus war
rant rational-basis scrutiny."25 The Court squarely rejected that posi
tion, stating that "laws that single out the press, or certain ekments
thereof, for special treatment 'pose a particular danger of abuse by the
State,' and so are always subject to at least some degree of heightened
First Amendment scrutiny."26
Assuming, then, that it is appropriate to treat legislation dealing
with speech-related activities differently from ordinary economic leg
islation, we are in a world of more rigorous scrutiny than is applied to
ordinary legislation. 27 As part of raising the bar for what is required of
legislation that infringes upon First Amendment interests, we expect
the underlying harm to which the legislature is responding to be a se
rious one, with some gravity. After all, if we let the legislature charac
terize almost anything as a cognizable (i.e., legislatable) harm, we
eviscerate not only the requirement of a harm but also the condition
that the legislation be tailored to fit that harm; the legislature could
simply aver a harm to which its legislation was perfectly tailored, even
if the harm alleged was trivial. It seems central, in other words, that
when First Amendment rights are threatened by legislation, courts re
quire a greater justification for the legislation than they would if no
First Amendment issue was presented.
Suppose that the cables in Turner sent, say, gas rather than video
programming through their wires, and Congress passed analogous

25. Turner I, supra note 7, 512 U.S. at 640.
26. Id. at 640-41 (quoting Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 228
(1987)); see also id. at 641 ("Because the must-carry provisions impose special obligations
upon cable operators and special burdens upon cable programmers, some measure of
heightened First Amendment scrutiny is demanded.").
Relatedly, the Court began its opinion by rejecting any suggestion that the First
Amendment was not implicated by a statute regulating cable operators. The Court an
nounced that "(t]here can be no disagreement on an initial premise: Cable programmers and
cable operators engage in and transmit speech, and they are entitled to the protection of the
speech and press provisions of the First Amendment." Id. at 636; see also id. ("Through
'original programming or by exercising editorial discretion over which stations or programs
to include in its repertoire,' cable programmers and operators 'see(k] to communicate mes
sages on a wide variety of topics and in a wide variety of formats.' " (quoting City of Los
Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986) (alteration in origi
nal))).
27. Such speech-related legislation will often - perhaps always - apply to speech that
is part of an economic activity; that is, in most cases the compensation for the speech will not
be exclusively nonmonetary. This does not mean, though, that the activity involved is com
mercial speech. The Supreme Court has emphasized that commercial speech merely pro
poses a commercial transaction. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,
Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 421 (1993); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 482 (1995). Neither
the must-carry regime at issue in Turner, nor any of the other examples of proactive legisla
tion discussed in Part II, either has been treated as a regulation of commercial speech or
should be under the prevailing doctrines.
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legislation - that is, a statute requiring that the operators of the ca
bles carry gas produced by local gas companies. We can imagine a
wealth of potential government interests that might be sufficient to
support such legislation for purposes of rational basis constitutional
review: perhaps the government wanted to give a boost to local com
panies simply because it preferred localism; or perhaps the govern
ment was hostile toward cable companies because it considered them
too arrogant and powerful, even though (let's imagine) there was no
existing antitrust or other cognizable harm. Either of those rationales,
or dozens of others, would probably satisfy any court that reviewed
such legislation if it were challenged as a violation of the cable compa
nies' constitutional rights (most probably, their rights to due process).
But because the cables at issue in Turner did not carry bits of gas, but
instead bits of data - video programming - the threshold was raised;
it would not be sufficient for Congress simply to say, for instance, that
it preferred little companies to bigger ones, or local companies to na
tional ones, just because Congress thought that such a world would be
a better place. We are looking, instead, for a more weighty justifica
tion - that is, a fairly specific and fairly serious harm to the public in
terest that the legislature is trying to avoid or minimize - in order for
a statute infringing upon free speech interests to pass muster.
This point takes on particular significance for my purposes because
it is central to the category of predictive harms. In the example of a
must-carry statute for gas, let's assume that no discernible detriment
has flowed to the local gas companies from the pre-statute arrange
ment (i.e., with no must-carry regime); the local companies have no
evidence of harm that could justify the statute. That absence should
not be a problem, for purposes of constitutional review; the low
threshold for ordinary rational basis review means that it probably is
sufficient for the legislature to justify the statute simply by saying that
the relevant harm was the mere possibility that local companies might
be excluded. Or the government might instead recharacterize the
harm as something that is occurring (perhaps a particular gas company
is losing money) and have that serve as the justification for the legisla
tion.28 In so doing, the legislature can avoid the assertion that the harm
is speculative by redefining the government's interest in a way that
renders the harm current. As long as the threshold for such harms is
quite low, such redefinition will probably work.
But if heightened scrutiny applies, that approach would, and
should, be insufficient. Heightened scrutiny entails a more serious
threshold. As in the antitrust context, a harm to a competitor will not
28. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) ("[T]he exis
tence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed . . . . ); Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (stating that the legislature's judgment is "well-nigh conclu
sive").
"

290

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 99:281

suffice; we would be looking for a harm to competition, and thus to
consumers. And because we are looking for more substantial harms,
legislatures will not have the option of just picking some current phe
nomenon and articulating that as the harm. Harms sufficient to satisfy
heightened scrutiny may not yet exist, and thus may be predictive.
II.

EXAMPLES OF PREDICTIVE HARMS

A. Turner
Turner I highlights the significance of the threshold. The central is
sue in Turner I was the standard of review for the must-carry legisla
tion. Turner Broadcasting argued, and four dissenting Justices agreed,
that the legislation constituted a preference for the programming of
fered by local broadcasters and thus was content-based. Content
based legislation is subject to strict scrutiny, under which the govern
ment interest must be "compelling" and the statute must be the least
restrictive means to further the articulated interest.29 The majority
concluded, however, that the must-carry provisions were content
neutral. The Court thus held that the provisions were subject to inter
mediate scrutiny under which the required interest must be "impor
tant or substantial" and the statutory scheme need not be the least re
strictive so long as the means chosen do not " 'burden substantially
more speech than is necessary to further the government's legitimate
interests.' "30
What interests me here is the first part of that test, in which the
Turner Court considered whether the interest involved was sufficiently
"important or substantial" to justify the legislation. The government
did not even bother to argue that the legislation was constitutional be
cause, for instance, Congress simply prefers local companies to na
tional companies. Instead, the government presented three more spe
cific interests involved in the legislation: "(1) preserving the benefits of
free, over-the-air local broadcast television, (2) promoting the wide
spread dissemination of information from a multiplicity of sources,
and (3) promoting fair competition in the market for television pro
gramming. "31 Significantly, these more specific interests were not suf
ficient. Turner accepted them in the abstract but quite appropriately
held that, in order to pass constitutional muster, the harms had to be
more specific, and more powerful.32 The plurality stated that, "in ap
plying O'Brien [i.e., intermediate] scrutiny we must ask first whether
29. See, e.g., Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
30. Turner I, supra note 7, 512 U.S. at 662 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781, 799 (1989)).
31. Id.
32. See id. at 664.
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the Government has adequately shown that the economic health of lo
cal broadcasting is in genuine jeopardy and in need of the protections
afforded by must-carry."33 Moreover, the required showing was fairly
specific: not only would the government have to show that a signifi
cant number of broadcast stations would be refused carriage (or oth
erwise disadvantaged) on cable systems, but "the Government must
further demonstrate that broadcasters so affected would suffer finan
cial difficulties as a result. "34
This, then, illustrates the difficulty: when we are looking for "im
portant" or "substantial" or "compelling" interests - that is, when
heightened scrutiny is involved - the harm may be sufficiently impor
tant and particular that its existence is not a given. Thus, it may be that
the only cognizable harm is a predictive one. Turner itself is one ex
ample. There was already evidence that some local broadcasters were
not carried by cable operators. But, as eight of the Justices agreed,35
that was not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of intermediate scru
tiny. The plurality instead required the aforementioned showing of
dropped broadcasters leading to genuine jeopardy to their economic
health. The problem, as the plurality acknowledged, was that those
harms had not yet come to pass. There was little evidence that there
had been any harm to local broadcasters. Rather, Congress was mak
ing what Turner I acknowledged to be "predictive judgments"36 about
what Congress feared would happen in the future to broadcasters ab
sent must-carry. The main harms thus lay in the future,37 and the Court
remanded the case for further evidence on them.

33. Id. at 664-65.
34. Id. at 667. The remainder of this paragraph of the opinion highlighted the serious
ness of the substantive hurdle. The plurality emphasized that "the parties have not presented
any evidence that local broadcast stations have fallen into bankruptcy, turned in their broad
cast licenses, curtailed their broadcast operations, or suffered a serious reduction in operat
ing revenues as a result of their being dropped from, or otherwise disadvantaged by, cable
systems." Id.
35. Justice Stevens was the only Justice who would have affirmed the district court and
upheld the statute in Turner I. He believed that the government's showing had been suffi
cient. Because, as he noted, a vote to affirm would have left the Court with no majority for
any disposition, he voted with the plurality to remand the case. See id. at 674 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("Were I to vote to affirm, however, no disposition of this appeal would com
mand the support of a majority of the Court. An accommodation is therefore necessary.").
36. Id. at 666.
37. See William E. Lee, Manipulating Legislative Facts: The Supreme Court and the First
Amendment, 72 TuL. L. REV. 1261, 1308 (1998) ("The thrust of these findings [in the Cable
Act of 1992) is not that cable has in fact harmed television broadcasters, but a prediction that
cable's unchecked market power may lead to harm.").
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Other Contexts

The must-carry provisions at issue in Turner are by no means
unique. Legislatures often act before a problem has materialized.
Holding aside for the moment legislation that focuses on content,38
other legislation focused on access to particular pipelines also relies on
predictive harms. The same legislation (the Cable Act of 1992) that
contained the must-carry requirement, for example, also included a
provision requiring that Direct Broadcast Satellite ("DBS") operators
reserve a percentage of their channel capacity for noncommercial edu
cational or informational programming.39 The district court invalidated
this provision, finding that "[t]here is nothing in the record purporting
to demonstrate that educational television is presently in short supply
in the homes of DBS subscribers, nor is there a reason to conclude
that section 25 was designed (or deemed necessary) by Congress to
quell anti-competitive DBS provider practices. "40 On appeal, the DBS
providers emphasized this conclusion, and the fact that Congress had
made no findings regarding the harms to which section 25 responded.
In rejecting the DBS providers' position, the Court of Appeals (in ad
dition to concluding that the statute was content-neutral41) simply
stated that "Congress could not have made DBS-specific findings for
the simple reason that no DBS system was in operation at the time the
1992 Act was enacted."42 The court could hardly have been clearer,
38. As will be discussed below, insofar as such legislation is based on unprovable predic
tive harms or prevents irreparable harms, it presents a somewhat different set of considera
tions. See infra Parts V.A & VIl.E; text accompanying notes 162-64.
39. The provision is section 25 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, and it states:
The Commission shall require, as a condition of any provision, initial authorization, or
authorization renewal for a provider of direct broadcast satellite service providing video
programming, that the provider of such service reserve a portion of its channel capacity,
equal to not less than 4 percent nor more than 7 percent, exclusively for noncommercial pro
gramming of an educational or informational nature.
47 u.s.c. § 335(b)(1) (1994).
40. Daniels Cablevision v. FCC, 835 F. Supp. 1, 8 (D.D.C. 1993), rev'd, 93 F.2d 957
(D.C. Cir. 1996); see also id. at 8-9 (concluding that "[i]n the absence of a record identifying
a valid regulatory purpose or some other legitimate government interest to be advanced by
conscripting DBS channel space, there is no justification for any First Amendment burdens
occasioned by section 25").
41. See Time Warner Entm't, Inc. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (concluding
that Turner l's reasoning for finding the must-carry provisions content-neutral also applied
to section 25). But see Time Warner Co. v. FCC, 105 F.3d 723, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(Williams, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane) (contending that section 25 is not
content-neutral, because "whereas the must-carry provisions reviewed in Turner [I] mandate
access for particular stations regardless of their programming content, the DBS provisions
speak directly to content, creating an obligation framed in terms of 'noncommercial pro
gramming of an educational or informational nature' " (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 335(b)(1) (1994)
(emphasis in original omitted))).
42. Time Warner, 93 F.3d at 976.
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then, that Congress was not responding to any existing harm created
by DBS operators. This was classic proactive legislation, passed before
DBS had an opportunity to do much of anything, for good or ill.
In fact, the Cable Act of 1992 produced still more examples. One
of its provisions directs the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") to limit the number of subscribers a cable operator may
reach,43 and a companion provision directs the FCC to limit the num
ber of channels that can be occupied by a programmer in which a ca
ble company has a financial interest.44 Congress justified the limitation
on subscribers on the theory that horizontal concentration would harm
new and small programmers, and the limitation on channel occupancy
on the theory that vertically integrated companies would freeze out
unaffiliated programmers.45 Time Warner challenged these provisions
as violations of the First Amendment, arguing that the harms to which
Congress responded were entirely speculative.46 Neither the District
Court for the District of Columbia nor the D.C. Circuit suggested that
any of the feared harms had actually occurred47 - and, notably, nei
ther did Congress. As the D.C. Circuit noted, Congress identified as
the harm justifying the limit on subscribers that " [t)he potential effects
of [concentration in the cable industry] are barriers to entry for new
programmers and a reduction in the number of media voices available
to consumers,"48 and the harm justifying the limit on channel occu
pancy was that "cable operators have the incentive and ability to favor
their affiliated programmers. This could make it more difficult for
noncable-affiliated programmers to secure carriage on cable sys
tems."49 Again, the harms that motivated the legislation had not yet
been visited on anyone.50
43. 47 U.S.C. § 533(f)(l)(A).
44.

47 U.S.C. § 533(f)(l)(B).

45. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(4) & (5); see also Time Warner Entm't. Co. v. United States,
211 F.3d 1313, 1319-22 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
46. See Time Warner, 211 F.3d at 1319 ("Time Warner does not argue that the Congress
failed to identify an important governmental interest, but rather faults the Congress for
having acted without having made findings, and without having evidence upon which it could
have made findings, that either of these problems is a real one."); id. at 1322 ("Time Warner
argues that the Congress's reason for enacting the channel occupancy provision - to pre
vent cable operators from favoring affiliated programmers and possibly even excluding oth
ers - addresses only a speculative harm because the Congress had no evidence that such
exclusionary conduct actually had occurred.").
47. See id. at 1319-20 (emphasizing that Congress drew inferences about potential
threats to diversity from horizontal concentration); id. at 1322 (noting again potential
threats, and stating that a vertically integrated operator "may . . . compromise the consum
ers' interests").
48. 47 U.S.C. § 521(a)(4).
49. 47 U.S.C. § 521(a)(5).
50. The D.C. Circuit relied on the deferential approach to predictive harms enunciated
in Turner II as its basis for rejecting Time Warner's arguments about the speculative nature
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Disputes over predictive harms are not confined to the past. Some
brewing controversies also involve such harms. For example, one of
the major current battlegrounds in the world of television is a new
must-carry issue - the possibility of requiring cable operators to carry
broadcasters' digital signals. The federal government has granted each
television broadcaster the use of an additional six megahertz of spec
trum until 2006,s1 at least some of which must be used to broadcast
digital television.s2 Digital compression technology will allow broad
casters to send multiple digital signals over the six megahertz, if they
so choose.s3 Broadcasters are pushing the FCC and Congress to re
quire cable operators to carry all of their digital broadcast signals.s4
Cable operators, meanwhile, consider such digital must-carry to be a
more serious intrusion than the must-carry regime at issue in Turner,
as the multicasting allowed by digital compression would greatly in
crease the number of cable channels that must be devoted to broad
cast signals.ss The FCC is currently considering the matter; in July
1998, the FCC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that laid out
options ranging from no must-carry obligations to a requirement that
all cable systems carry not only the existing analog stations but also all
digital commercial television stations.s6 The harms that would justify
must-carry rules, however, are predictive; neither the broadcasters nor
anyone else has marshaled evidence of the harms flowing from the ab
sence of a must-carry regime that would be necessary to justify the
imposition of such a regime.s7 Rather, proponents argue that the ab-

of the harms. That is, the court found not that the harms had already begun, or that they
were inevitable, but rather that Congress had drawn "reasonable inferences, based on upon
substantial evidence," in identifying these potential harms, and that under Turner II no more
was required. See Time Warner, 211 F.3d at 1319-20, 1322; see also infra notes 98-103 and
accompanying text [discussing Turner /l's deferential approach to predictive harms).
51. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(14) (Supp. V. 1999). Broadcasters do not pay for this use of
the spectrum, and the statute allows for extensions of this grant to broadcasters beyond 2006.
Subsection (j)(l4) provides that the FCC can extend a broadcaster's use of both sets of spec
trum beyond 2006 if 15% of the households in a given market do not either subscribe to a
multichannel service that carries the available digital transmissions or have a television re
ceiver capable of receiving digital signals.
52. See Advanced Television Sys., 12 F.C.C.R. 12809, 12820, <jj 28 (1997).
53. See Advanced Television Sys., 11 F.C.C.R. 17771, 17774, <jj 5 (1996).
54. See, e.g. , Brooks Broliek, Hedlund Tells ALTV to Keep Fighting for Digital Carriage,
HOLLYWOOD REP. Jan. 25, 2000, at 12.
,

55. See, e.g., Christopher Stern, Cablers to Battle Must-Carry, VARIETY, Nov. 1, 1999, at
22; Decker Anstrom, Should Cable Provide Digital Must-Carry?: No, Cable Networks
Shouldn't Be Relegated to Second-Class Status, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Jan. 18, 1999 at 36.
56. Carriage of the Transmissions of Digital Television Broad. Stations, 13 F.C.C.R.
15092 (1998).
57. See generally Thomas W. Hazlett, Digitizing "Must Carry" Under Turner Broad
casting v. FCC (1997), 8 SUP. Cr. ECON. REV 141 (2000); Harris J. Aaron, Note, I Want My
MTV: The Debate Over Digital Must-Carry, 80 B.U. L. REV. 885 (2000).
.

November 2000]

Proactive Legislation

295

sence of a must-carry regime for broadcasters' digital signals will result
in noncarriage of those signals,58 and that such noncarriage will harm
broadcasters to the point that their digital offerings, and ultimately
perhaps the broadcasters themselves, will eventually die.59 These
harms are potentially serious; if they came to pass, their elimination
would constitute an important or substantial government interest. But
at this point they are speculative.
Another prominent example of predictive harms involves competi
tors' access to cable modems for the delivery of Internet services. This
is the most controversial current issue in the world of Internet access.60
Congress and the FCC have thus far refrained from acting,61 but many
localities have mandated such access,62 giving rise to litigation.63 In the
background, but largely unexamined, looms the issue of predictive
harms.64
58. But see 7 WARREN'S CABLE REG. MONITOR (Sept. 6, 1999), available at 1999 WL
6826118 (noting that AT&T signed its second DTV distribution agreement and the indus
try's third agreement, agreeing to transmit Fox's 22 major market-owned stations through
2009); A T&T & NBC Deal: A Digital Template, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, June 14, 1999, at 6,
available at 1999 WL 10009242.
59. See Aaron, supra note 57.
60. See John Schwartz, How Much Room in the Fat Pipe? Internet Providers' Fortunes
Are Riding on Fight for 'Broadband' Access to Homes, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1999, at Hl;
Corey Grice, A T&T Case Could Decide Fate of Fast Net, CNET NEWS.COM, Nov. 1, 1999, at
http:l/news.cnet.com/news/0-1004-202-1425825.html; Peter S. Goodman, A T& T Cable
Internet Case Looms Large, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 1999, at El; The Battle for the Last Mile,
THE ECONOMIST, May 1, 1999, at 59.
61. See David Kaut, Tauzin, Dingell Ready Broadband Bill, but Face Stiff Resistance
from Colleagues, 4 ELECTRONIC COM. & L. REP. (BNA), No. 26, at 577 (June 30, 1999); Bill
McConnell, Panel Splits on Unbundling, BROADCASTING & CABLE, July 5, 1999, at 12; FCC
CABLE SERVICES BUREAU, BROADBAND TODAY, A STAFF REPORT TO WILLIAM E.
KENNARD, CHAIRMAN FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (1999) (hereinafter
BROADBAND TODAY] ; Internet Ventures, Inc., 15 F.C.C.R. 3247 (2000) (order denying peti
tion for declaratory ruling that Internet service providers are entitled to leased access to ca
ble facilities under section 612 of the Communications Act); Bryan Gruley, FCC Encourages
Court to Stop Portland from Making A T&T Open Cable Lines, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 1999,
at A4; FCC OFFICE OF PLANS & POLICY, THE FCC AND THE UNREGULATION OF THE
INTERNET (1999).
62. Over twenty-five localities have passed, and legislatures in nine states and Congress
are considering, legislation that would require cable modem providers to open up their lines
to competing Internet service providers. See Matt Beer, Cable on Front Line of Broadband
War: Major Internet Players Battling over Access to Your Living Room, S.F. EXAMINER,
June 13, 1999, at Bl (noting such trends in Oregon and California).
63. See AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000). Litigation is also
underway, at earlier stages, in Broward County, Florida; Henrico County, Virginia; and
Madera County, California. See Press Release, OpenNet Coalition, OpenNet Coalition
Criticizes AT&T/MediaOne Decision to Sue Henrico County over Open Access (Jan. 21,
2000), at http://www.opennetcoalition.org/news/948493968.shtml.
64. Some commentators have noted that the harms are predictive, but they have not
discussed the constitutional ramifications of the speculative nature of the case for open ac
cess. See James B. Speta, Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile?: A Critique of Open Ac
cess Rules for Broadband Platforms, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 39, 77-90 (2000); Phil Weiser,
Paradigm Changes in Telecommunications Regulation, 71 COL O. L. REV. 819, 831 (2000) .
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The essential elements of the dispute are these: Cable operators
have begun to offer Internet service via a cable modem through their
cables. These cables (generally coaxial) have much greater capacity,
and therefore much greater speed, than ordinary, unimproved tele
phone copper wires. Cable Internet service is thus one of the new
forms of "broadband" service - so named because of the greater
bandwidth, or capacity, that it offers.65 The cable companies have, by
and large, contracted with a given Internet service provider ("ISP") to
be the exclusive provider of Internet access to their customers.66 That
is, just as customers pay a monthly fee for cable television and get a
specific package of channels aggregated by the cable operator, cus
tomers also pay a monthly fee for cable modem service that connects
them to a particular provider of Internet access.67 Other Internet pro
viders, and some consumer groups, have sought legislation that would
One might argue that laws requiring cable Internet providers to open their wires to
competing Internet service providers do not merit heightened First Amendment scrutiny
and thus do not raise the same sorts of concerns about predictive harms. This position may
seem to gain support from A T&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000). In
the course of holding that Portland lacked the authority to regulate cable modem service,
the court in A T& T stated that cable broadband is a "telecommunications service" that may
be subject to common carriage requirements. Id. at 878-79. Because any further discussion
was unnecessary to the resolution of the case, the court did not discuss the implications of its
reasoning, for First Amendment purposes or otherwise. But the opinion raises the question
of the First Amendment protections available to cable Internet providers. One problem is
that, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion notwithstanding, another court, most commentators, and
a lengthy FCC paper have concluded that cable Internet service does not fit into the cate
gory of "telecommunications service" and is not, as a statutory matter, subject to common
carrier obligations, but instead should be treated as either cable or information service (both
of which would be subject to First Amendment protections). See MediaOne Group, Inc. v.
County of Henrico, 97 F. Supp. 2d 712, 715 (E.D. Va. 2000); James B. Speta, The Vertical
Dimension of Cable Open Access, 71 COLO. L. REV. 975 (2000); Barbara Esbin, Internet
over Cable: Defining the Future in Terms of the Past, OPP Working Paper No. 30, available
at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp30.txt; Howard A. Shelanski, The
Speed Gap: Broadband Infrastructure and Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
721, 740-42 (1999); Christopher E. Duffy, The Statutory Classification of Cable-Delivered
Internet Service, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1251 (2000); see also Turner I, supra note 7, 512 U.S. at
636 (1994). But in any event, the placement of cable Internet service in a statutory category
is not dispositive for First Amendment purposes. Many of the First Amendment concerns
discussed in Part I would seem to apply to cable Internet service no matter how it was statu
torily characterized. For a fuller discussion of this issue, see generally Raymond Shih Ray
Ku, Open Internet Access and Freedom of Speech: A First Amendment Catch-22, 75 TUL. L.
REV. 87 (2000). Although the issue is far from clear, the better answer seems to be that open
access mandates will trigger the First Amendment inquiry discussed in this Article.
65. See Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Adv. Telecomm. Capability to All
Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such De
ployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecomm. Act of 1996, 14 F.C.C.R. 2398, 2406, 'lI
20 (1999) [hereinafter Advanced Services Order] (defining broadband as the capacity to
provide speeds of transmission permitting users "to change web pages as fast as one can flip
through the pages of a book and to transmit full-motion video").
66. See Esbin, supra note 64, at 77-81; David Bank, A T&T Gets At Home Stake in TC/
Deal, WALL ST. J., June 25, 1998, at A16.
67. See Marcus Maher, Comment, Cable Internet Unbundling: Local Leadership in the
Deployment [sic] High Speed Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 211, 213-16 (1999).
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prohibit this arrangement, arguing that the cable companies should
not be allowed to send all their customers to a single provider and in
stead should be compelled to allow all ISPs to provide service to the
cable Internet customers.68
The ISPs believe that their exclusion from cable modems will
weaken their position such that it ultimately harms competition among
ISPs and perhaps the competitive structure of Internet services that
rely on a competitive ISP industry.69 More specifically, their argument
is that cable modem service will likely become so popular that it will
exercise the sort of bottleneck power that harms competition and
thereby justifies regulation of speech-related activities;70 indeed, this is
exactly the argument that persuaded the plurality in Turner II. Such
harms, though, do not yet exist.71 As the FCC recognized when it ap
proved AT &T's merger with cable provider TCI, the market for
Internet service is "quite competitive today."72 In fact, cable access ac
counts for a mere 2 % of the ISP market;73 cable modem service only
recently passed the one million customer mark, as opposed to more

68. See McConnell, supra note 61 (describing the legislation).
69. See Patricia Fusco, Consumer Groups Speak Out in Portland Oregon/A T&T Fran
chise Case, INTERNETNEWS.COM (Sept. 16, 1999), at http://www.isp-planet.com/news/
consumer_groups.html.
A cable modem subscriber can also choose to utilize an ISP. The ISPs fear, however,
that subscribers will drop service with the traditional ISP since most of its services (essen
tially, everything except the proprietary services offered by ISPs like America Online) will
already be provided by the cable-modem companies' Internet provider.
70. See CONSUMER ACTION & CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, TRANS
FORMING THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY INTO A PRIVATE TOLL ROAD: THE CASE
AGAINST CLOSED ACCESS BROADBAND INTERNET SYSTEMS 58-74 (1999), at http://www.
consumerfed.org/bbreport.pdf; CONSUMERS UNION, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF
AMERICA, & MEDIA ACCESS PROJECT, WHO Do You TRUST? AOL AND AT&T . . .
WHEN THEY CHALLENGE THE CABLE MONOPOLY OR AOL AND AT&T . . . WHEN THEY
BECOME THE CABLE MONOPOLY? 11-23 (2000) , at http://www.consumersunion.org/pdf/aol.
pdf; HARRY M. SHOOSHAN III ET AL., STRATEGIC POLICY RESEARCH, MACABLE.COM:
CLOSED v. OPEN MODELS FOR THE BROADBAND INTERNET 17-30 (1999), at http://www.
opennetcoalition.org/news/macablel0-15-99.pdf.
71. See Speta, supra note 64, at 77-90; BROADBAND TODAY, supra note 61, at 32-46;
Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v. Broward County, Florida, 2000 WL
1741740, at *13 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (finding that "the harm the [cable open access] ordinance is
purported to address appears to be non-existent"); Ku, supra note 64, at 1 19. Even those
who disagree with the FCC's wait-and-see approach admit that the harms are somewhat
speculative. See, e.g. , Mark Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, Ex Parte Statement In re: Applica
tion for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses Media One Group, Inc. to AT&T
Corp., CS Docket No. 99-251, 'II 54 ("We simply do not know enough to know how sensitive
the innovation of the Internet is to changes in this competitive architecture.").
72. Application for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214
Authorizations from Telecomm., Inc., Transferor to AT&T Corp., Transferee, 14 F.C.C.R.
3160, 3206 'II 93 (1999).
73. See NATIONAL TELECOMM. AND I NFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
FALLING THROUGH THE NET: DEFINING THE DIGITAL DIVIDE 38 (1999).

298

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 99:281

than forty million for traditional dial-up ISPs.74 Cable Internet service,
in other words, lacks not only a dominant market position but also any
current ability to limit competition in the ISP market.75 Moreover, it is
by no means clear that cable modems will pose the harms that com
peting ISPs fear. For one thing, cable modem service may not be the
wave of the future; competing modes of transmission might prove
preferable.76 Telephone companies have developed digital subscriber
line ("DSL") service for telephone wires, which has broadband capa
bilities.77 Many think that DSL will overwhelm cable Internet service
in popularity.78 ISPs have access to those wires, so if DSL is the domi
nant player, then cable's exclusive arrangements with proprietary ISPs
may mean little. Furthermore, satellite and fixed wireless providers (as
well as more exotic technologies79) are gearing up for broadband
service and may overwhelm both cable modems and DSL.8° Finally,
74. See Patricia Fusco, Cable Access Providers Top Million Customer Milestone,
INTERNETNEWS.COM
(Aug.
2,
1999),
at
http://www.internetnews.com/ispnews/print/0,1089,8_172801,00.html; BROADBAND TODAY, supra note 61, at 32.
75. See BROADBAND TODAY, supra note 61, at 23-24.
76. See Jon Healey, Demand for Data: More, More, Faster, Faster Fiber Optics Light the
Way for Rapid Growth ofthe Internet, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, May 4, 1999, at lF, avail
able at http://www.mercurycenter/news/indepth/docs/data050499.html; Dana Blankenhorn,
The Sharks Circle, INTELLECTUALCAPITAL.COM (July 29, 1999), at http://www. intellectual
capital.com/issues/issue261/item5893.asp; P. William Bane & Stephen P. Bradley, The Light
at the End of the Pipe, SCI. AM., Oct. 1999, at 110; Andrzej R. Pach & Zdzislaw Papir, Edito
rial, Broadband Access Copper Technologies, IEEE COMM. MAG., May 1999, at 58; John
Skoro, LMDS: Broadband Wireless Access, SCI. AM., Oct. 1999, at 108.
77. See, e.g., BROADBAND TODAY, supra note 61, at 20-21; John Borland, Bells Step Up
Net Services to Compete with Cable, CNET NEWS.COM (Oct. 20, 1999), at http://news.cnet.
com/news/0-1006-200-920161.html.
78. See, e.g., Press Release, Cahners In-Stat Group, DSL Poised To Overthrow Cable in
Global Broadband Battle (Feb. 28, 2000) available at http://www.instat.com/pr/2000/
tx0002sp_pr.htm; ISP-Planet Staff, ISPs' Rollout of DSL Leave Predictions in the Dust,
INTERNETNEWS.COM (Dec. 3, 1999), at http://www.isp-planet.com/news/cahners_dsl_rollout.
html; Paul Roche, Why DSL Will Win the Broadband-Access Battle, ZDNET NEWS (Apr. 17,
2000), at http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/comment/0,5859,2551062,00.html.
79. See Andrew J. Glass, Atlanta Tech: National Players Locked in Fight over 'Fat Pipe, '
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Sept. 15, 1999, at Dl (stating that "several firms are working on
technology they claim would allow the existing electrical grid to be used to send data, voice
or video signals at speeds that would leave the current cable modem or telephone-based sys
tems in the dust").
80. See, e.g., Dan Gillmor, Delivering Fiber Speeds Without Needing the Wires, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 14, 2000, available at http://www.mercurycenter.com/sutech/
columns/gillmor/docs/dg031400.htm; David Barboza, New Alliance Will Promote Wireless
Access to Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1999, at CZ; Nora Macaluso, Report: Wireless to
Dominate Web by 2001, E-COMMERCE TIMES (Apr. 1 1 , 2000), at http://www.
ecommercetimes.com/news/articles2000/00041 1-3.shtml; Joshua L. Kwan, Sprint to Launch
High-Speed Wireless Net Access for Home Users, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 23, 2000,
available at http://wwwO.mercurycenter.com/svtech/news/front/docs/sprint102400.htm; Gerry
Blackwell, Broadband Now - The Wireless Way, lNTERNETNEWS.COM (Dec. 1, 1999), at
http://www .isp-planet.com/technology/wireless_reselling.html; Katie Hafner, No Cable? No
D.S.L.? Try Satellite, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2000, at Gl; Price Colman, EchoStar Ramps Up
Data Delivery, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Aug. 24, 1998, at 47; Clint Boulton, Cisco Leaps
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even absent regulation the cable modem providers (spurred, in all
likelihood, by customer preferences) may well decide to allow differ
ent ISPs to provide service to their customers.81 The relevance of all
this is that the harms that could give rise to a substantial or important
government interest have not yet arisen.82 Such harms are predictive
rather than actual.
III. S UPREME COURT RESPONSES TO PREDICTIVE HARMS
The Supreme Court has tended not to distinguish predictive harms
from other kinds of harms, and indeed other kinds of legislative find
ings. At the same time, the Court has not been consistent about the
degree of deference that it applies to legislative assertions of harm. I
think these two phenomena are related, and that a distinction between
current and predictive harms will provide a better basis for determin
ing how to treat each.
into Broadband Fray, INTERNETNEWS.COM (Oct. 26, 1999), at http://www.internetnews/
article/%2C1087%2C8_225991 %COO.html; BROADBAND TODAY, supra note 61, at 21-22;
Corey Grice, The Next Wave in Fast Net Access, CNETNEWS.COM, July 28, 1999, at
http.//news.cnet.com/news/0-1004-201-343783-0.html.

81. See Speta, supra note 64; BROADBAND TODAY, supra note 61, at 44-46; Advanced
Services Order, supra note 65, at 'II 'II 93-101.
A number of such agreements have already been announced (although the degree to
which the spur was the threat of proactive legislation, instead of customer preferences, is not
clear). For instance, Time Warner has reached agreements with Earthlink and Juno (both
Internet Service Providers not affiliated with Time Warner) that allow each to offer Internet
service to Time Warner's cable Internet customers over Time Warner's cable Internet lines,
and Comcast has reached a similar agreement with Juno. See Saul Hansell, Time Warner
Makes Access Deal With Earthlink, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2000, at Cl, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2000/l 1/21/technology/21TIME.html; James Evans, Earthlink, Time
Warner Reach Broadband Deal, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, Nov. 20, 2000, available at
http://www.thestandard.net/article/display/0,1151,20315,00.html; Alec Klein, Time Warner,
Earthlink Reach Deal, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 2000, at El, available at http://washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/articles/A46686-2000Nov20.html; Time Warner to Let Internet Provider Use
Cable System, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2000, at C2; Time Warner, Juno Make Deal, NEWSDAY,
Aug. 1, 2000, at A45; Peter S. Goodman & Alec Klein, Comcast, Juno Strike Net Access
Deal, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2000, at E4, available at http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
articles/Al566-2000Nov28.html; Thor Olavsrud & Jim Wagner, Juno, Comcast Form Open
Access Pact, INTERNETNEWS.COM, at http://www.isp-planet.com/news/juno_comcast.html.
82. See BROADBAND TODAY, supra note 61, at 23-30, 32-39 (noting nascence of cable
modem service, dominance of narrowband service, and surfeit of other broadband options
that might prove preferable to cable modem service); Ku, supra note 64, at 120 (stating that,
"while the market for Internet access may have the potential to become uncompetitive at
some point, any conclusion that it is or will become so soon is both premature and specula
tive"); Jason Riley, Faster Web Access Coming (One Day) to a Home near You, WALL ST. J.,
July 14, 1999, at A23 (noting that advocates of open access to cable modems "are acting on
assumptions that could prove false"); William E. Kennard, How to End the World Wide
Wait, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 1999, at Al8 (emphasizing the uncertain future development of
the broadband market and stating that "[w]e cannot regulate against problems that have yet
to materialize in a market that has yet to develop"); McConnell, supra note 61, at 12 (quot
ing U.S. Representative Zoe Lofgren as stating, of cable modems' market position, that "[t]o
say 1 % [market share] is a monopoly is preposterous," and U.S. Representative Martin
Meehan as saying that unbundling of cable modem service "seems premature at this point").
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There are two different responses that the Court has had to legisla
tive findings in the First Amendment context, and they are in some
tension with each other. The first is a general (i.e., not specific to the
First Amendment) principle of deference to legislative factfinding.
The Court has emphasized legislatures' (and in particular Congress's)
greater institutional competence - their expertise, factfinding capa
bilities, etc.83 - in positing that courts owe deference to legislative
findings.84 This has arisen in a number of cases not involving the First
Amendment,85 but also has been intimated in the First Amendment
context.86 The second strain is specific to the First Amendment: the
Court has expressed an unwillingness to defer to legislative fact
finding. For example, in Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia87
the Court emphatically stated that "[d)eference to a legislative finding
cannot limit judicial inquiry when First Amendment rights are at
stake."88
Some Supreme Court First Amendment opinions simply adopted
this second position.89 Other cases, though, invoked both traditions
and attempted to create a coherent whole.90 An early attempt at such a
combination was Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic
National Committee ("CBS").91 There, the Court stated that legislative
findings were subject to "great weight," but "[t]hat is not to say we

83. Institutional competence is discussed at greater length infra Part VII.A.
84. See, e.g., Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 331 n.12
(1985) ("When Congress makes findings on essentially factual issues such as these, those
findings are of course entitled to a great deal of deference, inasmuch as Congress is an insti
tution better equipped to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing on such an
issue.").
85. One example is Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 72-74 (1981) (deferring to Con
gress's judgments about the propriety of excluding women from the draft).
86. Walters is an example of such apparent implicit deference. Its language on deference
to legislative findings occurred in the context of its rejection of a due process claim, 473 U.S.
at 320-34, but its subsequent brief discussion of the First Amendment claim in the case
treated the latter claim as inseparable from the due process claim, id. at 335.
87. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
88. Id. at 843.
89. See, e.g., Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129 (1989) (quoting and
relying upon the statement from Landmark Communications); FCC v. League of Women
Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 388 n.18 (1984) (same).
90. The same is true for lower courts that are faced with the unenviable prospect of try
ing to determine what standard the Supreme Court applies. Different lower courts have de
vised diverging approaches to the deference owed to legislative findings in the First
Amendment context. Some seize on one strand or the other, see, e.g., Excalibur Group, Inc.
v. City of Minneapolis, 116 F.3d 1216, 1221 (8th Cir. 1997) (emphasizing deference), whereas
others, following the lead of cases like Turner I, simply articulate the importance of both
deference and independent judgment, and then try to muddle through somehow, see, e.g. ,
Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1995).
91. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
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'defer' to the judgment of the Congress."92 The opinion then immedi
ately followed up by stating: "The point is, rather, that when we face a
complex problem with many hard questions and few easy answers we
do well to pay careful attention to how the other branches of Gov
ernment have addressed the same problem."93 The apparent balance
was that the Court would not defer to the legislature, but it would find
the legislature's views weighty and useful.
The two strains arose again in Turner, but this time with a different
casting of the balance. In Turner I, the Court began its discussion of
deference by saying that "courts must accord substantial deference to
the predictive judgments of Congress,"94 emphasizing that "Congress
is far better equipped than the judiciary to 'amass and evaluate the
vast amounts of data' bearing upon an issue as complex and dynamic
as that presented here."95 But the Court went on to state:
That Congress' predictive judgments are entitled to substantial deference
does not mean, however, that they are insulated from meaningful judicial
review altogether. On the contrary, we have stressed in First Amend
ment cases that the deference afforded to legislative findings does "not
foreclose our independent judgment of the facts bearing on an issue of
constitutional law." This obligation to exercise independent judgment
when First Amendment rights are implicated is not a license to reweigh
the evidence

de nova,

or to replace Congress' factual predictions with

our own. Rather, it is to assure that, in formulating its j udgments, Con
gress has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence.96

The Court thus dealt with the same tension between deference and in
dependent review, and, as in CBS, tried to mediate between the two.
There was a difference, however; although Turner I's standard was
less than pellucid,97 it did indicate that deference would be appropri92. Id. at 102-03.
93. Id. at 103.
94. Turner I, supra note 7, 512 U.S. at 665 (1994).
95. Id. at 665-66 (quoting Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S.
305, 331 n.12 (1985)).
96. Id. at 666 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Sable Communications, Inc. v.
Virginia, 492 U.S. 115, 129 (1989), and Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S.
820, 843 (1978)).
97. Some of the Court's terminology was lifted from other contexts, so its application to
legislative findings is somewhat opaque. For instance, "substantial evidence" is a term of art
in administrative law, where it describes the review that courts give to agency determinations
of fact in formal adjudications. Before Turner, the Court had never attempted to apply that
standard to legislative findings; and, to add to the confusion, the Court disclaimed any at
tempt at actually requiring Congress to compile a record, as an administrative agency must.
Moreover, the standard, even as applied to administrative law, is fairly muddy; the classic
statement is that "[ s]ubstantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Consoli
dated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). On this issue, and other ambiguities in
the Turner test, see Comment, Constitutional Substantial-Evidence Review? Lessons from the
Supreme Court's Turner Broadcasting Decisions, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1162, 1166-70 (1997).
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ate. The Court not only would pay careful attention to the legislature's
views, but also would give them substantial deference.
After the remand in Turner I, the Court took another crack at
characterizing its approach to legislative findings, and it appeared to
tilt further away from independent review. The Court stated that its
"sole obligation is 'to assure that, in formulating its judgments, Con
gress has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evi
dence.' "98 Gone was any reference to, or suggestion of, the Court's
"independent judgment," or independent review more generally. In its
place were statements like the following:
The Constitution gives to Congress the role of weighing conflicting evi

dence in the legislative process. Even when the resulting regulation

touches on First Amendment concerns, we must give considerable defer
ence, in examining the evidence, to Congress' findings and conclusions,
including its findings and conclusions with respect to conflicting eco
nomic predictions.99

The larger significance of Turner I and Turner II, for my purposes,
is that the Court did not reveal any consideration of the possibility
that the predictive harms it was facing might appropriately be treated
with greater suspicion than current harms would be treated. The Court
clearly considered the relevant harms to be predictive ones, referring
repeatedly to the fact that the asserted harms to broadcast had not yet
occurred and that the legislative assertions of such harms were there
fore predictions.100 But the Court did not articulate any greater wari
ness about reliance on such predictions, or suggest that they raised dif
ferent issues. Instead, the Court offered general arguments in favor of
deference. In fact, if anything the Court suggested that greater defer
ence for predictive harms might be appropriate; insofar as it distin
guished predictions, it offered the distinction as an additional justifica
tion for deference. Thus, in Turner I the Court's first supporting
statement after its pronouncement of deference was that "[s]ound
policymaking often requires legislators to forecast future events and to
anticipate the likely impact of these events based on deductions and
inferences for which complete empirical support may be unavail
able. "101
98. Turner II, supra note 7, 520 U.S. at 195 (emphasis added) (quoting Turner I, supra
note 7, 512 U.S. at 666).
99. Turner II, supra note 7, 520 U.S. at 199.
100. See Turner /, supra note 7, 512 U.S. at 665-67; Turner II, supra note 7, 520 U.S. at
185, 188, 191, 195-96, 199, 204, 207, 211.
101. Turner I, supra note 7, 512 U.S. at 665 (citing FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe
Line Co., 365 U.S. 1, 29 (1961) and FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S.
775, 814 (1978) ). The notion of deference to forecasts was initially articulated in the context
of ordinary economic regulation and later was extended, without any suggestion or discus
sion of the difference that the First Amendment might make, to speech regulation. The
original source was Transcontinental Gas, which, as the case name might suggest, involved
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Turner I did offer one glimmer of a move toward greater wariness
about predictions: the Court emphasized that "[w]hen the Govern
ment defends a regulation on speech as a means to redress past harms
or prevent anticipated harms, it must do more than simply 'posit the
existence of the disease sought to be cured. ' It must demonstrate that
the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural."102 In Turner II,
however, the "not merely conjectural" part of the formulation fell out
of the equation (in fact, all forms of the word "conjecture" were ban
ished entirely), and the "real" was de-emphasized as well.103
This was an important road not taken, as some forms of predic
tions are different from other harms, and we should recognize those
differences. The key lies in the Supreme Court's own language about
"real, not merely conjectural" harms. The Supreme Court ignored the
import of these words, and I think that was a mistake, because predic
tive harms are conjectures, and that should make us wary. We must
look closely at the significance of the predictive element - the very
element that the Court glossed over. Once we see these as predictions,
rather than findings of existing fact, we not only see that they bear less
resemblance to ordinary factfinding than we may have supposed, but
also that they bear more resemblance to other sorts of predictions
than we may have imagined at first blush.
IV. DISTINGUISHING PREDICTIVE HARMS FROM OTHER FINDINGS
The previous section raises an obvious question: What is the dif
ference between predictive harms and other kinds of findings? Isn't
legislation filled with predictions, and isn't even reliance on a current

gas regulation and had nothing to do with the First Amendment. In the course of reviewing a
challenge to such economic regulation, the Court stated: " [W]e think that a forecast of the
direction in which future public interest lies necessarily involves deductions based on the
expert knowledge of the agency." 365 U.S. at 29. In National Citizens Committee for Broad
casting, this language crossed over to the First Amendment context. 436 U.S. at 814
("[C]omplete factual support in the record for the [FCC's] judgment or prediction is not pos
sible or required; 'a forecast of the direction in which future public interest lies necessarily
involves deductions based on the expert knowledge of the agency.' " (quoting Transconti
nental Gas, 365 U.S. at 29)); see also Turner II, supra note 7, 520 U.S. at 196 (quoting this
language from National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting as justifying deference to fore
casts). The Court thus ended up applying the same principle of deference in speech and non
speech contexts. This Article, of course, contends that the two contexts should be treated
differently.
102. Turner I, supra note 7, 512 U.S. at 664 (quoting Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768
F.2d 1434, 1455 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
103. The two relevant appearances of the word "real" in Turner II are noteworthy. In
recapitulating Turner I, the Court referred to the question on remand of whether there was a
"real harm." Turner II, supra note 7, 520 U.S. at 195. But in presenting its resolution of that
question, Turner II stated that "[w]e have no difficulty in finding a substantial basis to sup
port Congress' conclusion that a real threat justified enactment of the must-carry provi
sions." Id. at 196 (emphasis added).
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harm a prediction of sorts, such that there is no reason to treat predic
tive harms differently?
It is true that legislation involves predictions. Most saliently, there
are three basic predictions that are implicit, and sometimes explicit, in
the context of judicial review of legislation for constitutional purposes:
the legislation will alleviate the harm at which it is aimed; it will not
have excessive spillover effects on other activities; and other, less in
trusive legislative options will do less good and/or more bad. The first
prediction essentially compares the legislation to the existing state of
affairs before the legislation was passed and asks whether the legisla
tion will actually mitigate the problem that it is designed to mitigate.
The second asks whether the means chosen are broader than neces
sary to mitigate the problem. And the third prediction compares the
legislation to other, hypothetical worlds that would be created if other
legislation was passed.
Although the formulation of these predictions comes from the
world of judicial review (more particularly, strict scrutiny104), these
predictions are - or should be if the legislature is acting in good faith
- inherent in the legislative process. Even if the legislature never ac
tually articulates them, they are part and parcel of legislation. Passage
of legislation entails a prediction that the statute will alleviate the
harm to which the legislation responds. The legislature may not ex
plicitly so state, but it is implicit in the passage of the statute; the leg
islature is acting, presumably, because it sees a problem and has de
vised a legislative response that, it predicts, will mitigate that problem.
Similarly, where constitutional interests are at stake, a relevant ques
tion is whether the statute will affect constitutional rights that are not
part of the harm to be eliminated; this, too, is a prediction about the
impact of the legislation. And in cases involving constitutional inter
ests legislatures are also likely to make - and courts will require un
der heightened scrutiny - a prediction that other, less intrusive forms
of regulation would not have the same beneficial effects as would the
legislation that was actually passed.105 Again, this is a prediction about
a state of affairs under a legal regime - here, the hypothetical regimes
that would be created by various alternatives.

104. See, e.g., Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126-27 (1989); Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321-29 (1988).
105. In cases involving strict scrutiny, the existence of a less restrictive alternative will
usually be fatal to the challenged statute. See, e.g., Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 13031. In cases involving heightened but not strict scrutiny (such as content-neutral regulatory
and commercial speech contexts), the existence of a less restrictive alternative is not fatal,
but it does cast doubt on the statute's satisfaction of the tailoring requirement. See, e.g. ,
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 490-91 (1995) (stating that other options, "all of
which could advance the Government's asserted interest in a manner less intrusive to re
spondent's First Amendment rights, indicates that [the challenged provision] is more exten
sive than necessary"); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799-800 (1989).
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To be sure, these predictions usually have significant elements of
law and policy. When a legislature implicitly (or explicitly) contends
that a given enactment will achieve the legislature's goals, contained
within that proposition is the legislature's choice of a particular goal.
A prediction that there will not be an excessive effect on other rights
includes a notion of what would be excessive. Similarly, an assertion
that no less restrictive alternative would be equally effective entails an
implicit measuring stick of what constitutes effectiveness. But the pre
dictions also have a significant factual element. Once the legislature
determines what it wants to achieve, there is still the factual question
of whether its legislation will actually advance that goal, and whether
another route would advance it further. The legislature, in other
words, is also making an old-fashioned factual prediction regarding
what will actually happen under a particular legal regime.
It may be difficult for courts to determine how to deal with the le
gal and policy determinations. Factors such as the perceived gap in
democratic accountability might lead courts to be wary about second
guessing a legislature, but by the same token great deference would
eviscerate the courts' role. More relevant for my purposes, it may be
difficult to separate the factual elements of a prediction from the pol
icy and legal elements. A question like the one of fit - is this legisla
tion tailored to the problem at hand - has such a massive overlay of
legal and policy elements that it is difficult to ask the factual question
without bringing in policy and legal considerations.
But courts in fact deal with such problems frequently, particularly
in administrative law contexts where determinations of law, fact, and
policy may be bound up in a single decision but nonetheless must be
separated for purposes of judicial review because each is subject to a
different standard of review.106 The factual predictions may be hard to
identify, but at least in theory they lay discoverable within these com
bined determinations.
Arguably, legislation entails another prediction as well - that the
harm that the legislation seeks to minimize will not go away on it� own
as quickly and as fully as it would via effective legislation, and thus the
legislation is responding to a real harm. That is, one might argue that
what really matters is not whether the proffered harms existed last
year, or the day that the legislation was passed, or, most signifi
cantly,107 on the day that the final appellate court rules on the constitu
tionality of the relevant piece of legislation, but instead whether those
106. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) ("The Secretary's task . . . contains 'elements of both a legislative policy determi
nation and an adjudicative resolution of disputed facts.' Although in practice these elements
may so intertwine as to be virtually inseparable, they are conceptually distinct and can only
be regarded as such by a reviewing court.'' (internal citations omitted) (quoting Mobil Oil
Corp. v. FPC, 438 F.2d 1238, 1257 (1973)).
107. On the reason why this is the most significant date, see infra note 109.
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harms will exist in the future, and that in this sense all harms are
equally predictive. Is there any difference between these existing
harms and what I am calling predictive harms?108
It is important to focus on what is being predicted about current
harms - namely, that a currently existing harm will not go away on its
own as quickly and fully as it would have without effective legislation.
All we are assuming, then, is that a harm that arose in the existing le
gal environment will tend to continue at least for some period of time
unless the legal environment is changed, or that, even if the harm
would have gone away on its own at some point, the legislation (as
suming that the legislation is effective, which is a separate prediction)
will likely send it to an earlier grave. There may be occasions when
these predictions are unfounded. The best example that comes to
mind would be legislation enacted in 1999 that limited speech about
the Y2K bug in order to allay then-existing fears that the Y2K bug
would wreak havoc on January 1, 2000. The legislation addresses an
existing harm - a palpable, demonstrable concern on the part of mil
lions of people. It just so happens that this concern involved an event
on a date certain in the future (thereby giving us an opportunity to
create a hypothetical under which a currently existing harm will go
away on its own). So, if a litigant brought a declaratory and/or injunc
tive action against this legislation, and the court heard the case such
that it was ready to issue its opinion in very late December, the court
might fairly say that the legislation responded to a current harm that
would go away on its own absent any (further) implementation of the
legislation, so that no existing harm could justify the legislation.109
108. It is worth noting that this raises a question of temporal perspective. When a court
issues retrospective relief, it obviously is examining facts that have already been established;
future changes to those facts presumably are irrelevant to the matter of retrospective relief.
When a court issues prospective relief, changes in the facts will be relevant; if a party brings
forward evidence that facts have changed such that the prospective relief is no longer justi
fied, it seems incumbent upon the court to alter its relief. But most litigation challenging the
constitutionality of a statute seeks declaratory relief, which has at least the appearance of
being concerned solely with the present. If so, then perhaps in declaratory actions we would
not care about the future existence (or nonexistence) of any fact, but rather would focus ex
clusively on its present status. This vision of declaratory relief seems too crabbed, however.
Of course the present is the central focus of any declaratory relief, but any disposition will
have an effect on the future as well. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Stepping into the Same
River Twice: Rapidly Changing Facts and the Appellate Process, 78 TEXAS L. REV. 269, 27680 (1999).
109. Some readers may wonder about a different possibility - namely that the govern
ment uses this Y2K legislation to clamp down on speech even after January 1, 2000 despite
the passing of the justification for the legislation, and a suit challenging the legislation
reaches a court in 2000 (or thereafter). Insofar as the court relied on a legislative finding (in
1999) of a then-current harm, wouldn't this also be a case of the predictive element of a cur
rent fact no longer being valid, and yet being treated as a current fact? The answer to that
question is yes, insofar as a court relied on that finding. But, as I discussed at some length in
Benjamin, supra note 108, it is troubling for a court - including an appellate court - to rely
upon outdated findings. If a party brings forward strong evidence indicating that a finding is
no longer valid in a case involving prospective relief, a court should reconsider that finding,
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This is not necessarily the only potential example. The problem is
that we are trying to determine how often a problem will go away just
as quickly without legislation as with it; and once the legislation is im
plemented, we will never know what would have happened without
the legislation. But it seems likely that the frequency of such sponta
neous dissipation on the same schedule with or without effective leg
islation is fairly small (unless we believe that most legislation is super
fluous - and the massive costs of lobbying for those backing proposed
legislation would seem to indicate otherwise).
Predictive harms, meanwhile, contain the same predictions as cur
rent harms (namely, that the relevant harm will not go away without
legislation as quickly and fully as it would with effective legislation)
plus the further prediction that the harm will arise in the first place.
That is, rather than assuming only that an existing harm will not be
subject to the same speed and extent of diminution on its own, the
legislation assumes that a harm that has not yet managed to arise un
der the existing legal regime will do so and that the harm will not be
subject to the same speed and extent of diminution on its own. This
additional predictive element seems to significantly increase the un
certainty. To put the point a bit differently, our only prediction with
respect to an existing harm is that effective legislation could shorten or
diminish its reign of terror (vis-a-vis its duration and severity absent
legislation). With predictive harms, we must not only predict that, but
also that a harm that does not currently exist will arise in the first
place - a prediction about which we are likely to have much less con
fidence.
One way of looking at this issue is to ask whether we would care,
in a case involving declaratory and/or injunctive relief, if the proffered
harm that formed the basis of the injunction had never actually oc
curred. We would care, because the absence of the occurrence of the
harm would deprive us of confidence that the harm would ever arise.
If, on the other hand, the harm had occurred, then we would have ex
istence proof that the harm was not just a nice theory but instead was
a real concern. In both cases, we would be dealing in probabilities the probability of an existing harm continuing to exist versus the prob
ability of a harm that had never existed coming into existence - but
the differences in those probabilities would be quite great.
There is also a different distinction between what I am calling cur
rent and predictive harms. As I mentioned above, the predictive ele
ment in current harms is an unavoidable aspect of the legislative (and
judicial) process. Whenever a legislature acts on a harm, the legisla
ture implicitly or explicitly assumes that the harm will exist without
rather than simply rely on it. See id. at 314-27. Accordingly, the relevant final date for the
predictive element of a finding of current harm is not the date on which the legislation is
passed, but rather the date on which the final appellate court issues its final ruling.
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the legislation longer than it will exist with the legislation. No matter
how long the legislature waits before it acts, and no matter how long a
court deliberates before it issues its opinion, there is no getting around
this predictive element of legislation. What I am calling predictive
harms, however, stand on a different footing. Legislating before a
harm appears is not inherent in the legislative process and is avoid
able.
This brings us back to the three basic legislative predictions with
which I began this discussion - that the legislation will achieve its
goals, that it will not adversely affect other rights, and that a less re
strictive alternative would not do a better job. How, if at all, are they
different from predictive harms?110
With respect to the other predictions entailed in legislation, de
laying11 1 implementation of the legislation will not give us any addi
tional information: the predictions either never will be borne out (the
hypothetical prognostications about the effects of alternate forms of
legislation), or they will be borne out only once the legislation goes
into effect. With respect to predicted harms, however, there is a way
that we can test the predictions to see if they are accurate, but such
testing requires that the legislation not go into effect. Once the legisla
tion is implemented, we cannot know whether the harm would actu
ally have arisen. Thus, we can gain greater information about the ex
tent of the harms, and we can do so through delaying implementation.
This, in turn, highlights the way that a prediction of harm is a
linchpin for other determinations. If the legislation goes into effect be
fore a harm arises, and the harm does not arise, there are two possible
explanations: first, the harm would have arisen, but the legislation
prevented that harm; or, second, the harm would never have arisen,
and therefore the legislation's effectiveness is unclear. The first see-

110. One might be tempted to answer that one difference is that predictive harms are a
necessary precondition to a legislature validly legislating in the first place. If there is no pos
sible harm, then there is nothing to which the legislature need respond. It is true that we do
not even get to the question of the effectiveness of legislation or of possible alternatives if
there is no cognizable harm to be addressed via legislation. The existence of a harm is a pre
requisite for these other considerations, not only as a matter of the formulation of the judi
cial tests (which begin by asking what harm the legislature is responding to), but more im
portantly as a matter of logic; the effectiveness of legislation presumes that there is
something appropriate to legislate about in the first place.
This distinction is of quite limited significance, however. Although the existence of a
harm is logically prior to the existence (and therefore effectiveness) of legislation, all of
these elements (a harm, effective legislation, tailoring, and the absence of less intrusive al
ternatives) are necessary preconditions to valid legislation that infringes upon free speech
rights. One may come before the others, but all are ultimately necessary. Thus one could
also say that the direct alleviation of a harm is also a sine qua non of legislation, a hurdle
every bit as significant as the requirement of a harm in the first place.
111. We should see invalidation of legislation as delaying its implementation, because
courts should revisit their old opinions when the facts change - here, when the predicted
harms actually arise. See infra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
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nario would vindicate both the prediction of harm and the prediction
that the legislation would alleviate that harm. The second scenario
would demonstrate the falsity of the prediction of harm and tell us
nothing about the effectiveness of the legislation. But we could never
know which scenario was the accurate picture.112 Thus, allowing the
legislation to go into effect before a harm arises also deprives us of an
ability to judge another crucial element of the legislation - namely,
whether it actually alleviates the relevant harm.
V.

A PRESUMPTION AGAINST PREDICTIVE HARMS

The previous sections indicate that predictive harms are different
from other kinds of predictions, and from current harms, most notably
in that they are avoidable in the legislative context in ways that other
findings are not. But that still leaves the question of the circumstances
under which we should avoid them; just because they are avoidable
does not mean that avoidance is necessarily the right course.
We can posit a basic answer to that question: we should avoid reli
ance on predicted harms (i.e., wait until they become actual harms)
where the expected value of such avoidance is greater than the ex
pected value of waiting.113 Of course, it is difficult to draw that line, but
that is always the case in constitutional law, in light of the incommen
surabilities. The real problem is that this answer is at such a high level
of generality that it is not terribly useful. Thus the question is how we
flesh out that calculus.

112. An old joke involves a person chanting in the middle of New York City. A passerby
asks the chanter why he is chanting. He replies: "To protect New York from the Bengal ti
gers" (or some other species not found in New York). The passerby says: "But there are no
Bengal tigers in New York." To which the chanter replies: "See? My chants are working."
113. We can put the calculus in equation form. Indeed, Judge Posner has suggested an
equation that would apply to First Amendment issues more generally. His is a modification
of the familiar B<P x L formula (where B is the burden, or cost, of the regulation, P is the
probability of the harm that the regulation is intended to avoid, and L is the magnitude of
that harm). He separates B into two components - V (for "value"), the social loss from
suppressing valuable information, and E (for "error"), the cost of error. Meanwhile, he dis
counts L to present value, because the harm from allowing the relevant speech may not be
incurred for several years. "With these adjustments, the . . . formula becomes V + E less than
P x L/(1 + i)", where n is the number of periods between the utterance of the speech and the
resulting harm and i is an interest or discount rate which translates a future dollar of social
cost into a present dollar." Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1986); see also John E. Lopatka & Michael G. Vita, The Must
Carry Decisions: Bad Law, Bad Economics, 6 SUP. Cr. ECON. REV. 61, 86-87 (1998). This
equation is interesting, but it is not clear that it advances our inquiry beyond the verbal for
mulation offered in text. Ultimately, we are measuring the costs (to First Amendment inter
sets) of enforcing a statute immediately versus the costs (in the forms of cognizable harms)
of waiting. The equation may give a false sense of precision, because these two sets of con
siderations are not really commensurate.
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A. Which Harms?
We can begin with a basic question: For what sort of harms might
there be a value to waiting? The obvious answer is harms for which we
do not have sufficient information now but likely will later. That is, we
should treat as a separate category harms that are predictive but veri
fiable/falsifiable.
The first issue is whether a harm has already arisen that would jus
tify this legislation. A harm is predictive if we have not reached what
ever level of injury we ordinarily require in order to say that a cogni
zable harm exists in nonpredictive contexts. In the examples from
Section II, the problem was that there was no basis for saying that the
absence of must-carry, or the absence of a broadband "open access"
rule, had resulted in an important or substantial harm in the world at
the time of adjudication (or, in the case of broadband access, today).114
There is obviously no bright-line rule for determining when this
threshold is crossed. It is difficult to determine exactly where the tip
ping point lies, such that the existing injuries now constitute a cogni
zable harm, without reliance on future developments of worse injuries.
And of course there can always be further proof; we can have one
more study or analysis, which will add to our corpus of knowledge.
But at some point we have enough. Although we could add another
study, we feel that we have enough information to say that there are
current injuries flowing from the conduct covered by the regulation
that satisfy the relevant standard - "important," "compelling," etc.
These are thorny matters, but they are the sort of legal determinations
that courts make all the time; courts look at the evidence of injury to
determine whether it justifies the relevant piece of legislation.115 In
fact, that is a core legal issue that all courts address in every case. So,
though determining exactly when a harm exists is difficult, it is nothing
new.
If there is not sufficient evidence of a current harm, then the harm
is predictive. But waiting still does not make sense if we will also lack
sufficient evidence in the future. Thus a second, related, element is
whether or not it is the sort of harm that is verifiable/falsifiable, and
therefore for which more time will give us more information.116 In the
examples above, further experience with broadcast television, and
with ISPs, will tell us more about the degree to which they suffer from

114. See supra note 109.
1 15. Cf Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596-97 (1993) (discussing
the level of confidence needed to satisfy a court about the admissibility of a scientific asser
tion).
116. Cf. KARL R. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. rev. 1989) (emphasizing the importance of the "falsifi
ability, or refutability, or testability" of a system).
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cable television and cable modems, respectively. There is, in other
words, a benefit to waiting in terms of additional information and thus
proof of harm.
But that will not always be the case. For some assertions, it is hard
to imagine what new evidence could prove. An example would be the
assertion that "exposure to religion helps children." The problem is
that many things - here, the development of children - are so over
determined that we can have little confidence that we can ever satis
factorily separate out a factor. We could imagine studies that might
give us useful information, but the confidence level created by these
studies still would probably be fairly low. One way of looking at this is
that these "predictive harms" bleed into policy and legal judgments.
We could try to come up with some evidence to demonstrate whether
prolonged exposure to television programming makes for a politically
inactive citizenry, and studies could add texture to our judgments and
thereby enhance our ability to answer the question, but ultimately this
seems like the sort of zeitgeist judgment that is not meaningfully prov
able.117 As a result, even though this may be a "predictive harm" in the
literal sense of the words, it is also a harm for which no more proof
will be coming, so there is no point in waiting. It may be - and assur
edly will be - difficult to determine whether the harm actually exists,
but the harm is not predictive in the sense that predictions ordinarily
can be tested and thus can await confirmation or disproof. Additional
time gives us nothing, so the underlying concern about "predictive
harms" - namely, that they are precipitous because they await clarifi
cation - does not obtain.
On the other hand, some assertions seem eminently provable. Will
DVD players displace VHS players? Admittedly, we may never
achieve certainty on this question, but, with more information, we
could answer the question with enough evidence of displacement that
it would be sufficient to satisfy our threshold for what constitutes a
cognizable harm.118 Although it is virtually impossible to categorically
rule out an alternative explanation for any phenomenon, we can reach
an answer with a sufficient level of probability to leave us confident in
the answer.119 With harms that deal with the shape of industries or the

1 17. See, e.g., GEORGE COMSTOCK, THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN TELEVISION 9
(1989) (noting that "there are . . . some questions that are difficult or impossible to confront

directly in any sound way by available methods and techniques").
1 18. See generally Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Proc
ess, 107 YALE L.J. 1535 (1998).
1 19. See Barry L. Shapiro & Marc S. Klein, Epidemiology in the Courtroom: Anatomy of
an Intellectual Embarrassment, in 1 PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY 87, 98 (Stanley A. Edlavitch
ed., 1989) ("Both science and law seek to determine what probably occurred based on all of
the relevant evidence . . . . When that degree of conviction has been reached, we are pre
pared to say that a hypothesis has been 'proven.' " ).
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absorption of new technologies, our knowledge ex post will be much
greater than our knowledge ex ante.120
As with the issue of when current injuries are sufficient, this ques
tion of provability involves a matter of line-drawing, with the usual
difficulties that line-drawing presents at the margins. Just as there is a
continuum of harms, but at some point a court must determine
whether there is sufficient harm to justify a piece of legislation, so too
there is a continuum of verifiability, but at some point a court must de
termine whether a particular prediction is verifiable or not. (And, in
fact, this is exactly the sort of determination that the Supreme Court
directed courts to make, and that courts as a result routinely make, in
deciding whether to admit proffered scientific testimony.121) Both de
terminations are difficult, but both seem necessary in identifying a
category of harms for which waiting for further developments might
be appropriate.122
B.

Costs ofRelying on Predictive Harms

That still leaves the question, though, of what sort of benefit there
may be to waiting (or, if you prefer, the cost of considering legislation

120. See Developments in the Law - The Law of Cyberspace, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1575,
1656 (1999) (arguing that lawmakers should adopt a "wait-and-see" strategy regarding
regulatory restraints on rights-management technologies, because we will know more about
the potential harms of such technologies after they are developed).
This distinction maps unevenly onto the most famous distinction between facts, namely
the legislative/adjudicative fact distinction. Legislative facts "do not usually concern the im
mediate parties but are the general facts which help the tribunal decide questions of law and
policy and discretion," whereas adjudicative facts are those "pertaining to the parties and
their businesses and activities." 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE
§ 12:3, at 413 (2d ed. 1979); see also FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee's note ("Adjudi
cative facts are simply the facts of the particular case. Legislative facts, on the other hand,
are those which have relevance to legal reasoning and the lawmaking process, whether in the
formulation of a legal principle or ruling by a judge or court or in the enactment of a legisla
tive body."). Adjudicative facts will almost always be provable. The examples in the text,
however, would probably be better understood as legislative facts (although this is far from
clear, and in fact highlights the difficulties in application of the legislative/adjudicative dis
tinction). Once one moves beyond paradigmatic examples there is wide disagreement even between Kenneth Davis, who originated the distinction, and the Reporter for the Fed
eral Rules of Evidence, vyho adopted the distinction for Rule 201. See 21 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5103 (2d
ed. 1987). What I am talking about arguably are "legislative facts" in the sense that they of
ten will extend beyond a specific course of action between parties. But insofar as some treat
the term "legislative facts" as focusing on facts that are really unprovable policy judgments,
such a category would not include what I am calling predictive harms.
121. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) (stating that "a
key question to be answered in determining whether a theory or technique is scientific
knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be whether it can be (and has been) tested").
122. This focus has some overlap with the concerns that motivated Judge Posner in
Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1998), but he was focusing on the good
that empirical work could do. I am focusing on some less obvious ways that it might actually
be implemented.

November 2000]

Proactive Legislation

313

while the harm is speculative). When we are confronted with predic
tive but provable harms, why should we want to wait?

1.

Current Constitutional A bridgement Versus Potential Harm

We can begin by focusing on an obvious but important point: We
are positing a situation in which a statute currently infringes upon a
constitutional right in order to stave off a problem that may arise in
the future, and it is not necessary that such an imbalance exist. That is,
we are relying on a predictive harm in infringing upon a constitutional
right even though we could wait for the harm actually to arise. In light
of these considerations, a general proposal presents itself: we should
be warier about legislation premised on such predictive harms than we
are of legislation premised on existing ones.
Why the extra wariness? First, there is the problem of current
rights sacrificed for no good reason. Courts and commentators often
focus on the problems of legislatures acting in bad faith. A central rea
son why we worry about bad faith is that the legislature's findings
might be a false predictor. The presumption of regularity that we
might normally accord to legislative findings would seem inappropri
ate where we have reason to doubt the legislature's reliability. What if
legislative findings are a false predictor not because of bad faith but
instead because the future is unknowable and the legislature may be
Chicken Little? In such a situation, many of the same concerns should
arise for purposes of review of the legislation. We might be allowing
the legislature to infringe upon constitutional rights without an ade
quate basis for doing so.
Second, if we are going to treat predictive harms the same as cur
rent harms, we may create an incentive for quick action on the part of
a legislature desirous of a particular regulation whether or not the
harms that would satisfy a court (and that, presumably, should moti
vate the legislature) materialize. The legislators know that harms suf
ficient to satisfy a court may not arise, so they might act when they can
just rely on predictions. That is, a legislature that wanted to regulate
would do so when the harms were merely predictive, knowing that
nothing would be lost by doing so (because the review would be the
same) but something important might be gained - namely the consti
tutionality of legislation that might not end up being constitutional if
the legislature delayed and the harm never arose in the way that the
legislature feared/hoped.
This suggests that, when fundamental constitutional rights are in
the balance, the uncertainty of predictive harms should trouble us.
The point of heightened scrutiny is that courts should look carefully at
legislative determinations to see if the legislature is trammeling upon
constitutional interests without a good reason to do so. But where a
court makes that determination based on its predictions, or on its re-
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view of the legislature's predictions, it necessarily is speculating based
on incomplete information. Where constitutional rights are dear, we
should be wary about letting them be infringed based on skimpy in
formation, and therefore potentially invalid speculation.

2.

A voiding a Second-Best

But, one might respond, the implementation of heightened scru
tiny responds to this concern to some extent. Courts will examine
closely the basis for these speculations. Courts do not blindly defer to
the legislature when it makes these predictions. If the legislature does
not compile a substantial record in support of its predictions, courts
will review those predictions quite closely; if the legislature does com
pile such a record, the court is more likely to accord some deference to
the legislature's expertise but still will make sure that there is a strong
basis in the record for the legislature's determination.123 Either way,
the court is attempting to ensure that the prediction has significant in
dicia of reliability. Such careful review does not, of course, eliminate
the guesswork that is entailed by speculation, but it is a second-best.
The problem is that it is clearly second-best: no amount of ex ante
confidence-building measures will give us as much information as an
ex post determination of what actually happened. The best way to re
duce the uncertainty of predictions is to wait until events unfold such
that they are no longer predictions. Regularizing the prediction proc
ess will likely reduce errors, but they will still be predictions, often
with a substantial degree of uncertainty.
Fine, a reader of the foregoing might respond, we have reason to
be worried about uncertainty when constitutional rights are at stake.
Unfortunately, as this Article has noted, legislation is filled with such
predictions; if we tried to get rid of all of them, there would never be
any legislation at all.124 In particular, the only way we will be able to
test a prediction that legislation will achieve its goals is if the legisla
tion goes into effect, and we will never be able to test whether other,
hypothetical forms of regulation would have worked better. So the
"second-best" may be all that we are able to achieve without totally
upending the legislative process, and thus may be the best.
It is true that we can never eliminate predictions: some element of
speculation is unavoidable. But the role for predictions can be mini-

123. Turner II seems to create such a regime. See Ken Bamberger, Note, Deference to
Legislative Fact Determinations in First Amendment Cases After Turner Broadcasting, 111
HARV. L. REV. 2312 (1998).
124. If courts decided to strike down all legislation that was based on uncertainty, no
legislation would pass muster. If courts instead decided to uphold all legislation that was
based on uncertainty, then they would eviscerate judicial review.
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mized, and such minimization is preferable to the alternative of
heightened scrutiny of those predictions ex ante.
C.

Free Speech Considerations

Concerns about precipitous legislation are particularly great in the
First Amendment context. In light of the perceived centrality and fra
gility of free speech in a republic,125 courts have evinced a strong desire
to confine prospective limitations on speech.
We see this concern reflected in the dim judicial view of prior re
straints. Courts are quite hostile to prior restraints on speech, em
ploying a presumption against them and sharply distinguishing them
from post-publication penalties.126 A number of commentators have
addressed the question why we might prefer criminal prosecutions af
ter the fact to a policy of enjoining the speech activity beforehand.
Part of the answer may be the collateral bar rule, under which a per
son who violates an injunction can be held in contempt even if the in
junction was invalid.127 In an ordinary criminal prosecution, the defen
dant may assert the invalidity of the statute as a defense, but the
application of the collateral bar would eliminate that option.128 But
other considerations also play a role.129 In particular, commentators
and the Supreme Court have emphasized the greater knowledge that
one can have about the effects of publication after the fact.130 Because

125. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964);
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 73-104 (1980) (arguing that free speech is a
representation-reinforcing right that is central to democratic governance, and accordingly
such a right should be jealously protected from legislatures who might be acting without
proper regard for that role).
126. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 714-15 (1931) (striking
down prior restraint while noting the availability of post-publication penalties); Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (invalidating prior restraint and emphasizing
the difference between prior restraints and post-publication judgments).
127. See Stephen R. Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L. REV. 539, 55253 (1977).
128. Cf Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 315 (1967) (noting situations in
which the collateral bar rule would not apply, such as "where the injunction was transpar
ently invalid or had only a frivolous pretense to validity").
129. See DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 48-49 (1998); THOMAS I.
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 503-12 (1970).
130. In Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, the Supreme Court stated that:
The presumption against prior restraints is heavier - and the degree of protection broader
- than that against limits on expression imposed by criminal penalties. Behind the distinc
tion is a theory deeply etched in our law: a free society prefers to punish the few who abuse
rights of speech after they break the law than to throttle them and all others beforehand. It is
always difficult to know in advance what an individual will say, and the line between legiti
mate and illegitimate speech is often so finely drawn that the risks of freewheeling censor
ship are formidable.
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prior restraints are predictive in that no harm has yet occurred, prior
restraints present a danger of "adjudication in the abstract."131 Courts'
wariness about such restraints avoids precipitous action.
Concerns about future activity also motivate the overbreadth doc
trine, which is squarely focused on the future chilling effect of an en
actment. Ordinarily, an individual has no standing to litigate the rights
of third persons, and facial challenges will be successful only if all ap
plications of the statute would be invalid.132 The overbreadth doctrine
applies different rules in the First Amendment context. Even if a law
applies to both protected and unprotected speech, with the result that
some of its applications (i.e., to unprotected speech) are constitutional,
a litigant can bring a facial challenge to the statute.133 Furthermore,
even if the law is constitutionally applied in a particular case (and even
if the litigant could be regulated under a narrower law), a litigant will
be able to assert the rights of those against whom enforcement would
be unconstitutional.134 The upshot of the overbreadth doctrine is that
courts consider potential, rather than actual, infringements of free
speech rights, thus raising the specter of adjudication in the abstract
that troubles us in the prior restraint context.
The explanation for this seeming inconsistency is that we are
privileging future free speech rights over future limits on free speech.
We reject adjudication in the abstract in the prior restraint context be
cause allowing prior restraints would mean prospective limitations on
speech. We allow such adjudication in the overbreadth context be
cause the doctrine effectively restrains prospective limitations on
speech. In each case, we are looking into an uncertain future. The First
Amendment leads us to reach different conclusions about the propri
ety of possibly precipitous rulings, based on the understanding that
our preference in speculation should be in favor of free speech rights.
This importance of avoiding restrictions on free speech rights
arises in other areas as well. For instance, it is manifested in the notion
that even a temporary intrusion on First Amendment interests consti
tutes an irreparable injury. In Elrod v. Burns,135 the Supreme Court

420 U.S. 546, 558-59 (1975); see also Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory ofPrior Restraint: The
Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. 11, 49-54 (1981); cf Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role
of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53, 66-70 (1984)

(arguing that adjudication in the abstract can sometimes occur in criminal prosecutions after
publication).
131. Blasi, supra note 130, at 49.
132. See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960) (on third-party standing);
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953) (same); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739
(1987) (on facial challenges).
133. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
134. See Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987).
135. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
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held that a preliminary injunction would be appropriate where "First
Amendment interests were . . . threatened . . . at the time relief was
sought [because the] loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even
minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable in
jury. "136 Also relevant is the Supreme Court's emphasis on factual ac
curacy in considering the constitutionality of laws that restrict First
Amendment interests. First Amendment jurisprudence is heavily fact
based, relying on the actual impact of speech, and speech regulation,
on people and institutions.137 In light of this fact-specificity, courts
have emphasized the importance of accuracy in factfinding and, relat
edly, independent appellate review of facts in a variety of contexts.138
As I noted above,139 the Supreme Court has struggled with the ap
plication of these principles to legislative findings of fact, sometimes
deferring, sometimes exercising independent judgment, and some
times claiming to do both. The importance of accuracy and the avoid
ance of abstract adjudications might suggest a different approach,
however: awaiting real evidence of harm where waiting may produce
more information and thus avoid a guessing game about the existence
of any injuries.140 Reliance on predictive but provable harms would

136. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 373.
137. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, Inc., 515 U.S. 557,
567 (1995) ("[T]he reaches of the First Amendment are ultimately defined by the facts it is
held to embrace . . . . "); Benjamin, supra note 108, at 273-75; Bamberger, Note, supra note
123.
138. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 505 (1984) (applying
independent review of lower court factual findings, in order "to be sure that the speech in
question actually falls within the unprotected category and to confine the perimeters of any
unprotected category within acceptably narrow limits"); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964) ("This Court's duty is not limited to the elaboration of constitu
tional principles; we must also in proper cases review the evidence to make certain that those
principles have been constitutionally applied. This is such a case, particularly since the ques
tion is one of alleged trespass across 'the line between speech unconditionally guaranteed
and speech which may legitimately be regulated.' Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525. In
cases where that line must be drawn, the rule is that we 'examine for ourselves the state
ments in issue and the circumstances under which they were made to see . . . whether they
are of a character which the principles of the First Amendment, as adopted by the Due Pro
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, protect.' Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331,
335; see also One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371; Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S.
372. We must 'make an independent examination of the whole record,' Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235, so as to assure ourselves that the judgment does not constitute a
forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.'' (ellipses in original)).
139. See supra Part III.
140. Arguably, this is consistent with City of Boerne v. Flores 521 U.S. 507 (1997), and
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S.
627 (1999). In those cases, the Court found that Congress had failed to put forward evidence
that would justify its reliance on section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The same problem

would exist here: Congress would have legislated without a sufficient factual background for
doing so. One way of understanding Boerne in particular is that Congress legislated precipi
tously; if Congress believed that interferences with religion were likely, it should have waited
for them to occur and then legislated. Just as the situation might have been different if Con-
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push our wary approach to existing harms to a presumption against
them. The principle, then, would be that in free speech cases where
evidence of harm is insufficient to support a piece of legislation but
could be made sufficient with additional information, it would be pre
sumptively inadequate to support the legislation. With more informa
tion, legislatures and courts could dramatically reduce their uncer
tainty and cross a threshold of sufficiency of information;141 and where
First Amendment interests are at issue, it seems incumbent upon them
that they do so.142
An important implication of this formulation bears emphasis: a ju
dicial decision to prohibit implementation of a statute based on the
statute's reliance on predictive harms should not prejudice a different
decision in the future once the harms arise.143 This goal could be
achieved by a court temporarily enjoining the relevant statute, with
the explicit understanding that it will adjudicate the issue finally if the
predicted harms actually arise.144 This approach seems unsatisfying,
gress had waited longer before passing RFRA, so, too, might it be different in the case of
predictions.
141. Minimizing uncertainty does not, of course, mean eliminating it. When we abstract
from the experience of several states in trying to figure out what would work in the nation,
we have some uncertainty that the same conditions will prevail there. When we try to figure
out the U.S. population, there is some guesswork. See, e.g. , Deborah Jones Merritt, Consti
tutional Fact And Theory: A Response to ChiefJudge Posner, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1287, 1293
n.25 (1999). But our movement (and presumption) should be toward reducing uncertainty.
And, more importantly, at some point courts will have enough information in hand to be
able to say that the current evidence supports the legislation. Such a decision is difficult to
make, because the amount of information will be on a continuum. See supra notes 114-116
and accompanying text. But there should be a presumption in favor of courts refusing to al
low implementation of legislation unless that quantum exists. Thus, we may never know to a
moral certainty, but at some point we have enough information to make a considered judg
ment; we could still gain more information, but at some point we cross the threshold be
tween not having enough information and having enough.
142. A reader might wonder whether this presumption is simply another way of saying
that we should apply strict scrutiny to legislation containing predictive harms. The major
flaw in this view is that the presumption involves only one part of the many elements of judi
cial scrutiny of a statute. All of the other ways that strict scrutiny applies (e.g., requiring a
compelling rather than substantial or important interest, requiring a greater degree of tai
loring) would not apply to cases of predictive harms (unless, of course, the legislation would
be subject to strict scrutiny even if the harms were not predictive). In addition, the fact that
there is a presumption against legislation based on predictive harms does not mean that the
weight of that presumption will be the same as it would be in the context of strict scrutiny.
The point of this section is that there should be a greater wariness about legislation based on
predictive harms, and that wariness translates into a reversal of the ordinary presumption in
favor of legislation; but that does not mean that the presumption will have the same force as
the presumption arising from the interference with fundamental rights that gives rise to strict
scrutiny. See also infra Part VILE.
143. A decision to uphold a statute that is based on predictive harms will effectively
prejudice any future developments, because we will never be able to know if the harm would
have developed. This is one of the reasons why delaying implementation of these statutes
makes sense in the first place.
144. For this proposal to work, the relevant court would have to be willing to consider
the new factual developments once they occurred - an updating process that courts, espe-
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though, because the harm may never arise, leaving the "temporary"
injunction in place into the indefinite (and, presumably, infinite) fu
ture without a judicial order or opinion. Temporary relief should be
just that, and it is problematic for it instead to become an indefinite
way station for matters on which courts do not want to slam the door.
Courts can achieve much the same result without distorting their pro
cedures, and therefore, more honestly, simply by adjudicating the mat
ter in the first instance and, if they invalidate the statute because the
harms are predictive but provable, doing so without prejudice to fu
ture litigation if the harms actually arise. This approach has a signifi
cant advantage in that it more explicitly allows the legislature to re
consider and modify its legislation if the harms do not emerge as the
legislature expected. Once the legislation is invalidated, the ball is
more clearly back in the legislature's court.
This approach might at first blush seem inconsistent with a notion
of precedent, but I believe, on the contrary, that it is commanded by
the notion of precedent. If the underlying facts change in a case in
volving prospective relief (including the invalidation of a statute), the
opinions that rest on those facts must be reconsidered.145 It seems in
tolerable to entrench a given result that is no longer supported by the
facts on the ground just because an earlier incarnation of that (or an
other) court, when faced with different facts, understandably came to
a different conclusion. We can call the second opinion an overruling of
the prior case, a reconsideration of it, a distinguishing of it, or anything
else that strikes our fancy, but the bottom line must be that the new
facts stimulate a fresh look at the statute. In the case of predictive
harms, therefore, the coming to fruition of the predicted facts would
clearly constitute such a change, so the appropriate treatment of such
a case is a new consideration of the matter.146 Such "springing constitu
tionality" raises tricky procedural issues, but they should be surcially appellate courts, might find discomfiting. I believe, however, that such updating is in
cumbent upon courts, even though it may be inconvenient. See Benjamin, supra note 108, at
369-71.
145. See id. at 276-80.
146. In a number of contexts the Supreme Court has endorsed the principle that
changes in underlying facts can produce a change in the legal rule that flows from those
facts. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992) (plurality opinion)
(suggesting that overruling can be appropriate when "facts have so changed, or come to be
seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification");
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938) ("Where the existence of a
rational basis for legislation whose constitutionality is attacked depends upon facts beyond
the sphere of judicial notice . . . the constitutionality of a statute predicated upon the exis
tence of a particular state of facts may be challenged by showing to the court that those facts
have ceased to exist."); Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. 765, 772 (1931) ("[A) police
regulation, although valid when made, may become, by reason of later events, arbitrary and
confiscatory in operation."). Unfortunately, the Court's actions have not been so clear, in
that it has never squarely reconsidered one of its cases on this basis. See Benjamin, supra
note 108, at 283-85.
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mountable.147 The result, then, is that an invalidation of a statute on
the grounds that it relies on predictive harms should only delay im
plementation of a statute until such time as the harm arises.
There is a related corollary proposition: just as the invalidation of a
statute relying on predictive harms should not prejudice the constitu
tionality of the statute once the harms arise, so too should it not limit
the legislature's ability to pass new legislation once the harm arises.
This point arises from Reno v. ACL U,148 the Internet indecency case.
In that case, the Supreme Court stated, as one of its reasons for sub
jecting Internet regulation to stricter scrutiny than broadcast regula
tion, that broadcast has a history of government regulation and has
been regulated since its inception, whereas the Internet has no compa
rable history of regulation.149 This creates a somewhat perverse incen
tive for legislatures - regulate a medium in its infancy or lose your
chance to regulate at all. This is particularly troubling when harms do
not currently exist and instead are predictive, as legislatures have an
added incentive to legislate precipitously even if they think that, all
other things being equal, waiting is the more prudent course; all other
things will not be equal if waiting means forfeiting the right to regu
late. Moreover, it puts added pressure on courts, in that striking down
a given enactment might prejudice a legislature's ability to pass a
similar enactment at a later date. Courts may feel obliged to approve
precipitous legislation, not because it is justified but because a con
trary ruling would limit the legislature's options for the future. Simply
stated, we must also abandon the suggestion in Reno v. ACL U that, if
the legislature fails to legislate, it may lose its opportunity to do so.
Waiting on the sidelines should not hurt the legislature. We simply
have to get rid of the notion that legislatures forbearing from legislat
ing creates any sort of a judicial presumption against future legislation.
VI. O VERCOMING THE PRESUMPTION
The discussion above suggests that there is a significant value to
waiting for provable predictive harms to come to fruition when First
Amendment interests are at issue. We have reason to distinguish such
harms from existing harms, and to treat the former with greater suspi
cion. Thus, assuming that courts defer to legislative findings of existing
harm and thereby presume their validity, the costs of allowing legisla
tion based on provable predictive harms should lead us to a different
stance, namely a presumption against legislative reliance on them.
147. See id. at 285-86.
148. 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (striking down statutory restrictions on the transmission of in
decency to minors and the display of patently offensive messages in a manner available to
minors).
149. Id. at 868-69.
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There remains, though, a crucial question: under what circumstances
might that presumption be overcome? To put the point differently,
under what circumstances might the expected value of relying on such
harms overcome the expected value of waiting?
An obvious answer, at a high level of generality, would be that the
presumption can be overcome if the costs of waiting for a harm to
arise are unusually high. That is, there may be situations in which the
cost of waiting is prohibitive, and arguably this changes the calculus.
What would make the costs of waiting particularly high? If, by the
time the harm comes to pass, the costs of legislating have increased
dramatically, or the benefits of legislating have decreased. What we
are worried about is that the changes will be extremely difficult, per
haps impossible, to repair, so that waiting for the harm to arise con
comitantly means waiting until it is too late for the legislature to act.
Even at that level of generality, the statement is contestable. A
skeptic might instead suggest that there should be an irrebuttable pre
sumption against legislation containing predictive harms. After all, the
fact that a harm may be unusually costly does not change the reality
that legislation is limiting constitutional interests where no current
harm exists. Costliness, in other words, does not change the imbalance
(between current infringements and future harms) that motivated the
rejection of predictive harms in the first place. At the same time,
though, it does dramatically affect the attractiveness of the proffered
alternative - namely, that the legislature simply enact the legislation
after the harm arises. The skeptic might persist, arguing that the fact
that a legislature might never be able to legislate to stop a problem
does not mean that we have to allow legislation at a time when we
otherwise would not.150 That is, even assuming that the problem is so
clearly irreparable that, once the harm exists, no satisfactory legisla
tion could be passed, we still might reply that this is the cost of having
a robust First Amendment, and that there are some things that a leg
islature simply will not be able to stop.
Such an approach would seem to make too much of the arguments
marshaled against legislation based on predictive harms. There may be
categories of legislation that are so troubling that we should impose an
insuperable hurdle against them. We might have that attitude, for in
stance, about legislation that prohibits people or parties from engaging
in core republican activities (such as political speech or voting) based
on their adherence to an unpopular political belief or religion. Perhaps
150. The Supreme Court has made a roughly analogous point in the context of standing
doctrine: there may be some situations in which no one has constitutional standing to chal
lenge a particular governmental action, so federal courts should not be swayed by the argu
ment that they should grant standing to the party with the most plausible standing claim in
order to ensure that the case gets heard. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the
War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974) ("The assumption that if respondents have no standing to sue,
no one would have standing, is not a reason to find standing.").
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our inference of an improper motive is so strong in such situations that
our presumption against the relevant legislation could not be over
come by any other factors. One could take the same attitude about
predictive harms; First Amendment absolutists might argue that pro
active speech regulation should fall into the same category, because
speech is simply too precious, and legislatures too craven, to allow for
regulation before a harm has occurred. But such a vision would need
to rely on arguments different from, and more sweeping than, those
put forward in this Article. Simply stated, we could be absolutists
about future harms, but that is a much higher standard to meet. The
free speech principles I discussed above support the proposition that
we should hesitate before allowing free speech rights to be infringed
based on a future harm, but they do not indicate that proactivity could
never be justified. After all, even in the context of an "ordinary" pre
sumption of invalidity under strict scrutiny, the presumption against
prohibited legislation can be overcome.151 Indeed, one of the justifica
tions for delay is that the legislation can be enacted later. If that is a
chimerical proposition (because the phenomenon would be suffi
ciently entrenched that it was irreparable), then one of the bases for
this Article's position would be negated.
A.

Two Guideposts

Assuming, then, that the costs of waiting are relevant, the question
is what level of costs should concern us. This obviously is a question of
degree, but we can begin with a couple of guideposts. First, we should
reject any definition of such costs that would find virtually all plausible
costs insufficient. Such a definition would turn our presumption
against legislation based on predictive harms into a de facto prohibi
tion, and that seems untenable for the reasons discussed above. Even
if relatively few situations would meet whatever threshold we adopt,
there should be some realistic level of costs that would, in fact, satisfy
it. The problem with this guidepost is that it does not eliminate many
formulations; we can concede the sufficiency of costs that would arise
in some situations (e.g., many people will be killed) - and thereby
avoid the problem of an irrebuttable presumption - without elimi
nating many formulations.
A second guidepost does more work. The correlative of the propo
sition detailed above is that we should reject any definition that would
find unacceptably high costs of waiting in virtually all plausible situa
tions. The problem here is that such a definition would negate the
point established thus far - that we should not as a matter of course
allow legislation based on predictive harms if it will abridge current
151. The Supreme Court has been at pains to make just this point in the context of racial
classifications. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995).
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First Amendment rights. If our definition of the costs of waiting in
cludes all realistic situations, then the presumption is meaningless. In
such a situation, we would simply be treating predictive harms the
same as current harms, and thus ignoring our concerns about the dan
gers presented by predictive harms.
This second proposition has greater significance, because some
formulations of costs of waiting would, indeed, apply to almost all
situations. For instance, one might point to the power of the present in
shaping the future. The argument would be that, once an event gets
going, it is harder to stop. This is the nature of momentum (or, if you
prefer, inertia). Thus, for example, one might be tempted to argue
that, once a set of events occur, the people and institutions who bene
fit from that occurrence have a vested interest in its continuation, and
may now (because of their income from these new developments)
have sufficient resources to successfully block any attempt at ending
the status quo. After the pattern (here, of no regulation) begins, it
takes on a force of its own - especially as the parties that lose this
fight will lose revenue and therefore clout on Capitol Hill. Striking
down attempts to regulate at time Tl, in other words, prejudices us
against regulation at time T2.
This is a serious consideration, but if we allow it to justify predic
tive legislation, then we are right back in the unsatisfying position
where we began - with legislatures having the ability to infringe upon
First Amendment interests even though nothing has yet happened that
would justify that legislation. The exception, in other words, would
swallow the rule.
The same is true of another possible cost of delaying implementa
tion of a statute - namely that, even if the legislature acts immedi
ately upon seeing the harm, there likely will be some slippage and thus
hardship for any people or entities who suffered the harm. Once again,
this is a serious concern. A rule that requires an existing harm does
impose some costs, and those costs may be borne by those who would
have benefited from an earlier implementation of the legislation. But
letting that overcome our presumption would gut it.
This statement may seem unsatisfactory; perhaps we should not
worry so much about the presumption being gutted. If there are any
costs to waiting, of whatever sort, why shouldn't those costs over
whelm the presumption, whether those costs arise only occasionally or
every time? There is of course no ineluctable rejoinder to this ques
tion; we are talking about the striking of a balance. But we should in
stead focus on the other side of the equation, on the fact that allowing
the legislation means we will lose the chance of finding out whether
the legislation was in fact justified. Upholding legislation based on
predictive harms entails the costs associated with allowing legislation
that potentially responds to no harms. Once the legislation is imple
mented, we will never know if the harms would have arisen, or if the
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legislation directly alleviated those harms. In light of the costs in terms
of freedom of speech, the economic costs associated with harms that
will exist for some short period of time - a length of time that can be
minimized by a vigilant legislature - seem to be outweighed.
These two guideposts still leave us with a wide range of costs. In
pursuing the inquiry a bit further, it makes sense to break down the
costs into two components: likelihood and severity. After all, with re
spect to any given development (here, a continuation of the status
quo), there are a host of possible outcomes, but some are more severe
than others, and some are more likely than others. In many instances,
the relationship is likely to be inverse. For instance, it is impossible to
rule out the possibility that, with respect to any given law, no matter
how trivial the law might seem to be, its invalidation would cause the
decline of the American polity into a state of utter chaos - the end of
the world as we know it. After all, the future is unknowable, and we
may be blissfully (but unfortunately) unaware that the invalidation of
a law prohibiting the sale of filled milk152 will produce a sudden and
immediate freak virus that will kill eighty percent of Americans in a
matter of days. Luckily, such an outcome seems exceedingly un
likely.153 On the other hand, the possibility that (to stick with the filled
milk example) some people will pay more for their milk is quite
likely,154 but the seriousness of the problem that this creates is fairly
low.
The difficulty, of course, is that some costs will not be dismissed so
easily, because their severity would be significant and their likelihood
seems nontrivial. Drawing a line is a tricky proposition, because the
potential costs are going to run the gamut. More specifically, the costs
are on a continuum, with no clear firebreaks. The problem, as occurs
so often in law, is that we have to determine when a trigger has been
tripped - which is, in this case, when the presumption flips. So even if
we wanted to have a sliding scale based on severity and likelihood, we
are confronted with a firebreak: When is the presumption overcome?
And this inquiry itself is imbedded in, and a major element of, a larger
on/off switch - namely, whether the legislation is constitutional or
unconstitutional. For better or worse, we have to draw a line at some
level of costs.

152. Cf United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (upholding legislation
prohibiting the shipment in interstate commerce of filled milk).
153. Or so the filled milk purveyors would have us believe.
154. That is, after all, the (often intended) result of prohibitions on certain kinds of
milk; those who are able to sell milk find that they can command a higher price for their
product because the supply has been reduced.
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Likelihood of Irreparable Harm

The one that strikes the balance well, in my view, would set the
threshold for severity at harms that would be extremely costly - so
costly that once such a harm appeared, it either could not be repaired
or could be repaired only through massive expenditures. The harm, in
other words, would combine severity and difficulty of reversal such
that it would be effectively irreparable substantial harm. As to prob
ability, such a harm would not have to be inevitable, but nor would a
small chance be sufficient. The trigger would be a likelihood of such
harm.155 The standard, then, would be that only if there were a likeli
hood of effectively irreparable substantial harm would the presump
tion against legislation based on predictive harms be overcome.
Where do I get this from, and where does it lead? It picks up on
one of the central standards for the granting of preliminary injunctive
relief - namely, whether the plaintiff will suffer an irreparable harm
if the injunction is not issued.156 The test for injunctive relief effectively
determines whether a given legal outcome will be imposed immedi
ately or will be delayed, and a roughly analogous inquiry seems ap
propriate here.157 Although the standard for preliminary injunctions
varies somewhat depending on the precise situation and the court, the
general approach is that, for an injunction to be appropriate, the
155. As I discussed above, there is a balance between likelihood and severity, and it
bears noting here that there may be some unusual cases in which the probability is substan
tial, but less than a likelihood, and the harm is extremely severe (e.g., the end of the world as
we know it). In such situations, the severity might be so great that it would seem appropriate
that the test outlined above be satisfied. In light of the probable rarity of such cases, how
ever, I will use the term "likelihood" as a convenient shorthand (as, I suspect, courts do as
well). See infra note 158.
156.

See

llA CHARLES ALAN WRIGIIT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 2948 (2d ed. 1995); see also id. § 2948.1, at 139 ("Perhaps the single most important prereq
uisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction is a demonstration that if it is not granted
the applicant is likely to suffer irreparable harm . . . . "). But cf. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE
DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 1 1 1-18 (1991) (arguing that courts have failed
to apply rigorously the requirement of irreparable injury).
157. The four traditional factors in the test for injunctive relief are instructive. They are:

(1) the significance of the threat of irreparable harm to plaintiff if the injunction is not
granted;
(2) the state of the balance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction
would inflict on the defendant;
(3) the probability that the plaintiff will succeed on the merits; and
(4) the public interest.
WRIGIIT ET AL., supra note 156, § 2948, at 133. The formulation I have proposed effectively
encompasses both of the first two factors, as they look at the harms to both sets of actors
(i.e., infringements upon First Amendment interests versus the harms of delaying implemen
tation of the statute) and the costs of each. Because the balance is so struck, it seems to en
compass the fourth factor as well; the "public interest" concern might be a separate consid
eration in most private lawsuits (where this test usually arises), but it is at the forefront here.
That leaves only the third factor, which has no real application to the situations addressed in
this Article.
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threatened harm should be substantial and irreparable. And, as to
probability, "[t)here must be a likelihood that irreparable harm will
occur. "158
The calculus involved in my proposed test for predictive harms
also arises frequently in a related First Amendment context, namely
prior restraints. There is a strong presumption that prior restraints are
invalid, but that presumption can be overcome if a grave and irrepara
ble injury seems inevitable absent the prior restraint.159 That is, there
158. Id. § 2948.1, at 153; see also id. § 2948.1, at 139 (stating that "(p]erhaps the single
most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction is a demonstration
that if it is not granted the applicant is likely to suffer irreparable harm"); City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 1 1 1 (1983) (emphasizing that injunctive relief requires "a
likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury") (internal quotations omitted);
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 531 (1987) (rejecting a request for in
junctive relief based on the fact that the alleged irreparable injury was not probable).
Environmental law provides a useful counterpoint. Some courts and commentators, em
phasizing the decades-long lag time between events taken today and future effects on the
environment, have suggested that some very serious environmental harms need not be likely
in order to be the basis of an injunction. See, e.g. , Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 24-25
(D.C. Cir. 1976); Gregory D. Fullem, Comment, The Precautionary Principle: Environmental
Protection in The Face of Scientific Uncertainty, 31 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 495 (1995); James
E. Hickey, Jr. & Vern R. Walker, Refining the Precautionary Principle in International Envi
ronmental Law, 14 VA . ENVT'L L.J. 423 (1995). This "precautionary principle" has its de
tractors. See generally Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53
WASH. & L EE L. REV. 851 (1996); Jonathan H. Adler, More Sorry than Safe: Assessing the
Precautionary Principle and the Proposed International Biosafety Protocol, 35 TEX . INT'L
L.J. 173 (2000). But assuming that this is a wise approach with respect to some environ
mental dangers, a different set of considerations seems applicable to the predictive harms on
which I am focusing. First, there is little reason to expect that the sort of harms on which I
am focusing - harms that are essentially economic - will have any significant lag time.
Second, even if environmental harms were indistinguishable from the ones on which this Ar
ticle focuses, there would still be reason to treat the two categories differently: because of
the applicability of the First Amendment to the speech regulations on which I am focusing,
our ordinary presumption in favor of legislation is flipped. The very uncertainty that leads
courts and commentators to err on the side of safety (i.e., environmental protection) should
similarly lead us, in the First Amendment context, to err on the side of protecting speech
interests.
That said, even in the context of speech regulation, there may be situations in which a
predictive harm is improbable but so severe that even running a relatively small risk is sim
ply too great a danger. As I noted in the text, courts state that they require likelihood of a
harm in the injunctive context. I strongly suspect, however, that they would apply a more
precautionary approach where the harm is extremely grave and thus would accept a merely
substantial chance; and I think such a principle is appropriate. Thus I (and I suspect the
courts) use the term "likelihood" even though a more accurate (but prolix) version might be
"likelihood except in unusual cases where a harm is particularly severe, in which case a sub
stantial chance might suffice."
159. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 569 (1976) (rejecting a prior
restraint because the probability of harm "was not demonstrated with the degree of certainty
our cases on prior restraint require"); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,
730 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting that a prior restraint is prohibited unless direct,
immediate, and irreparable harm to the nation or its people would result); id. at 726-27
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("(O]nly governmental allegation and proof that publication must
inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling
the safety of a transport already at sea can support even the issuance of an interim restrain
ing order."); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 733-34 (1931); In re King World
Prods., 898 F.2d 56, 59-60 (6th Cir. 1990); Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 619 F.2d 459, 476 (5th Cir.
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are some harms that are so likely (approaching certainty) and so great
and irreparable that even a prior restraint on them is permissible.160
This is an extraordinarily high hurdle, which reflects the aversion to
prior restraints.161 The aversion to predictive harms is similar in kind
but weaker in degree; the same sort of concerns motivate us, but our
fears will not be as great. Thus, the proposed standard of effective ir
reparability is a watered-down version of both halves (likelihood and
severity) of the threshold for permitting prior restraints.
What will this test entail? For one thing, it would involve a distinc
tion between harms based on their correctability. If the invalidation of
a piece of legislation is likely to be the proximate and but-for cause of
serious psychological or physical harms to a set of persons, repairing
them will be difficult, if not impossible. We can have no confidence
that future actions will undo, or truly compensate for, the harms that
individuals suffer. We can offer monetary compensation for such
harms, but that is a clear second-best. The loss of an arm, or the psy
chological cost inflicted by seeing one's parents murdered before one's
eyes, seems truly irreparable. A classic example would be the revela
tion of troop movements during a war.162 Another example would be
the revelation of the secrets to making a hydrogen bomb.163 (Note that,
with respect to this latter case in particular, once the knowledge has
been released it is too late to do anything about it or to mitigate the
harm.) This is information that is so potent, and so dangerous in the
wrong hands, that its dissemination will quite possibly directly harm
scores of people.

1980) (en bane) ("(A] prior restraint is only justified in exceptional circumstances and by a
showing of direct, immediate and irreparable harm.").
160. Somewhat similar considerations also arise in other First Amendment contexts.
See, e.g. , Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The question in every case is
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create
a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has
a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree."); see also Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("(W]e should be eternally vigilant
against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught
with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and
pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country."). In
the years since Justice Holmes issued his opinions in Schenck and Abrams, the Court has
brought more speech under the protection of the "clear and present danger" test, see, e.g. ,
Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. 539, and in the context of incitement has constructed even
higher hurdles to prosecution, see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding
that advocacy may be proscribed only where the relevant speech "is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action").
161. See, e.g. , Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 225 (6th Cir.
1996); TRIBE, supra note 18, § 12-36, at 1045-46 (noting the narrowness of the Supreme
Court's exceptions to the rules prohibiting prior restraints).
162. See Near, 283 U.S. at 716.
163. See United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 996 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
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We can contrast this with harms that are more straightforwardly
economic.164 In Turner, what if the must-carry statute had been invali
dated based on the Court's wariness about the prediction of broad
casters going out of business in appreciable numbers, and in the ensu
ing months the broadcasters had, indeed, gone out of business? If
Congress then passed the must-carry legislation again, it seems quite
likely that, soon after the legislation was passed, the broadcasters
would be back in business and back to the position that they formerly
occupied. Their absence from the airwaves for a matter of months
might have weakened their competitive position a bit, but the advan
tages conferred by must-carry would likely put them back in a strong
position (that is, after all, the point of must-carry). There might have
been some intervening changes in the ownership of the broadcasters
(except for the wise ones who believed that new legislation would be
passed and would now be upheld), but that would be a relatively small
consideration.
But what about the people who suffered stress from their pecuni
ary losses, or who lost their jobs (even if only temporarily) and suf
fered serious psychological damages as a result? These are potential
costs, but they have the same problem as the danger that delaying im
plementation will make future legislation harder to pass: these sorts of
potential harm will occur whenever there is any delay between the
arising of a harm and a legislature's response to it, and at least some
small delay seems inevitable. As a result, allowing these harms to
qualify would again have the effect of the exception swallowing the
rule.
The line is difficult to draw; it is hard to know when a harm be
comes sufficiently unusual and large that it avoids this problem of
overwhelming our presumption. In this way, it is somewhat analogous
to another difficult aspect of line-drawing, namely determining when
an activity substantially affects interstate commerce. In United States v.
Lopez ,165 Justice Breyer's dissent marshaled hundreds of sources indi
cating that guns in schools could affect interstate commerce.166 The
problem, as the majority opinion suggested, is that this reasoning
could be applied to almost any conceivable activity; but if nothing is
outside the interstate commerce power, then there are no limits on the
legislative power (and most of the remainder of Article I, Section 8
becomes surplusage).167 So, though it may be difficult to draw the line
164. Cf CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315 (1994) (Blackmun, J.) (finding that specula
tive economic harms were not sufficient to overcome the presumption against prior re
straints).
165. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
166. Id. at 631-44 (appendix to the opinion of Breyer, J., dissenting).
167. See id. at 567 ("To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to
pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional
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in determining exactly what affects interstate commerce, we can and
should reject any definition of interstate commerce that would en
compass essentially all legislation within it. This may seem analytically
backwards - we are rejecting a theory of commerce not because there
is no plausible commercial hook but because its effects seem undesir
able - but there is much to commend the approach. After all, a clever
lawyer can always say that " [f]or want of a nail the kingdom was
lost,"168 and soon we may find ourselves with an interpretation that
seems inconsistent with basic constitutional principles. So instead, we
conclude that, if we are to have any constraints on the legislative
power, we must reject theories of commerce that would sweep so
broadly. I am suggesting the same thing here; it will be difficult to
draw the lines, but any definition of "irreparable" harms that will be
universal sweeps too broadly.
That still leaves the question of when economic harms might be
sufficiently great as to meet this standard of irreparability. For many
economic injuries, putting the harmed parties in a position similar to
the one they would have been in if the legislation had been upheld at
time Tl, rather than time T2, would not seem to be too difficult; as
was discussed above, the must-carry regime is a good example. But
there may well be situations in which economic injuries become so en
trenched that they are effectively irreparable. The concern is often
couched in terms of network effects, or path dependence. The idea is
that some patterns, once established, become very difficult to displace.
Path dependence is thus the condition obtaining when initial devel
opments (e.g., how to design and control a network) will have a sig
nificant impact on later developments (e.g., how the network is used)
by rendering some otherwise attractive later developments unlikely
because of the cost of starting anew.169 Particular concern arises over

authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the
States.").
168. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE
SECOND CENTURY, 1888-1986, at 425 (1990) (discussing "for want of a nail" reasoning in the
context of commerce power). The entire rhyme is as follows:
For want of a nail, the shoe was lost,
For want of the shoe, the horse was lost,
For want of the horse, the rider was lost,
For want of the rider, the battle was lost,
For want of the battle, the kingdom was lost,
And all for the want of a horse-shoe nail!
MOTHER GOOSE'S NURSERY RHYMES 191 (Walter Jerrold ed., Alfred A. Knopf Inc. 1993)

(1903).
169. See Mark A. Lemley & D avid McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic
Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 488-500 (1998); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and
Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 643-62 (1996). Roe gives as an example of path de
pendence a winding trail that fur traders use through some woods (winding, in his example,
because of a wolves' den):
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the possibility of inefficient lock-in. If a company makes a superior
product and thus gains customers, the fact of it gaining those custom
ers will not cause us much concern without an assumption of lock-in.
After all, they may simply be gravitating toward the best product, with
the expectation that they will move to a better product from another
company once that becomes available. The fear involving network ef
fects, however, is that people or institutions will become "locked in" to
a particular approach, because they have invested in it and/or because
everyone else has invested in it, such that they will remain even
though the product or network is inferior to various alternativesY0
Everyone agrees that there can be path dependence (e.g., that where
the earliest travelers first cut a path may end up being the location of a
future road); there is less agreement, however, that a less efficient
path can be locked in via path dependence (e.g., where the road that
the earliest travelers laid is worse than the alternatives but nonetheless
gets accepted by everyone).171 Insofar as there can be inefficient lockTravelers continued to deepen and broaden the road even after the dangerous sites were
gone. Industry came and settled in the road's bends; housing developments went up that fit
the road and industry. Local civic promoters widened the path and paved it into a road suit
able for today's trucks.
It is time to resurface the road. Should today's authorities straighten it out at the same
time? They see no reason to raze the factories and housing developments that arose on the
path's bends and may not even bother to consider straightening it out. Today's road, de
pendent on the path taken by the trader decades ago, is not the one that the authorities
would lay down if they were choosing their road today. But society, having invested in the
path itself and in the resources alongside the path, is better off keeping the winding road on
its current path than paying to build another.
Roe, supra, at 643. In Roe's example, the path chosen seems less efficient than the alterna
tive (a straight road) would have been. The degree to which such inefficient Jock-in occurs is
a matter of some dispute, and it is not necessarily entailed by the concept of path depend
ence. Among a series of possibilities that might be similarly attractive in the abstract (e.g.,
should a road be built 100, 1000, or 10,000 feet north of the woods), an earlier decision (e.g.,
1000 feet) will render the other options less attractive.
170. See Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813,
817 (1998) ("Rather than systematic competition generating an efficient equilibrium solution
among various technologies, path dependence permits a technology that obtained an acci
dental advantage to become locked-in to an inefficient equilibrium.").
171. The prime example of inefficient lock-in has long been the traditional (QWERTY)
typewriter keyboard, which is thought to be a less efficient layout than others (notably, the
Dvorak system). Two researchers, however, have argued that the QWERTY keyboard lay
out is no less efficient (and that the tests putatively showing otherwise were polluted by
tester bias and inappropriate samples). More generally, they contend that path dependence
will rarely "lock in" significantly less efficient outcomes. See generally S.J. Liebowitz &
Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-in, and History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205
(1995); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1990); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy,
J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1994, at 133. Others contend that inefficient Jock-in may frequently
occur. See, e.g. , Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., An Antitrust Remedy for Monopoly Leveraging by
Electronic Networks, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 14-20 (1998). Perhaps the most commonly held
view is that inefficient lock-in can occur if the initial path is a bit less efficient, but that if the
initial path is much less efficient it will be jettisoned. See Roe, supra note 169, at 643-44
(noting that "[o]ccasionally, the path-dependent road becomes so costly that a society rips it
up and builds a new one"); James B. Speta, Tying, Essential Facilities, and Network Exter-
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in, however, it might well satisfy the standard of effective irreparabil
ity. That would seem to present a case where the costs of waiting are
particularly great. This evinces the difficulty of generalizing about pos
sible examples: we would need to look carefully at the potential dan
ger of lock-in and the costs that it might impose; in some cases, they
may be sufficient, and in other cases not.172 This highlights the ways
that the substantive line is hard to administer. But right now courts are
avoiding drawing it at all, and that is much worse.173
VII. WHAT ROLE SHOULD DEFERENCE PLAY?
The discussion thus far has elided an important question: How
should courts deal with situations in which the likelihood and severity
of a particular problem are contested, because the relevant court and
legislature disagree?
Deference is crucial here. If a court invalidates legislation based on
predictive harms unless those harms would likely be effectively irrepa
rable, but, in determining the likelihood of irreparability, defers to
legislative predictions of irreparable harm, then the shift advocated in
this Article may make relatively little difference. It would make some
difference, insofar as the relevant court required the legislature to
make that prediction, and insofar as the legislature took the require
ment of a finding seriously.174 A legislature acting in good faith would
have to confront the likelihood of irreparability, whereas the current
regime (as represented by Turner175) would not place any emphasis on
that consideration. The impact of this new consideration would denalities: A Comment on Piraino, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1277, 1279 (1999) (arguing that an infe
rior standard may become entrenched, "[b)ut these barriers are not insurmountable, and
proponents of new network standards have a variety of devices - such as initial, below-cost
pricing - to entice consumers to commit to a new network").

172. Lemley and McGowan highlight this difficulty in their article Legal Implications of
Network Economic Effects, supra note 169. They argue that the dangers posed by network
effects defy generalization and must be examined on a case-by-case basis in specific areas of
law and specific industries.
173. See United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950) ("We can never fore
cast with certainty; all prophecy is a guess, but the reliability of a guess decreases with the
length of the future which it seeks to penetrate. In application of such a standard courts may
strike a wrong balance; they may tolerate 'incitements' which they should forbid; they may
repress utterances they should allow; but that is a responsibility that they cannot avoid. Ab
dication is as much a failure of duty, as indifference is a failure to protect primal rights."); see
also Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Shielding Children, and Transcending Balancing,
1997 SUP. Cr. REV. 141, 149-67 (arguing that the Supreme Court in Reno v. A CLU, 521 U.S.
844 (1997), erroneously stated that equally effective less restrictive alternatives to the Com
munications Decency Act were available, and that the Court thereby ducked the important
question of how much of a reduction in effectiveness was compelled by application of the
First Amendment).
174. The possibility that the legislature would simply make such a finding in bad faith,
and in all cases, is discussed infra at notes 147-49.
175. See supra Part III.
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pend, however, on the degree to which the legislature took its duty se
riously. If the legislature acted in bad faith, the only significance of this
Article's proposal would be that courts would rubber-stamp a differ
ent unjustified legislative assertion (instead of a prediction of harm, a
prediction of irreparable harm). The discussion above, in other words,
does not change the fact that deference matters a great deal. So what
is the appropriate level of deference to legislative predictions of ir
reparability?
A. Institutional Competence
Questions about deference are not new, of course; they arise in a
variety of contexts. The most common, and widely accepted, way of
responding to them is to look to institutional competence.176 The idea
is to examine the type of decision at issue and the available institu
tions, and then determine which institution is better equipped to make
the decision. In the context of judicial review of a statute, if courts are
the better decisionmakers, then the court, on review, should decide
the issue, rather than defer to the legislature. On the other hand, if the
legislature is better positioned to make the decision, then the court
should defer to that legislative expertise.
This suggests a comparative analysis. Indeed, one of the key in
sights of recent scholarship on institutional competence is that it is not
terribly useful to focus on a single institution. Even if that institution
does not do a good job, perhaps it does a better job than any other in
stitution, and thus should be the relevant decisionmaker. An institu
tion's absolute weakness, in other words, is relatively unimportant;
what matters is its comparative strength or weakness.177 This Section
suggests a modification of that insight: comparative abilities are im
portant, but in some contexts the absolute competence is important as
well.

1.

Factfinding Capabilities

Other commentators have already discussed some of the advan
tages of legislatures and courts when it comes to factfinding. By and
large, courts have limited control over their dockets, and no ability to

176. See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, I MPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITU
TIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994); Christopher L. Eisgruber, The
Most Competent Branches, 83 GEO. L.J. 347 (1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. PITT. L.
REV. 691 (1987); Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amend
ment and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1045 (1985).
177. See, e.g., KOMESAR, supra note 176, at 3-7.
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initiate an inquiry into matters that interest them.178 Moreover, when
an issue does come before a court, the information coming to the court
is generally limited to that which interested persons and groups pro
vide.179 Legislatures, on the other hand, can choose to investigate mat
ters as they see fit, and they can invite comments from anyone that
they believe might have something of interest to present. Legislatures
can call on many different sources of information housed within the
legislative branch, such as committee staffs that specialize on a par
ticular set of issues and, at the federal level, standing research bodies
like the Congressional Research Service (a large research agency de
signed specifically to provide accurate research to members of Con
gress) and the Congressional Budget Office.180 In addition, legislatures
can choose to contact hordes of entities outside the legislative branch,
including think tanks and academic societies (not to mention advocacy
groups that collect information). And, of course, they can hear from
individuals and entities who might have valuable information. These
latter sets of groups are not obliged to respond absent a legislative
subpoena, but experience (and the vast number of entities that have
legislative liaison offices) suggests that they are only too willing. In
contrast, courts, as has been frequently noted and sometimes la
mented, have relatively few resources under their control.181 Not only
are the issues they will face controlled by the cases that individuals
happen to bring, but also the sources of information are similarly lim
ited. Judges' only standing army is a few law clerks, and the vast ma
jority of the information they receive is from self-selected interested
parties.182 Judges can seek information from disinterested parties,183
178. These statements - and indeed all the characterizations of courts in this discussion
- generally describe the litigation process; but these are generalizations only, and there are
some exceptions. For instance, judges have on occasion seized a more active role in shaping
the litigation before them. See generally MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN,
JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: How THE COURTS REFORMED
AMERICA'S PRISONS (1998).

179. See, e.g., DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 38-51 (1977);
Cornelius J. Peck, The Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48
MINN. L. REV. 265, 296-97 (1963).
180. See, e.g. , WALTER J. 0LESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY
PROCESS 59-60, 195, 275 (3d ed. 1989).
181. See Maurice Rosenberg, Anything Legislatures Can Do, Courts Can Do Better?, 62
AB.A. J. 587, 590 (1976); Frederick K. Beutel, Some Implications of Experimental Jurispru
dence, 48 HARV. L. REV. 169, 180-81 (1934).
182. See Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Lawmaking: A
Proposed Research Service for the Supreme Court, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1, 10-17 (1986).
183. Perhaps the best recent example is from the breast implant litigation. Judge Pointer
in Alabama convened a panel of four independent experts to evaluate the current evidence
regarding the causal connection between silicone and immune system disorder. See In re Sili
cone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., Master File No. CV 92-P-10000-S (N.D. Ala.
May 30, 1996) (order no. 31 establishing National Science Panel), available at http://www.fjc.
gov/BREIMLIT/ORDERS/orders.htm; id. (N.D. Ala. June 13, 1996) (order no. 31B con
firming appointment of National Science Panel), available at http://www.fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/
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but such procedures are ad hoc and, in part for that reason, fairly
cumbersome.
These considerations have led some commentators to suggest that,
for instance, legislatures have a greater capability to make findings on
broad, contested issues of fact.184 Legislatures can draw on the exper
tise of their many research supports to canvass the experts they deem
appropriate, and thus end up with a better chance of receiving views
from a wide and representative range of expert opinion. Courts, on the
other hand, are more likely to hear from the fringes - the experts that
each side chooses. After all, experts who testify at trial are chosen by
the parties. It stands to reason that one important criterion in the par
ties' choices would be the degree to which the expert would back up
the parties' contentions; and, all other things being equal, the more
skewed the expert's position toward the hiring party, the better. So
courts' information is likely to be from the ends of the bell curve,
rather than the middle, and this may lead to a weaker ability to find
broad scientific facts.185 Courts, on the other hand, might be thought to
do a better job on narrower findings. Judicial procedures, particularly
those that allow for direct and cross examination, might give courts an
advantage in teasing out specific facts. Witnesses are on the spot in a
way that they usually are not in a legislative hearing, and perhaps in
formation that they divulge will therefore be more revealing.186
This does not end the analysis in ordinary cases, of course, because
the question is whether legislatures' putative greater ability to find
broad facts is overcome by factors that may cloud its vision to the ex
tent that courts, even with admittedly fewer, and weaker, resources,
may produce better factfinding. One of the central insights of public
choice theory is that the performance of an institution often does not
match its potential competence. 1 87 Members of institutions may pursue
their own interests, and those of the institution, rather than a recog
nizable version of the "public interest," with the result that we may
have less confidence in their actual undertakings than we do in their

ORDERS/orders.htm; Thomas M. Burton, Top Judge in Breast-Implant Case Calls on Doc
tors to Hear Evidence, WALL ST. J., July 22, 1997, at B6; see also Hall v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Or. 1996) (granting a motion to exclude testimony of plaintiff's
expert witnesses after considering the findings of an appointed panel of independent experts
from several different scientific disciplines).
184. See, e.g. , HOROWITZ, supra note 179, at 33-56, 294-98.
185. See generally Wendy E. Wagner, Congress, Science, and Environmental Policy,
1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 181.
186. See FRANCIS L. WELLMAN, THE ART OF CROSS-EXAMINATION 204-06 (4th ed.
1936).
187. See DENNIS MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 1 (1989) (defining public choice as "the
economic study of nonmarket decision making, or simply the application of economics to
political science").
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theoretical abilities.188 This is a familiar debate, and I will not replay it
here.189 Suffice it to say that the issue revolves around the question
whether features of the legislative process such as the democratic re
sponsiveness entailed in elections make legislators subject to capture
by powerful groups that serve their members' interests, and whether
courts are likely to be as clouded by their own institutional interests.190
The fear is that, though legislators have the resources to enable them
to answer a factual question accurately, they will in fact seek a politi
cally expedient or personally remunerative finding, rather than an ac
curate one, thus rendering any advantage in ability valueless in terms
of the outcome of their decision.191 Judges, meanwhile, do not depend
on any constituencies for their continued employment and are thought
to focus more directly on the right question - namely, whether a
finding is in fact accurate.192
188. See, e.g., William F. Shughart II, Public-Choice Theory and Antitrust Policy, in THE
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST: THE PUBLIC-CHOICE PERSPECTIVE 7, 9
(Fred S. McChesney & William F. Shughart II eds., 1995) ("The model of public choice in
sists that the same rational, self-interest-seeking motives that animates human action in or
dinary markets be applied to decision making in the public sector as well. The assumption
that all individuals, in or out of government, pursue their own self-interests is the fundamen
tal tenet of public choice.").
189. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC
CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991); JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON
TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962) (arguing that legislative decisionmakers act
in their own self interest and discussing the legislative acts that result).
190. See generally R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
(1990); Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Re
view?, 101 YALE L.J. 31 (1991).
191. See generally JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS (1973) (utilizing
public choice assumptions about legislative self-interest to develop a systematic account of
legislatures' actions); MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATURES: A THEORY OF
POLITICAL MARKETS (1981) (same).
192. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 520-21 (4th ed. 1992)
(noting the value of judges' "aloof disinterest" in the outcome of cases). This does not neces
sarily mean that judges are insulated from their private interests so much as that their pri
vate interests may more closely comport with public interests. Assuming, for example, that
their private interest is in their reputation and esteem among their colleagues and litigants,
those interests might be fairly closely aligned with the public interest. See Robert D . Cooter,
The Objectives of Private and Public Judges, 41 PUB. CHOICE 107, 129 (1983) (suggesting
that judges tend to seek to maximize their prestige among litigants).
Of course some would say that the insulation of the courts from democratic constraints
renders their judgments more suspect, and others would dispute that they are insulated from
the democratic process in the first place. Although a full discussion of these issues is beyond
the scope of this Article, perhaps a brief note is in order. As to the former point, the coun
ter-majoritarian difficulty might legitimately raise concerns about the role of courts in in
validating democratically enacted legislation (although, as Matt Adler points out, the
"democratic process" is not as democratic as this vision seems to assume, see Matthew D.
Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond the Countermajoritarian Diffi
culty, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 759 (1997)), but here I am focusing on the narrower question of
who is likely to find facts more accurately, on the assumption that in at least some cases judi
cial invalidation of legislation is permissible. As to the suggestion that judges are not as in
sulated as we may believe: that may be true, but the point is a comparative one, and it seems
clear that federal judges are less subject to the constraints of the ballot box (and the fund.

336

Michigan Law Review

2.

(Vol. 99:281

Beyond Factfinding

This analysis is useful for my purposes but incomplete. Factfinding
is valuable for making predictions, but it is hardly sufficient. Predictive
harms are not simply a matter of gathering facts; one must attempt to
move from what we currently know into a guess about future events.
These are not findings so much as forecasts. The situation is further
complicated by what is required of these predictions. Remember that
it is not enough for the legislature to say, for instance, that a competi
tor will be harmed. Rather, the legislature must point to a harm that
rises to the level of "important" or "substantial" - a harm to the pub
lic interest (usually to competition).193 Furthermore, it must then find
that the cost of waiting will be particularly high (i.e., that the harm will
be effectively irreparable). These are akin to the sort of projections of
economic developments that we associate with antitrust law, where
economic theories loom large. The predictions are best understood as
applied economic theory/market forecasting: Will, for instance, the
power of cable television lead to broadcast networks being squeezed
out of the market? If so, will the broadcasters suffer irreparable harm?
In answering those questions, a supple understanding of the facts on
the ground is probably necessary, but it will not get you very far with
out an economic theory behind it. (Once it occurs, then you can more
easily argue that the validity of the premises has been established.) We
are asking not only for predictions, but for predictions in the form of
economic theory.
So who is likely to be better at these predictions, legislatures or
courts? We could start with familiarity, on the theory that an entity
that routinely makes such predictions is likely to hone its techniques
and thereby do a better job than an entity that rarely makes such pre
dictions. At first blush, this might seem to give the edge to legislatures.
After all, predictions of serious harm should be, and with any luck are,
central to any legislative decision to act in the first place. Admittedly,
legislatures might not routinely make predictions of irreparable harm,
but they are in the business of making predictions more generally. The
problem with this reasoning is that courts make these sorts of predic
tions all the time, as well. In deciding whether or not to grant tempo
rary relief to one party or another, courts utilize a balancing test a
critical element of which is the likelihood that either party will suffer
irreparable harm during the pendency of the case.194 Courts make this
raising and politicking imperatives that it entails) than are legislators. I should note, how
ever, that the point has more power in states where judges run for election; although such
races usually are not as blatantly political as legislative elections, the position of judges is
much closer to that of legislators in jurisdictions with regular, contested judicial elections.
193. See supra text following note 28.
194. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
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determination quite frequently - whenever injunctive relief is re
quested - and it is quite similar to the sort of prediction on which this
Article focuses. This test is also used specifically in the First Amend
ment context. Prior restraints on the publication of First Amendment
material are disfavored in the law, but the presumption against prior
restraints can be overcome if there is a showing of irreparable harm.195
The threshold in prior restraint cases may be extraordinarily high, but
the underlying predictive question is the same - how much harm will
occur if the speech is allowed to continue.
When we move beyond familiarity to look more directly at what
makes for a good prediction and therefore who will do it better, we
come to an immediate difficulty: we do not know what makes for ac
curate predictions of this sort. A determination about relative accu
racy (i.e., whether courts or legislatures will do a better job of pre
dicting) is thus undercut by the more serious problem that we can
have little confidence about absolute accuracy. We might reasonably
guess that the people or institutions who are likely to be the most ac
curate in predicting irreparable harm are those who have a solid grasp
of historical and current facts, a supple understanding of the theories
and developments that might help to identify future trends, and the
intelligence to pick out the important elements and combine them into
a powerful prediction. This would give us reason to prefer that a given
entity engage in factfinding (which, as I noted above, seems to be a
sine qua non) , have access to important research and theories, and be
filled with intelligent members. That sounds wonderful, but it is stated
at such a high level of generality that it does not get us very far. Both
legislatures and courts engage in factfinding, have access to research
and theoretical developments, and claim to be populated with rela
tively intelligent people.196 We could try to be more specific - say, by
looking to who has the best database on particular historical trends but that requires a set of assumptions that amount to little more than
guesswork (here, that those historical trends are good predictors of the
future). It is difficult to have confidence that any particular formula
for predictions (other than the very general one listed above) makes
for accuracy.
Predictions are never a matter of simply extrapolating from past
events, because too many variables can lead to changes in future be
havior. This problem is likely to be particularly acute in fields in which
195. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
196. I am not aware of any serious studies comparing the intelligence of legislators and
judges, but I suspect that many Americans, and many readers, have their own sense of the
answer to this question, albeit one based in most cases on anecdotal evidence and potentially
clouded by bias. Cf. Frank B. Cross, Institutions and the Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 1529, 1537-45 (2000) (arguing that judges, like legislators, are chosen for
political and ideological reasons, and that there is little basis for assuming that the former
are better equipped to engage in constitutional analysis than the latter).
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the predictive harms will arise - developing areas like telecommuni
cations and the Internet that combine human interactions with future
technological change. Forecasting human patterns in a stable field is
difficult enough, but forecasting the future development of techno
logical innovation and absorption by those humans makes ordinary
human interactions seem easy by comparison. In such circumstances,
there may not be much of a track record on which we can draw, and
past events may tell us less than we hope about the future.197
Research on the accuracy of predictions bears this out. There are
no useful studies on the accuracy of legislative and judicial predictions
of the sort at issue in this Article. The literature on legislative and ju
dicial predictions tends to focus on questions very different from the
predictive harms of irreparability on which I am focusing (e.g., predic
tions that a particular criminal will engage in the same criminal activity
if released198) and thus is not terribly helpful for our purposes. There
is, though, research that focuses on somewhat analogous questions and
thus provides us with some guidance. One analogous area of study is
the rate of technological and scientific innovation and absorption.
Given the relevance of technological development to the predictions
that are likely to be at the center of proactive legislation, these studies
may provide some useful insights. Unfortunately, researchers who
have studied the issue have come to wide agreement that technologi
cal and scientific innovation and absorption is essentially impossible to
predict, because it is not linear but rather is full of "leaps ahead, feed
back loops, and sudden and unexpected lacunae. "199 Another analogue
is economic forecasting - in particular, projections of company- and
industry-specific growth and development. Such predictions are fairly
close to the ones that interest me in this Article, because they incorpo
rate (and often turn on) projections regarding the ability of a product
or industry to exploit a market, harm its competitors, etc. Again, the
news on the accuracy front is not terribly encouraging: studies of these

197. For instance, just because Microsoft arose and obtained a hammer-lock on operat
ing systems for personal computers does not mean that the next creator of a killer OS will
achieve similar dominance.
198. See, e.g., Eric S. Janus & Paul E. Meehl, Assessing the Legal Standard for Predic
tions of Dangerousness in Sex Offender Commitment Proceedings, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y
& L. 33 (1997); Douglas Mossman, Dangerousness Decisions: An Essay on the Mathematics
of Clinical Violence Prediction and Involuntary Hospitalization, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUND
TABLE 95 (1995); Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 97
(1984).
Otber commentators have focused on other sorts of predictions, but, again, the emphasis
has been on more individualized predictions. See, e.g. , Eric Chevlen, The Limits of Prognos
tication, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 337 (1996) (discussing the limited usefulness of medical statistics in
making predictions of survival outcome for individual patients).
199. Bruce L.R. Smith & Claude E. Barfield, Contributions of Research and Technical
Advance to the Economy, in TECHNOLOGY, R&D, AND THE ECONOMY 1 (Bruce L.R. Smith
& Claude E. Barfield eds., 1996).
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predictions have cast doubt on their accuracy, particularly when indus
tries or markets are in a stage of growth or development.200 Forecasts
by managers who worked within a company were slightly more accu
rate than forecasts by outsiders (usually financial analysts), but this is
far from encouraging, as legislatures and courts are of course outsid
ers.201
This should not surprise us. These are the sorts of predictions on
which well-remunerated companies filled with experts specialize, and
even they, by their own admission, are frequently wrong.202 They are
also the sorts of matters on which billion-dollar companies will make
divergent bets, in the form of their investment in planned future de
velopments. Some pan out and others do not, but relatively few people
and companies have had the foresight to back the right predictions
with any degree of reliability.203
On a more anecdotal level, in recent years - and particularly as
the year 2000 approached - a number of people and publications
took the time to look back on predictions of economic and technologi
cal developments that were made in the recent past (sometimes by
them).204 These predictions were all over the map, and a distressingly
200. See, e.g., Elroy Dimson & Paul Marsh, An Analysis of Brokers' and Analysts' Un
published Forecasts of UK Stock Returns, 39 J. FIN. 1257, 1281-83 (1984) (finding a low cor
relation between the prior and future forecast accuracy of analysts); John S. Poole, Man
agement Forecasts: Do They Have a Future in Corporate Takeovers? 42 Sw. L.J. 765, 805-07
(1988); Gregory Waymire, Additional Evidence on the Accuracy ofAnalyst Forecasts Before
and After Voluntary Management Earnings Forecasts, 61 ACCT. REV. 129, 130-32 (1986);
Ronald M. Copeland & Robert J. Marioni, Executives' Forecasts of Earnings per Share Ver
sus Forecasts of Nai've Models, 45 J. Bus. 497, 503-06 (1972).
201. See, e.g., James D. Cox, Insider Trading Regulation and the Production of Informa
tion: Theory and Evidence, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 475, 481-82 nn.17-18 (1986) (noting that the
error rate of management forecasts was slightly less than that of outside analysts); Russell M.
Barefield et al., Accuracy of Management and Security Analysts' Forecasts: Additional Evi
dence, 7 J. Bus. RES. 109, 1 13-15 (1979) (same); William Ruland, The Accuracy of Forecasts
by Management and by Financial Analysts, 53 ACCT. REV. 439, 445-47 (1978) (same); Bikki
Jaggi, Further Evidence on the Accuracy of Management Forecasts Vis-a-Vis Analysts' Fore
casts, 55 Acer. REV. 96, 96-101 (1980) (same).
202. Technology forecasting agencies' optimistic (and probably unrealistic) claim is that
70% of their predictions are accurate. See Jim Frederick, The Virtual Science of High-Tech
Forecasting, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1999, § 6 (Magazine), at 70.
203. The problems of inaccuracy are by no means limited to these categories of experts.
More general studies of experts' predictions have also found disappointing accuracy levels.
See generally Colin F. Camerer & Eric J. Johnson, The Process-Performance Paradox in Ex
pert Judgment: How Can Experts Know So Much and Predict So Badly?, in TOWARD A
GENERAL THEORY OF EXPERTISE 195 (K. Anders Ericsson & Jacqui Smith eds., 1991) (re
viewing studies finding underwhelming accuracy rates among many different kinds of ex
perts, including academics, accountants, doctors, and psychologists); PAUL E. MEEHL,
CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND A REVIEW
OF THE EVIDENCE (1954 ). As Camerer and Johnson succinctly state, "experts know a lot but
predict poorly." Camerer & Johnson, supra, at 196.

204. See, e.g. , We Waz Wrong, THE ECONOMIST, DEC. 18, 1999, at 47; Scott Rosenberg,
The Wrong Stuff: In the Future, Predictions of the Future Will Be As Off-Base As They've
Been in the Past, SALON (Jan. 7, 2000), at http://www.salon.com/tech/col/rose/2000/0l/07/
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high percentage proved to be wrong. The predictions seemed reason
able, perhaps inevitable, at the time that they were made, yet they did
not pan out. And, perhaps worse, the reasons for their inaccuracy are
unclear.
The problem, simply stated, is that being a good factfinder is
probably helpful, but it is not sufficient - it does not necessarily make
one a good theorist about future developments. Who will do a good
job between the legislature and the courts in applying economic the
ory to future developments? It seems hard to say, in part because the
track record of just about everyone who makes such predictions (in
cluding those who are paid lots of money for them) is so spotty. And
part of the reason we lack a clear sense of what makes for a better
prediction is that we do not know what makes for reliable predictions
and thus have no reason to have confidence that anyone will make
these predictions accurately.
There is yet an additional cause for concern. Studies have found
that people have confidence in their own predictions that far exceeds
their accuracy, and thus they overestimate their ability to accurately
gauge the likelihood of future events.205 Even frequent predictors of
ten overestimate their accuracy.206 And significantly, this applies to
experts, who are "often wrong but rarely in doubt."207 Across a wide
·

wrong_predictions; Virginia Postrel, Surprise, Surprise!: Uncertainty is an Essential Ingredi
ent of Progress, WALL ST. J., Jan. 1, 2000, at R16; Lee Gomes, Entertainment World Has

Flawed Crystal Ball: Conflicting Napster Predictions Evoke Errors in Foretelling Impact of
VCR, Digital Tape, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2000, at Bl; Kenneth L. Fisher, Bet Against the
Experts, FORBES, Apr. 19, 1999, at 406; Alan M. Tuerkheimer & Stuart A. Vyse, The Book
of Predictions: Fifteen Years Later, SKErnCAL INQUIRER, Mar./Apr. 1997, at 40; Nicholas
Petreley, Making Predictions Is Easy, Particularly If Some Kind of Death Is Involved,
INFOWORLD, Nov. 9, 1998, at 126; Robert Kuttner, What Do You Call an Economist with a
Prediction? Wrong, B US . WK, Sept. 6, 1999, at 22; J. SCOTT ARMSTRONG, LONG-RANGE
FORECASTING: FROM CRYSTAL BALL TO COMPUTER (2d ed. 1985); cf Lee Sigelman et al.,
Inside Dopes? Pundits as Political Forecasters, 1 PRESS!POLmCS 33 (1996) (finding that
50.1 % of 757 predictions made by panelists on the McLaughlin Group proved to be correct,
and that in no subject area of these predictions was the panelists' accuracy rate higher than
55 % ).
205. See, e.g., Robert P. Vallone et al., Overconfident Prediction of Future Actions and
Outcomes by Self and Others, 58 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 582 (1990); David
Dunning et al., The Overconfidence Effect in Social Prediction, 58 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 568 (1990); Sarah Lichtenstein & Baruch Fischhoff, Do Those Who Know More
Also Know More About How Much They Know?, 20 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE
159 (1977); see also MARK BOYENS & PAUL 'T HART, UNDERSTANDING POLICY FIASCOES
8 (1996).
206. This may be related to hindsight bias - the tendency of people to view past events
as inevitable and thus easily predictable ex ante. Insofar as people tend to overestimate the
degree to which the past is predictable (as studies on the hindsight bias indicate), they may
also be inclined to overestimate the predictability of the future. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A
Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998);
Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight
Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment
Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 288 (1975).
207. Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of
24 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 411, 412 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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November 2000]

Proactive Legislation

341

range of disciplines, experts (and other frequent predictors) have an
inflated sense of the accuracy of their predictions.208 Experts attempt
to make accurate predictions of future probabilities, and they feel con
fident about those predictions; but frequently that confidence is mis
placed, and particularly so with respect to predictions concerning
fields that lack a long and consistent history.209 Moreover, both experts
and ordinary individuals tend, even in hindsight, to justify their confi
dence by overestimating their accuracy.210 Experts will often
misremember an inaccurate prediction, or defend an incorrect predic
tion by saying that it "almost occurred, " or that it still will happen in
the future and is simply taking longer than they had originally ex-

This has also been said of lawyers. See Robert P. Casey, The Pope John Paul XX/lI Lecture,
44 CATH . U. L. REV. 821, 822 (1994) ("Most lawyers are - what is the expression? - often
wrong, but never in doubt.").

208. See, e.g., John B. Kidd, The Utilization of Subjective Probabilities in Production
Planning, 34 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 338 (1970) (finding that engineers are overconfident in
their predictions); Mary Ellen Hynes & Erik H. Vanmarcke, Reliability of Embankment Per
formance Predictions, in MECHANICS IN ENGINEERING 367, 371-73 (Donald E. Grierson et
al. eds., 1976) (finding that expert engineers are prone both to make mistakes and to be
overconfident about their accuracy); Jay J.J. Christensen-Szalanski & James B . Bushyhead,
Physicians' Use of Probabilistic Information in a Real Clinical Setting, 7 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 928 (1981) (finding overconfidence among
physicians); LEE B. LUSTED, AMERICAN COLLEGE OF RADIOLOGY COMM. ON EFFICACY
STUDIES, A STUDY OF THE EFFICACY OF DIAGNOSTIC RADIOLOGIC PROCEDURES: FINAL
REPORT ON DIAGNOSTIC EFFICACY 104-05 (1977) (same); Carl-Axel s. Stael von Holstein,
Probabilistic Forecasting: An Experiment Related to the Stock Market, 8 ORG. BEHAV. &
HUM. PERFORMANCE 139 (1972) (finding overconfidence among securities analysts); Stuart
Oskamp, Overconfidence in Case-Study Judgments, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 287 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (finding overconfidence
among clinical psychologists); MARGARET A. NEALE & MAX H. BAZERMAN, COGNITION
AND RATIONALITY IN NEGOTIATION (1990) (finding overconfidence among negotiators);
Arnold C. Cooper et al., Entrepreneurs' Perceived Chances for Success, 3 J. Bus.
VENTURING 97, passim (1988) (finding overconfidence among entrepreneurs). As Griffin
and Tversky note, the main exception to this widespread phenomenon of overconfidence
among experts and other frequent predictors is weather forecasters, "who receive immediate
frequentistic feedback and produce realistic forecasts of precipitation." Griffin & Tversky,
supra note 207, at 412; see also Sarah Lichtenstein et al., Calibration of Probabilities: The

State of the Art to 1980, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 306,
309-11, 322 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
209. See Lichtenstein et al., supra note 208; Willem A. Wagenaar & Gideon B. Keren,
Does the Expert Know? The Reliability of Predictions and Confidence Ratings of Experts, in
INTELLIGENT DECISION SUPPORT IN PROCESS ENVIRONMENTS 87 (Erik Hollnagel et al.
eds., 1986) (finding overconfidence in predictions among several different kinds of experts,
including lawyers); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The "New" Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics,
Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739, 758 (2000).
210. Disturbingly, those who are least competent suffer from the greatest rniscalibration
of their abilities. And, even after seeing their mistakes, these people's wild overestimates of
their abilities diminished only very slightly. See Justin Kruger & David Dunning, Unskilled
and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in Recognizing One's Own Incompetence Lead to In
flated Self-Assessments, 77 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1 121 (1999). Those who are
more competent, on the other hand, tend to underestimate their accuracy (though their de
gree of miscalibration is less than the least competent individuals' miscalibration). See id.; see
also Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, supra note 205.
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pected.211 As a result, even if a predictor has confidence in the accu
racy of her prediction of the likelihood of some future harm occurring,
that does not mean that we should share her confidence.
This is a long way of saying that we have little basis for preferring
legislatures to courts, or vice versa, in the realm of the sort of predic
tive harms on which this Article is focusing.212 The problem is even
211. See generally Philip E. Tetlock, Theory-Driven Reasoning About Plausible Pasts
and Probable Futures in World Politics: Are We Prisoners of Our Preconceptions?, 43 AM. J.
POL SCI. 335 (1999); Baruch Fischhoff & Ruth Beyth, "I Knew It Would Happen": Remem
bered Probabilities of Once-Future Things, 13 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 1
(1975).
.

212. This discussion focuses on courts making findings regarding irreparable future
harms versus legislatures doing so. There is, however, another possibility: the court or legis
lature could delegate the making of such findings to a third party. As for courts, some state
courts may have a limited ability to do this under state law, but federal courts would have a
difficult time pursuing this option, as non-Article III actors cannot exercise judicial author
ity, and simply transferring the case to another court would not change anything for pur
poses of the analysis in the text. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plurality opinion). The more obvious, and much more common,
delegators are legislatures, and the common delegatees are administrative agencies.
It is difficult to generalize about courts or about legislators, but it is even more difficult
to generalize about agencies, as they vary so greatly in so many ways. See, e.g. , William F.
Fox, Jr., Understanding Administrative Law 8-18 (3d ed. 1997) (noting the wide variety of
agencies and functions performed by them). Nonetheless, as with courts and legislatures,
there is a substantial literature on the institutional competence and possible public choice
limitations applicable to administrative agencies. See, e.g. , Terry M. Moe, The Positive The
ory of Public Bureaucracy, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE: A HANDBOOK 455
(Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997); Stephen P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the
Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1998). To summarize briefly: as to institu
tional competence, the advantages that apply to legislatures are also thought to apply to
agencies; indeed, one rationale for having agencies is to permit greater competence than is
possible within a legislature. Although the head (or heads) of an agency may not be an ex
pert, agencies usually have significant research capabilities. Like legislatures, agencies can
choose to conduct investigations (though their purview is narrower than that of a legisla
ture), can seek input from their staffs, and can solicit comments from other entities. Their
capability to engage in fact finding may be compromised by a narrowly drawn frame of ref
erence (e.g., an agency whose only mission is to focus on a particular industry might make
findings specific to that industry that fail to take into account factors that affect the economy
more generally), but a specificity of focus may also enhance expertise within a particular
field. Accordingly, agencies generally get fairly high marks on institutional competence
grounds. Indeed, the cases that Turner I cited as supporting deference to legislative predic
tions, see note 84 and accompanying text, had actually involved deference to agency exper
tise. See FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1, 29 (1961) (stating that "a
forecast of the direction in which future public interest lies necessarily involves deductions
based on the expert knowledge of the agency"); FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broad.,
436 U.S. 775, 814 (1978) (quoting this statement from Transcontinental Gas). Public choice
considerations, however, are a different matter entirely. The theory of capture (whereby a
powerful entity effectively controls the entity that regulates it) grew out of studies of agency
behavior. A number of factors contribute to this concern - to name just a few, the facts that
agencies usually have a somewhat narrow focus, that agency officials often come from, and
plan to return to, the industry that they regulate, and that agencies usually operate below the
public's radar. These factors help to produce both regulatees whose power vis-a-vis a given
agency is much greater than that of broader consumer interests and agency personnel who
have the opportunity to maximize their own interests at the expense of the public interest.
Why not say more? Because the point noted in the text about predictions is not limited
to courts and legislatures but instead applies to all predictors: we do not know what makes
for accurate predictions, and there is little reason for confidence that anyone will do a good
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worse, however: for many of these predictions, we have no reason to
believe that either courts, legislatures, or any other predictors are
likely to be accurate - despite the confidence that they, or we, may
have in their predictions. Where, then, should this lead us?
B.

R edundancy

The answer seems to go back to our baseline. If we have no reason
to prefer a world without the proposed legislation, then we might just
go with one entity or the other. But where we have reason to privilege
the status quo (i.e., to reject proposed legislation), we might want to
place the hurdle higher.
Such a raising of a threshold in a way that prefers a class of out
comes arises frequently in law. Often, it is because we have reason to
prefer the status quo as a default. A classic example is a twelve-person
criminal jury, with unanimity required. There is nothing ineluctable
about a requirement of unanimity, and some jurisdictions do not re
quire it.213 Indeed, we could have a rule that provided for conviction
on any given count as long as a single juror thought it appropriate. The
higher we raise the threshold percentage of jurors required for convic
tion, the lower the number of convictions.214 This would presumably
mean that fewer innocent people would be convicted,215 but it also
would likely mean that a higher number of guilty defendants would
not be convicted.216 Raising the percentage of jurors who are required
job in making these predictions. As a result, bringing agencies into the mix adds little to the
analysis. We are still left with no reason to believe that anyone will do a particularly good
job, and it does not really matter whether that "anyone" includes one player or one thou
sand.
213. See J. Clark Kelso, Final Report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on Jury System
Improvement, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1433, 1494 (1996) (noting that Oregon and Louisiana utilize
nonunanimous juries in criminal cases); see also Jere W. Morehead, A "Modest" Proposal
for Jury Reform: The Elimination of Required Unanimous Jury Verdicts, 46 U. KAN. L. REV.
933, 933-45 (1998).
214. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 460-61 (1966).
215. This proposition is not logically required. One might"imagine that juries will always
be unanimous anyway, so that requiring one or twelve to agree will make no difference; or
that juries are likely to be counter indicators (i.e., they are more likely to convict the inno
cent than the guilty, and more likely to acquit the guilty than the innocent), and that those
who would be convicted in split verdicts are more likely to be guilty than those who are con
victed in unanimous verdicts. The first proposition seems flatly false, as an empirical matter,
given all we know about splits within juries. The second proposition seems exceedingly un
likely; moreover, if true it would suggest that we should abolish the jury system altogether,
as even a random system would be more accurate in determining guilt.
216. The incidence of outright acquittal might also be low (because of the unanimity
requirement), but hung juries would be more common. See Richard A. Primus, When De
mocracy is not Self-Government: Toward a Defense of the Unanimity Rule for Criminal Ju
ries, 18 CARDOZO L. REV . 1417, 1417 & n.2 (1997) (noting that unanimity favors defendants
and reduces convictions, in part because after any given nonunanimous outcome (i.e., hung
juries), there is some possibility that the prosecutor will decide not to retry the case).
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to agree217 thus tends to raise the n in the phrase "[i]t is better to let n
guilty men go free than have one innocent man convicted. "218 Simply
stated, a higher percentage of jurors means that we will have fewer
false positives (convicted innocent defendants) but more false nega
tives (guilty defendants who are not convicted).219 Why might we pre
fer such a state of affairs? Because we have reason to privilege an out
come - nonconviction.
This can also arise in non-constitutional contexts. The Senate's in
ternal rules requiring a supermajority to end a filibuster privilege the
status quo.220 Other supermajority rules prefer more particular sub
stantive outcomes, such as the rule adopted by the House of Repre
sentatives in 1995 mandating a three-fifths vote to pass a tax rate in
crease.221 Michael Rappaport and John McGinnis, meanwhile, have
argued for a different kind of legislative supermajority rule - one that
would apply not to taxes but instead to spending.222 Their reasoning is

217. Raising the number of jurors also tends to depress conviction rates. See Robert H.
Miller, Comment, Six of One is not a Dozen of the Other: A Reexamination of Williams v.
Florida and the Size of State Criminal Juries, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 621, 670-74 (1998);
MICHAEL J. SAKS, JURY VERDICTS: THE ROLE OF GROUP SIZE AND SOCIAL DECISION
RULE 15-16 (1977). The Supreme Court concluded in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78
(1970), that there was no empirical support for differences between 6- and 12-member juries,
but the Court's treatment of the relevant studies left much to be desired. See Michael J.
Saks, Ignorance of Science is No Excuse, TRIAL, Nov.-Dec. 1974, at 18 (asserting that, in
Williams v. Florida, "the law's confrontation with some relatively simple empirical questions
was simply an embarrassment").
218. See generally Alexander Volokh, N Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1997)
(collecting the many different numbers for n in that statement from different sources, and
finding that the number ranges from 1 to 100).
219. See, e.g., Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries
(Should) Make Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1 , 41 (1997) (noting that "when con
victing, quorum rule juries did so with less confidence that they were correct than was true of
juries deciding under a unanimous rule").
Many commentators have adopted the terminology of statistics to identify false positives
and false negatives, calling the former "Type I" errors and the latter "Type II" errors. See,
e.g. , Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV.
1477, 1504 (1999). Commentators often distinguish between such errors, and there is an ex
tensive literature applying the distinction in a variety of fields. See, e.g. , Posner, supra (dis
cussing Type I and Type II errors in the context of evidence law); Lynn A. Stout, Type I Er
ror, Type II Error, and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 711
(1996) (discussing these errors in the context of securities law).
220. S. Doc. No. 104-1, 104th Cong., Sen. Rule XXII (1995). Indeed, the constitutional
requirement of Presidential approval of legislation (or a legislative supermajority for an
override) and the constitutional requirement that the House and Senate pass the same piece
of legislation in order for it to become law implement a redundancy principle. See also infra
text following note 245.
221. H.R. Doc. No. 103-342, House Rule XXI(5)(c), at 652-58 (1995), amended by H.
Res. 5, 105th Cong. (1997).
222. See John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules as a Consti
tutional Solution, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 365 (1999); see also Michael B. Rappaport,
Amending the Constitution to Establish Fiscal Supermajority Rules, 13 J.L. & POL. 705
(1997).
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that public choice problems lead legislatures to have a systemic bias in
favor of increasing spending; the way to counter-balance, in their view,
is to require that a supermajority of legislators agree to raise taxes.
Most decisions would still be made by a simple majority, but some
situations in which we have reason to be mistrustful of a straight ma
jority requirement would instead be subject to the supermajority rule.
There are myriad other possible examples of such rules. When ap
pellate courts impose a high burden on complaining parties before
they will overturn a decision of a trial judge, they are privileging, as a
default, the trial judge's actions. Invalidation of a statute on constitu
tional grounds could require a supermajority of Justices, or the ordi
nary majority of the Supreme Court plus the legislature.223 Before the
Civil War, some Southern states argued that federal decisions could be
applied to them only if they concurred; that, too, is a form of super
majority rule, here in the form of required redundancy. Procedures
that entrench the status quo by making change more difficult are just
another form of these rules - here, preferring the status quo as a de
fault on the assumption that it will be preferable to the changes that
would otherwise occur.224
These examples of redundancy/supermajority arise when, in effect,
we want to drive down the number of false positives at the likely ex
pense of more false negatives. Why would we ever do this? Put simply,
because we expect that without redundancy/supermajority rules the
percentage of false positives would be too high. As a result, we raise
the threshold for finding positives as high as our default preference
takes us. The difficulty, of course, is that this relies on two considera
tions that are difficult to quantify and impossible to justify (in the
sense of showing that all other answers are inferior) - namely, how
many false positives we will have at any given level of redun
dancy/voting requirement, and where we want to set the bar for such
false positives (i.e., how strong is our preference for our default). We
are left with our own sense of what threshold seems about right, even
though it seems a fool's task to try to argue that one threshold is, in
some meaningful sense, "better" than another. After all, how do we
know what is the appropriate threshold of accuracy for criminal juries,
and thus the n in the "n guilty men" formulation?
The rationale for redundancy applies here as well. First, we have
reason to privilege, as a default, invalidation of legislation that in
fringes upon First Amendment interests and is based on predictive
harms. Second, we have little confidence in the competence of a legis223. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitu
tional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 139-44 (1893); cf. ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE PoLmCAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAw (1990).
224. See John Harrison, The Fiscal Powers and the 1930s: Entrenchment, 41 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 295, 295-308 (1999).
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lature, court, or anyone else in making the decision whether our pre
sumption against such legislation is overcome (i.e., whether there is a
likelihood of irreparable substantial harm). In light of the high risk of
error, and the rights at stake, we should choose a regime that requires
a greater level of agreement than we would require in ordinary cases.
Such a heightened threshold probably will increase the number of
false negatives, but it should decrease the number of false positives.
How might this be achieved? One obvious option is intra
institutional redundancy. Perhaps the easiest option to implement
would take its cue from cases on independent appellate review of cer
tain First Amendment rulings. In Bose Corporation v. Consumers
Union of United States, Inc. ,225 the Supreme Court ruled that the First
Amendment altered the ordinary rules of deference to factfinders,
displacing deferential with independent review. The finder of fact in
that case (the district court) had concluded that Consumers Union had
made a statement with actual malice, because an article it published
contained a false statement of fact and the author's testimony about
his intended meaning was not credible. Ordinarily, such findings of
fact would be subject to appellate review for clear error.226 The
Supreme Court held, however, that because the case implicated First
Amendment interests the Court should engage in independent review
of the district court's findings.227 Subsequent to Bose, the question has
arisen whether its rule of independent review applies to trial courts'
findings of fact in cases striking down governmental restrictions on
speech as contrary to the First Amendment. A split has developed on
this question.228 Some courts have held that appellate courts should
make an independent examination of the whole record in all cases in
volving First Amendment claims.229 Other courts have held that, be
cause the Bose standard is designed to protect First Amendment
rights, de nova review is appropriate only where the trial court has
rejected a First Amendment claim.230 This second line of cases em
ploys a redundancy principle. These courts have adopted a rule of re
view that is intended to decrease the chances that constitutionally pro-

225. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
226. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a); Bose, 466 U.S. at 498-99.
227. See Bose, 466 U.S. at 499, 510-11.
228. See Don's Porta Signs, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 485 U.S. 981, 981-82 (1988)
(White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting a split among the lower courts).
229. See Don's Porta Signs, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 829 F.2d 1051, 1053 n.9 (11th Cir.
1987); Bartimo v. Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective Ass'n, 771 F.2d 894, 897 (5th Cir.
1985); Lewis v. Colorado Rockies Baseball Club, Ltd., 941 P.2d 266, 270-71 (Colo. 1997).
230. See Multimedia Publ'g Co. v. Greenville-Spartanburg Airport Dist., 991 F.2d 154,
160 (4th Cir. 1993); Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380, 383 (9th Cir. 1988); Planned
Parenthood Ass'n v. Chicago Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225, 1229 (7th Cir. 1985); Brown v.
K.N.D. Corp., 529 A.2d 1292, 1295-96 (Conn. 1987).
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tected speech will be erroneously punished by providing, in effect, that
free speech interests will not be limited unless both the trial court and
appellate court agree that the limitation is appropriate. If either court
finds in favor of First Amendment interests, then those interests will
trump. Such redundancy probably decreases false positives (situations
in which First Amendment rights are improperly infringed), but may
well increase false negatives (situations in which First Amendment
rights should be limited but are not).
This approach easily could be applied to the predictions at issue
here. The rule could be that, where legislation relies on predictive
harms, an appellate court will defer to a lower court that invalidates
such legislation but will engage in de nova review of a ruling that up
holds it. As I discussed above, this or any level of redundancy is assail
able.231 But application of this post-Bose approach has the advantage
of having been applied in a related First Amendment context, and of
increasing the hurdle to predictions without making it insuperable.
The argument for intra-institutional redundancy will be strongest
when we have reason to privilege the status quo and little confidence
in anyone's absolute accuracy, but one institution has an advantage
relative to all the others. In such circumstances, it makes sense to re
quire redundancy (to counter the insufficiently high absolute accu
racy), and to place all the relevant decisions within the entity that will
do the best job, relatively speaking. Here, however, we not only have
insufficiently high absolute accuracy, but also little reason to prefer
one entity over another. In such circumstances, another choice pres
ents itself (and might be preferable): inter-institutional redundancy.
Intra-institutional judicial redundancy gives the legislature little in
centive to focus on the predictive harm, and the irreparable damage it
might do. If courts do not defer to legislative findings, there seems lit
tle point in the legislature building a record, or even singling out the
issue. The failure to give a legislature an incentive to build a record
may be suboptimal. Although factfinding is not sufficient to create an
accurate prediction, it will usually be valuable. Insofar as giving the
legislature an incentive to engage in factfinding makes such factfinding
more likely, the result should be a more accurate legislative predic
tion. The court could thus build on a better record, and that might
even have potential advantages relative to the court's own capabilities.
The gains from the creation of legislative findings would not be suffi
cient to suggest deference (because of the weak absolute accuracy and
our lack of confidence that a legislature with a factual record will do a
better job than a court with a factual record), but they may be worth
pursuing. It also bears noting that this sort of redundancy will be
231 . Why not require this redundancy plus a supermajority of appellate court judges?
Why not require that two different trial court judges hear the case separately, with each be
ing required to uphold the legislation in order for it to be valid?
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available whenever legislation is challenged, whereas intra
institutional redundancy is premised upon the pursuit of an appeal.
Intra-institutional redundancy, in other words, requires that parties
expend the additional costs of an appeal in order to gain the benefit of
two different entities making the appropriate predictions.
The regime crafted by Turner II provides an incentive for legisla
tures to create extensive factual records, by indicating that review of
statutes with such records will be more deferential than review of stat
utes without them: If the legislature makes findings of fact, the court
will defer to those findings; if the legislature fails to make findings of
fact, the court will not defer to the legislature's implicit judgment that
the finding exists but rather will engage in independent review.232 My
argument here is that, when predictive harms are at issue, each ele
ment of that dichotomy should be ratcheted up: if the legislature
makes findings, then the court applies its own independent judgment;
if the legislature fails to make findings, then the legislation should be
invalidated. We could thus achieve the same incentive, without in
volving the deference that would seem unwarranted, via inter
institutional redundancy. That is, we could say that, in order for a stat
ute predicated on predictive harms to be upheld, both the legislature
and the court must conclude that there is a likelihood of irreparable
substantial harm. Because of the dangers presented by predictive
harms, the skepticism would be knocked up a peg.
The advantage of such a system over intra-institutional redundancy
is that each branch will have an incentive to make its own determina
tions, thus bringing to bear the benefits that each branch has to offer.
In any given case, we do not have any reason to prefer one set of deci
sionmakers to another, because it is difficult to say that one set of de
cisionmakers is using better (i.e., more accurate) tools than the other,
and we do not have any reason for confidence in either decisionmaker.
But we do know that each institution engages in a somewhat different
inquiry, and that each institution is a necessary element (the legisla
ture must pass the statute, and the judiciary must review it when it is
challenged); and we have every reason to give both institutions an in
centive to consider the legislation, and the predictions on which it is
predicated, as carefully as possible.
C.

Objections

How, one might ask, is this different from a simple rule of no def
erence to legislative findings? The difference is that, with a no defer
ence rule, the court would ignore what the legislature did no matter
what it did; here, by contrast, the legislature's making, or failing to

232. See supra note 123.
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make, findings is significant. And where the rubber hits the road is
that, even if the court were inclined to believe that the harm would be
irreparable, it should nonetheless invalidate the statute and thus send
it back to the legislature if the legislature failed to make the same
findings itself. The idea is that, when a legislature passes a law, we
should want both institutions to agree that it would avert an unusually
costly problem down the road. The reason to prefer such redundancy
to deference is that we can have greater confidence when the legisla
ture has given its input than when a court is on its own. Requiring in
ter-institutional redundancy is a way of seeking the wisdom of differ
ent branches with different techniques, backgrounds, etc. My proposal
simply recognizes that difference.233
One possible objection to this redundancy approach is that it may
seem inconsistent with the dignity of legislatures. Courts would be ef
fectively requiring legislatures to make findings - something that
might be appropriate to require of administrative agencies but seems
inappropriate to require of legislatures. On one level, this is true:
courts would be telling legislatures that factual findings are a precon
dition for legislation based on predictive harms to pass constitutional
muster. Insofar as this is a concern, it would argue for intra
institutional redundancy, rather than inter-institutional redundancy.
On the other hand, the real source of the indignity would seem to be
the distrust of legislation based on predictive harms in the first place.
Once we have a category of legislation that will be struck down absent
unusual circumstances, we are paying relatively scant respect to the
legislative process.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has effectively imposed similar
burdens on legislatures in other contexts. In Califano v. Goldfarb,234
the Court reviewed a provision that automatically provided survivor's
benefits in the Social Security system to a widow, but provided such
benefits to a widower only if his deceased wife had provided at least
half of his support. The Court had previously upheld somewhat similar
distinctions, such as a Florida law that granted widows, but not wid
owers, an annual $500 property tax exemption,235 in light of the eco-

233. It is true, of course, that this proposal shares with ordinary independent review
(also known as second-guessing the legislature) the fact that the courts will be considering
the relevant statute after the legislation has been passed. We can call this "second-guessing
the legislature," but it also ensures that there is independent review by both branches. After
all, the President's decision to sign or veto a law comes after Congress has acted. It may be
accurate to describe the President's action as "second-guessing," but it would also be accu
rate to describe it as crucial, and constitutionally authorized, independent review by a sepa
rate branch of government.
234. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
235. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
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nomic disadvantages faced by women.236 In Goldfarb, however, the
Court refused to apply the compensatory rationale of these earlier
cases because in the legislative record "nothing whatever suggests a
reasoned congressional judgment that nondependent widows should
receive benefits because they are more likely to be needy than nonde
pendent widowers."237 In this way, the Court "stress[ed] the absence of
appropriate congressional support as a factor negating constitutional
,,
ity. 23s
Other instances are analogous. One example is the regime in
Turner.239 More broadly, when the Court applies a clear statement
rule, it has the effect of requiring a form of redundancy. When a court
requires a clear legislative statement that the legislature intends a par
ticular result before the court will reach an issue (i.e., the natural
reading of the statute would indicate that the legislature intended to
cover a given activity, but the court instead requires a clear statement
of such intent because of the importance/sensitivity of the activity that
would be covered), this effectively requires a particular legislative as
sertion - a statement that clearly reveals the legislature's desire to ex
tend its legislation to the relevant activity. Only if the legislature in
cludes a clear statement will the court make a determination as to
whether application of the legislation to the relevant activity would be
constitutional.240 Additionally, in United States v. Lopez,241 the Court
suggested that it would not uphold legislation that had no obvious
connection to interstate commerce absent findings from Congress that
the activity covered by the statute actually affected interstate com
merce.242 The Court did not require such findings (much less suggest

236. See id. at 354-55; see also Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975) (uphold
ing a lenient attrition standard for female naval officers as compensating for the fact that,
because women were excluded from certain forms of service and from combat, they faced
greater difficulties in building a record supporting a promotion).
237. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 214.
238. Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional Ad
judication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 695, 725 (1996).
239. See supra notes 94-99 and 123 and accompanying text.
240. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 467 (1991); Will v. Michigan Dep't of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi
Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 V AND. L. REV.
593, 599 (1992). Admittedly, if the legislature fails to make a clear statement the legislation is
not struck down but instead simply is not applied to that activity. But there is no real sub
stantive difference between that outcome and simply striking down, but severing, the portion
of the statute that applies to the protected activity without prejudice to a reconsideration
once the magic words (here, a clear statement) are included. As in the redundancy example,
the legislature is given a choice: fail to use the required words and the legislation will not
apply to the activity that you want to cover; use those words and we will then make our own
judgment as to whether the legislation is constitutional.
241. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
242. Id. at 562-63.
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that such findings, by themselves, would establish a sufficient effect on
interstate commerce),243 but it did emphasize their absence in striking
down the legislation.244 Significantly, Congress could avoid that stric
ture by passing legislation that more obviously affected interstate
commerce. The same is true here: a legislature that wanted to pass
legislation without bothering with findings could rely instead on cur
rent harms rather than predictive ones.245 In fact, the legislature would
have a further option, because the invalidation would just be tempo
rary until the predicted harms actually materialized. The invalidation
that would occur in the initial litigation would be a temporary state of
affairs until more information could be amassed. Contrast this with in
validation on Commerce Clause grounds, which presumably lasts until
fundamental changes in the economy take place such that events that
do not substantially affect commerce come to have such an effect.
As these examples might suggest, we can see this requirement of
redundancy in the context of the larger issues of separated govern
ment. One way of understanding our constitutional structure is that it
is all about inter-institutional redundancy. After all, in order for li
ability to be imposed on any individual all three branches must agree
to move forward: the legislature must pass the statute (and overcome
a presidential veto if he disagrees); the executive must execute the law
and bring a prosecution under it; and the judiciary must convict. Even
for statutes permitting a private cause of action (and thereby arguably
cutting the executive out, at least in part), the legislature must pass the
statute and the judiciary must find it permissible. Implicit in the pas
sage of legislation is, or should be, the legislative judgment that the
legislation is justified, which here would mean that it prevents an ir
reparable harm. The inter-institutional redundancy element merely
requires the legislature to make that implicit judgment explicit. Or, to
put the point a bit differently, the redundancy inherent in legislation is
redundancy at a high level of generality; a legislature might enact leg
islation on a set of bases very different from the bases on which the

243. See id. If there was any doubt on this point, the Court erased it in United States v.
Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000). In that case the Court struck down a section of the Vio
lence Against Women Act of 1994 despite the Act's inclusion of numerous findings asserting
a connection between violence against women and interstate commerce. See id. at 1752
("[T)he existence of congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitu
tionality of Commerce Clause legislation.").
244. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63; see also Frickey, supra note 238, at 723-38 (discuss
ing Lopez, and drawing this comparison between Lopez and Goldfarb); Vicki C. Jackson,
Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180,
2239 & nn.254-55 (1998) (noting the absence of congressional findings in Lopez).
245. Even as to current harms, the statute would be on much stronger footing if the leg
islature made findings. Cf Turner II, supra note 7, 520 U.S. at 180; see supra notes 94-99 and
123 and accompanying text. This highlights both the importance of findings in other contexts
and the way in which my proposal is merely ratcheting up the current approach to existing
findings. See supra text accompanying note 232.
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court upholds it. In situations like this one, we have reason to want
agreement not only on the legislation, but also on some more specific
elements of that legislation. So my proposal is merely moving the in
ter-institutional redundancy already inherent in judicial review, and
the separation of powers itself, to a greater level of specificity.
But one might complain, does that give legislatures too much
credit? What if they are just a bunch of political hacks who will make
any finding necessary to get the legislation they favor implemented,
whether or not they actually believe that finding? That is a vision of
legislation that casts aspersions on the dignity of the legislature, but of
course that does not make it untrue. I happen to believe that it will
sometimes be true, but that, at least at the margin, some legislators
who might support legislation will not in good conscience sign on to a
finding that the harm they are predicting and then preventing is one
that would be effectively irreparable. But if that vision of legislators as
averring irreparability in bad faith is true in all cases rather than some,
then the proposed redundancy would simply function as a de facto in
dependent judicial review of those predictions; and, of course, such in
dependent review would be vital and necessary, because by hypothesis
the legislative findings were cooked. Certainly, the worst of all possi
ble worlds with a dissembling legislature is for courts to give any def
erence to legislative pronouncements. This proposal would avoid any
such deference.
We can also turn the question around and ask whether this regime
gives too much credit to courts. This Article has spoken as if standards
of review matter. Some people, might argue that rules of deference are
just smoke and mirrors, because a court will "defer" to a legislative
finding that it thinks is correct and will "exercise independent judg
ment" when it does not think the finding is correct. The elaborate
scheme that I have proposed, in other words, might seem naive; on
this theory, courts will defer only to what they already believe. This
critique taps into a long-standing debate about the degree to which
judges actually apply the standards to which they profess to be bound,
but I believe .that it is particularly vulnerable here because there is a
strong contender for existence proof of the importance of the level of
deference in these cases. It is of course impossible to prove, but it ap
pears that the result in Turner II would have been different absent the
deference that the plurality found to be appropriate. The substantive
case for the predictive harms in Turner was weak. The legislative rec
ord contained numerous flaws and inconsistencies. Indeed, Justice
O'Connor had a field day in dissent dissecting, and mocking, the evi
dence that Congress assembled.246 The plurality did not suggest that
Congress's economic analysis was remotely persuasive, and in fact

246. See Turner II, supra note 7, 520 U.S. at 235-49 (O'Connor, J,, dissenting).
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went out of its way to avoid endorsing Congress's views and instead
merely said that Congress's conclusions were "reasonable."247 The de
cisive factor for the plurality appeared to be its willingness to defer, as
opposed to the dissent's unwillingness to do the same.248
D. Looking Directly at the Probabilities
The emphasis in this Article on false positives and false negatives
raises another question. Remember that a central distinction between
current and predictive harms is one of probability - that predictive
harms are less likely to arise than are current harms to remain until
the legislation is implemented. If a major difference between current
and predictive harms is that one seems much more probable than the
other, then why not simply have courts directly ask the question of
probability, rather than use the distinction between predictive and
current harms as a proxy? That is, given that some current harms con
ceivably may dissipate on their own as quickly as they would with leg
islation (remember my Y2K example from above249) and that some
predictive harms may be exceedingly likely, why not let courts directly
ask the question of the probability of a harm occurring and thus allow
them to take such outliers into account? Wouldn't that be better than
using the procrustean approach of a categorization based on current
versus predictive harms that may well contain a few false positives and
a few false negatives?
Such an approach is in some ways similar to the one I am propos
ing. Its big difference is one that seems difficult to justify based on the
arguments presented here. We can begin by thinking about this pro
posal in the context of predictive harms. The change with this ap
proach would be that, rather than look at whether a harm is predic247. There were many situations in which the plurality in Turner II was at pains to dis
tance itself from Congress's judgments and in fact indicated a wariness about accepting Con
gress's judgments absent the deference that it showed. See id. at 210-11 (conceding that "the
record . . . contains evidence to support a contrary conclusion," but emphasizing that "[t]he
question is not whether Congress, as an objective matter, was correct to determine must
carry is necessary to prevent a substantial number of broadcast stations from losing cable
carriage and suffering significant financial hardship. Rather, the question is whether the leg
islative conclusion was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence in the record be
fore Congress."); id. at 211 ("Although evidence of continuing growth in broadcast could
have supported the opposite conclusion, a reasonable interpretation is that expansion in the
cable industry was causing harm to broadcasting."); id. at 212 ("While these phenomena
could be thought to stem from factors quite separate from the increasing market power of
cable (for example, a recession in 1990-1992), it was for Congress to determine the better
explanation.").
248. See also Comment, supra note 97, at 1 173 ("The result in Turner II would not have
been the same without 'considerable deference.' . . . The Court was palpably unpersuaded by
Congress's economic analysis, which leaped over inconsistencies in the record. The differ
ence between the plurality and the dissent is simply whether deference could, or should,
bridge the gap." (internal citations omitted)).
249. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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tive, the court would determine how probable the harm was. The
probabilities of a harm arising are, of course, already a central part of
the irreparability determination that this Article proposes. But, a
skeptic might respond, the difference in the two approaches is that a
harm that may be fairly likely but not terribly severe will not be
stopped by the test of effective irreparability, whereas a direct focus
on the probability of the harm would catch those harms. If that is our
concern, the question creates its answer: for these harms are, by hy
pothesis, not likely to be severe, so the cost of waiting for them to de
velop is not high. With respect to such likely but not terribly frighten
ing harms, we would just be waiting for them to develop. If we are
particularly worried about the specter of such harms, we could adjust
the irreparability test to be triggered for any harm that is exceedingly
likely (and thus probability would serve as a basis for allowing the
harms, as this hypothetical suggests), but that takes us back to our bal
ance regarding free speech interests. In light of our concerns about the
importance and fragility of free speech rights, and of accurate deci
sionmaking in delineating those rights, we have reason not to be so in
clusive in delimiting the category of harms that justify regulation. Al
lowing regulation as long as some harm is quite likely would allow
effectively any regulation. The approach advocated here would draw
the balance differently, which probably would lead to a greater num
ber of false negatives (harms that would be costly but nonetheless
would continue because both branches did not agree that they would
be costly), but the reason for that is concern about the underlying free
speech rights in the first place.
We can also look at the other half of the probability proposal,
which is that courts would examine current harms to see if they were
likely to go away of their own accord as quickly as they would with
legislation. Such an approach has its attractions, as it would eliminate
the proxy role for current harms and let courts ask directly whether
the harm had a high probability of spontaneous dissipation. But it
would thereby involve bigger changes to the courts' approach to
harms than the arguments in this Article would seem to support. As I
noted above, currently the common (although not universal) judicial
approach to existing harms in free speech cases is that courts give
some deference to the legislative determination that they exist (and,
implicitly, would not self-destruct without legislation as quickly and as
fully as they would be destroyed by effective legislation).250 Such an
approach may raise various concerns, but for purposes of this Article,
I have accepted it and instead have focused on why, assuming this def
erence to existing harms, we might want to have a different rule for
250. The determination of whether the legislation is effective is a separate question. The
first question is what sort of harm exists, and to answer that question we would ask whether
effective legislation might end it earlier. See supra text accompanying note 109.
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predictive ones. The proposed focus on probability would effectively
eliminate that deference in all situations; the court would determine
the probability of destruction for every harm.251 That may be desirable,
but such an ending of deference would not rely simply on the argu
ments in this Article. Still, this might be the only tenable approach
(rather than a permissible, though not compelled, one) if we thought
that there were likely to be numerous instances in which current
harms would go away on their own as quickly without legislation as
with it. The problem is that we cannot say this with any confidence. It
is hard to imagine, in fact, many current harms that would go away on
their own as quickly as they would with effective legislation aimed at
stopping them. There will be some,252 but not so many that the distinc
tion here between current and predictive harms, though admittedly in
some ways artificial, is untenable.
If I am correct about the paucity of current harms that will dissi
pate on their own as quickly as they would with effective legislation,
then courts' determination of probabilities in all cases would be quite
costly. Presumably, any court (or other decisionmaker) that seeks to
determine the probability of a harm occurring, or continuing to occur,
in the future begins by gathering data about the state of the world,
adds whatever additional information seems important for purposes of
prediction, and then creates a forecast of future harm. Determining
whether a harm currently exists would be part of the process of as
saying the state of the world - and would usually be the easy part.
The difficult assignment, as I discussed in Section A(2), is figuring out
what material one needs in addition to the current state of affairs, lo
cating that additional material, and combining everything into a pre
diction. My proposal is that courts undertake the first part of the first
stage (determining whether the harm currently exists) in all cases; and
only if the harm does not exist would the court then go to the trouble
of making its probability determination. The idea is that the benefit of
courts directly examining the probability of a current harm dissipating
is likely to be low. The costs, meanwhile, would be fairly high: Courts
would have to invest substantial additional resources into making

251. The court could defer to these legislative determinations of probability, but that
would destroy the advantages of redundancy as a check on the legislature in the first place.
In theory, the court could ask this question consistent with deference to the legislature:
the legislature would make a determination of the probability of the harm continuing, and
then the court would determine the probability of the legislature being right in its estima
tion. But a judicial determination of the probability that the legislature accurately made its
own probability determination would seem to be little different from a direct judicial deter
mination of probability. For events where the courts deemed the actual probability to be
low, if the legislature considered the probability to be high, then the court would not defer;
the court would only defer if it agreed that the event's probability was high.
252. My Y2K example is the best that I can think of.
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these determinations.253 An approach that excludes current harms
from the searching consideration of probabilities advocated in this Ar
ticle has the obvious problems attendant to such rules (in particular, a
rigidity that does not allow for exceptional cases), but it has the advan
tage of obviating an inquiry that is likely to be quite costly relative to
its benefit.
E.

Unprovable Harms

We can now return to another issue related to this Article. Among
predictive harms affecting First Amendment interests, the focus has
been on those that are provable. What about those that are unpro
vable? The presumption against provable predictive harms flowed in
part from the fact that invalidating these statutes would allow courts,
and the legislature, to see whether the harm materialized. With re
spect to unprovable harms, there is no such advantage to waiting, and
that eliminates a central element of the argument for a presumption
against unprovable harms. Moreover, because the reason to prefer re
dundancy is that we have cause to privilege the status quo, the lack of
a presumption against legislation containing unprovable harms would
thus appear to undercut the argument for redundancy.
But for many unprovable harms that will not be the end of the
story. These harms will generally be unprovable because they do not
deal with matters like economic forecasts about which we can gain
more information over time, but instead with more ineffable concerns
that are not so easily charted. Such concerns will not be subject to
graphs and calculations, because they are likely to be value judgments.
And such value judgments will correlate quite closely with content
based, rather than content-neutral, legislation.254 That is, harms that
are based on value judgments about what is good for society will usu
ally arise in contexts in which the legislature is preferring one type of
programming over another, because it is "good" (and therefore to be
encouraged) or it is "bad" (and to be discouraged).255
The relevance of this correlation is that content-based speech
regulation is subject to a presumption of invalidity (and, indeed, sub
ject to strict scrutiny).256 So, although the route identified here for
provable harms does not apply to unprovable ones, many, indeed

253. And even after doing so the court would make predictions in which we could not
have great confidence. See supra Part VII.A.2.
254. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25
WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983).
255. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., Converging First Amendment
Principles for Converging Communications Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1719, 1726-30 (1995).
256. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
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most, such harms will nonetheless be part of legislation that is subject
to a presumption of invalidity.
That there is a presumption against the legislation as a whole does
not, however, necessarily rule out deference to the legislature on the
factual question of whether these unprovable harms will in fact arise.
Even with such a presumption, we might conclude that legislatures will
do a good job of making the relevant predictions, and a better job than
courts would, and thus that the predictive finding should be for the
legislature to make. After all, the reason why redundancy makes sense
in the context of provable predictive harms is that our confidence in
anyone's predictions is not high (and inter-institutional redundancy is
a viable option insofar as we do not have reason to believe that one
entity will do a better job than another). So, do the arguments for re
dundancy apply here as well?
We can begin by noting that the questions should be the same:
again, we would want to know whether invalidating this legislation will
be sufficiently costly that it should overcome our presumption against
it. As in the context of provable harms, that entails determining the
costs of waiting - specifically, the likelihood and severity of an ir
reparable harm. We might draw the balance a bit differently in the
context of strict scrutiny, perhaps employing a somewhat heavier pre
sumption against the legislation and thus having a higher threshold for
the combination of likelihood and severity that will overcome the pre
sumption. But the factors to be balanced would be the same.
Difficulty arises when we try to evaluate whether any institution
will make sufficiently accurate findings about these unprovable harms
that we do not need to drive down the false positives via redundancy,
and whether one institution will do a better job than another. The
same problems that apply to predictions of provable harms apply to
predictions of unprovable harms - namely, that we have no reason
for confidence in anyone's predictions. We have no good data on what
makes for accurate predictions or who does them particularly well. In
fact, the situation for unprovable harms is a bit worse. With respect to
provable harms, it is conceivable that we could build up a sufficiently
large database of accurate and inaccurate predictions from the past to
allow us to identify particular factors that enhanced accuracy, or par
ticular entities that do an unusually good job. But unprovable harms,
by definition, cannot be verified. Thus the track record will always be
a matter of speculation.
So what level of scrutiny do we apply to predictions the accuracy of
which we know little or nothing about? As was the case for provable
harms, the answer goes back to our presumption. If we have a pre
sumption in favor of such legislation, then absent evidence that the
legislature is likely to do a poor job of determining the likelihood of
irreparable but unprovable harm, the arguments for redundancy
would not apply. But the opposite presumption would change the de-
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fault: in the absence of evidence that the legislature will do a satisfac
tory job of making its prediction, we should require redundancy. The
legislature is making a determination about which we can have little
confidence, and our presumption tells us to err on the side of de
creasing the potential false positives at the possible expense of false
negatives.
This does not answer the question of whether we should prefer in
tra-institutional to inter-institutional redundancy or vice versa. The
absence of useful data on comparative accuracy undermines our abil
ity to make a reasoned choice. Will a legislature or a court do a better
job of determining what poisons the minds of small children, or
whether an uplifting message really will produce more virtuous citi
zens? Does the electoral process make legislators better, or worse, at
such determinations? What about a judge's ability to look witnesses in
the eye? Any answer would be guesswork. But the discussion above
does suggest that we should prefer redundancy in one form or an
other. Thus, for somewhat different reasons, the approach to unpro
vable harms will often be similar to, if not the same as, the approach to
provable harms: redundancy, with two different entities having a crack
at the question; and only if both find that the harm is likely to arise
should the legislation be approved.
VIII.

APPLICATION TO THE OTHER PREDICTIONS

This Article thus far has focused on predictions of harm in support
of speech regulations. But, as I discussed in Part IV, there are other
predictions that are implicit in the consideration of regulation, and
speech regulation in particular - predictions that the legislation will
directly alleviate the (presumably existing) harm, that it will not have
excessive effects on other activities, and that less intrusive alternatives
would not serve the legislature's goals as well. What do the concerns
raised in this Article tell us about those predictions, and what should
we do about them?
When it comes to predictions of effectiveness, fit, and the prefer
ability of the chosen method to the alternatives, a presumption against
relying on those predictions would apply to all legislation: such predic
tions are unavoidable, and thus any presumption against relying on
them would presumably be folded into the standard of review applied
to all cases.257 This does not mean, however, that we have no reason to
be concerned about the factual element of these predictions. The gen
eral constitutional and First Amendment considerations discussed
above with respect to predictions of harm are not limited to predic
tions of harm. The logic of that reasoning would seem to extend to
257. Arguably, indeed, the standards of review do take into consideration the predictive
elements inherent in every piece of legislation.
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these other predictions as well. The question is, given that these pre
dictions exist in every piece of legislation, how do the considerations
discussed in this Article apply to them?
A. Predictions of Legislative Effectiveness and Fit
The first two predictions are that the legislation will have the de
sired effect - that is, that it will directly alleviate the harm that the
legislature seeks to minimize - and that it will not have negative
spillover effects. If we wanted to get more information about these
predictions, what might we do? The obvious answer is that we might
want to test the predictions. The problem is that we can obtain such
information only if the legislation goes into effect, which will occur if
the legislation is enacted and passes muster in the first place.
Should a desire for more information lead courts to uphold (or
legislatures to pass) legislation so that it can be implemented and we
can discover if it performs as advertised? The answer is no, for several
reasons. First, we are talking about predictions that are inherent in
every piece of legislation. Thus this presumption would significantly
loosen the standard of review not just in some special cases that con
tained a prediction, but in all cases.258 Second, and relatedly, the whole
point of heightened scrutiny is that we have reason to be wary about
the legislation in the first place. Where the interests that will be in
fringed are fundamental constitutional rights, courts should not be in
the business of blithely approving legislation to see if it works. This is
particularly clear in the First Amendment context, where a series of
doctrines reflect a concern that free speech should not be infringed ei
ther lightly or precipitously.259 It would be a perversion of these prin
ciples to use the always-present predictive aspect of legislation as a ba
sis to water down a First Amendment test.
But this does not mean that this element of predictiveness (i.e.,
that the legislation will alleviate the problem, and not infringe upon
other constitutional interests) has no significance for purposes of leg
islative or judicial review. The background presumption that I have
suggested in this Article - that we should prefer testing predictions
with subsequent reality to relying solely on the predictions ex ante can operate here. Where legislation has gone into effect, legislatures
should monitor their enactments so that they can repeal any that have
not had the desired impact or have had inappropriate spillover conse-

258. We could try to avoid this problem by singling out for validation only those cases in
which we have serious doubts about the prediction, but that would entail giving a preference,
for purposes of review, to precisely the legislation to which we should be the most hostile. If
we have good reason to doubt that the legislation will achieve its purposes, that should
strengthen the case for invalidation.
259. See supra Part V.C.
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quences. And courts should be ready and willing to hear a new case
alleging that the legislation has not, in actuality, alleviated the harms
as it was supposed to and/or has limited other rights that were not part
of the relevant harm. What this means is that a court that upholds a
statute not only can but should be prepared to reject its precedent if a
party brings forward evidence that the prediction did not pan out as
expected in actual practice.
This is central to the legitimacy of courts. Given that they are re
lying on predictions that may not tum out be accurate, they must be
willing to reconsider their decisions when such inaccuracies arise. (It
often will not be easy to determine when that has happened, but that
is a matter of finding the right evidence; the principle remains that,
where the legislation turns out not to be effective, a ruling premised
on such effectiveness must be reconsidered.) This principle is a corol
lary to the one discussed in Part V that a court should reconsider its
invalidation of a statute predicated upon predictive harms if the pre
dictions actually pan out. Both principles are a subset of the broader
proposition that changes in the factual assumptions and conclusions
that form the underpinning of a legal conclusion merit a reconsidera
tion of that legal issue.260 It is also analogous to something that the Su
preme Court has expressed a willingness to do - reconsider a rule
that it creates (as opposed to a statute passed by the legislature) if that
rule proves to be unworkable or impracticable in actuality.261 The im
plementation is different, but the principle is the same. If a court crafts
a holding in an attempt to resolve an issue or mitigate a problem
(which holding is, of course, a prediction of effectiveness and practica
bility), and the court's rule turns out not to have the expected salutary
effects, then the court should be prepared to reject that rule and de
vise another. Similarly, if a court approves of legislation based on a
prediction about the effects of the legislation and those effects do not
actually occur, then the court should take that new development into
consideration and examine the statute anew, with no deference to the
previous (and now falsified) prediction of effectiveness.
B.

Predictions ofNo Effective Alternatives

Some of what I discussed above also applies to predictions about
the absence of effective alternatives. If, for instance, a legislature re
jects a less intrusive alternative in enacting a speech regulation on the
assumption that it would be less effective, and that alternative later
proves to be at least as effective, the legislature should repeal the ex260. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text; see also Benjamin, supra note 108,
at 275-87.
261. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 543-47 (1985); Swift
& Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 1 15-16, 124-28 (1965); see also supra note 146.
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isting legislation and replace it with the less intrusive alternative.
Similarly, if a court dismisses an alternative that avoids constitutional
problems because it would be unworkable, and it later proves to be
workable, then the legislation should be reconsidered.
But the prediction of no effective alternatives is trickier, because
often the alternatives are hypotheticals that have not been imple
mented. We will not be able to test the prediction that the chosen path
is better than the alternatives if those alternatives are forms of legisla
tion that are never enacted. With the predictions of effectiveness and
fit, our experiment is based on seeing the legislation in action, as those
predictions do not rely on the nonpreferability of alternatives. But this
prediction does rely on alternatives. How can we test the alternatives
to see if they are preferable?
A possibility would be for the legislature to have trial runs, seria
tim, of each of several alternative pieces of legislation. One problem is
the mechanism through which this would be achieved if the legislature
proved unwilling; a court could either attempt to require such trial
runs or could simply wait a year or so before invalidating each new
piece of legislation, but the former would be far too intrusive and the
latter would seem an insupportable manipulation of the judicial proc
ess. Assuming that the legislature were willing to engage in such trials
(or that we overcame our concerns about courts creating them), bigger
problems would await. Because the populace would know that these
were short-term trial runs, they might not modify their actions in re
sponse to the legislation in the same way as they would if the legisla
tion were permanent. And insofar as people did respond to the legisla
tion, the serial dislocation and compliance costs attendant to each new
piece of legislation would seem prohibitive.
The more obvious option would be to run the trials not seriatim
but rather simultaneously in different areas. This, then, suggests a dif
ferent approach, one that is familiar to all students of federalism: the
states as laboratories of democracy.262 If several states (or other subna
tional units263) attempted each of the various alternatives, we could
gain a lot of information from the implementation of those alterna
tives and thereby render our predictions about the effectiveness of
262. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 397-400
(1997); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 passim
(1996); DAVID OSBORNE, LABORATORIES OF DEMOCRACY 2-3 (1990). The origin of the
term is often attributed to Justice Brandeis. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S.
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal sys
tem that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
263. Some legislation is passed on county-wide or city-wide basis. Other legislation is in
the form of interstate compacts. See, e.g. , Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform
Act of 1996 § 147, 7 U.S.C. § 7256 (Supp. II. 1996) (approving the creation of an interstate
dairy compact). For convenience, I will use the term "states" to encompass these different
units.
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those alternatives much closer to statements of fact (as long as the
collections of states seemed representative).264
This suggests that an interest in testing the prediction regarding al
ternatives should push courts toward greater hostility to nationally
uniform legislation, and greater solicitude toward legislation on the
state level, than the courts otherwise would have. Implementation of
federal legislation will not tell us anything about the various alterna
tives, but implementation of state legislation will.265
This may seem troubling to those who consider Congress to be su
perior to state legislatures, especially if that superiority is thought to
flow from Congress's greater capacity to gather and distill facts in
making difficult determinations.266 But insofar as Congress has supe
rior abilities, it can enact the plan for alternative systems and give
authority to states as an aspect of "cooperative federalism," or can
simply design the alternative systems itself and then designate which
states will be subject to each.267 Congress, in other words, can still play
a central role. In any event, the larger point is that my formulation
does not necessarily entail an absolute preference for legislation ap
plied at the state level, but rather simply posits that the ability to ex
periment with alternatives is an advantage, and that advantage applies
to legislation that is not nationally uniform. In some situations there
may be reasons to prefer federal uniformity that outweigh the benefits
of state experimentation.268 Similarly, the advantages of state experi
mentation do not necessarily suggest more favorable judicial review
for state rather than nationally uniform legislation, but rather that,
whatever review one would ordinarily give to each, it be hardened for
federal legislation and/or softened for state legislation. If for other
264. In fact, such studies have been undertaken in examining the effects of different
states' approaches to, for example, term limits and campaign finance legislation. See Michael
J. Malbin & Gerald Benjamin, Legislatures After Term Limits, in LIMITING LEGISLATIVE
TERMS 209 (Gerald Benjamin & Michael J. Malbin eds., 1992); Gary F. Moncrief et al., For
Whom the Bell Tolls: Term Limits and State Legislatures, 17 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 37 (1992);
Robert Dreyfuss, Reform Beyond the Beltway: States as Laboratories of Clean Money, AM.
PROSPECT, May-June 1998, at 50; Ruth S. Jones, State Public Financing and the State Parties,
in PARTIES, INTEREST GROUPS, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS 283 (Michael J. Malbin
ed., 1980).
265. For a discussion of related benefits to such experimentation at the subnational
level, see Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimental
ism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998).
266. See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of
Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1 175-83 (1999).
267. One example of such cooperative federalism is the Public Utility Regulatory Poli
cies Act of 1978, which created a national policy encouraging the use of alternate energy
sources but allowed states to experiment with how to foster the growth of such sources. 16
U.S.C. § 824a-3(b) (1994). On cooperative federalism, see Daniel L. Rubinfeld, On Federal
ism and Economic Development, 83 VA . L. REV. 1581 (1997).
268. See Philip J. Weiser, Chevron, Cooperative Federalism, and Telecommunications
Reform, 52 vAND. L. REV. 1 (1999).
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reasons one had a strong preference for subjecting federal legislation
to more lenient judicial review, that preference still might not be over
come. When, however, the benefits of national uniformity are not so
overwhelming, the response to predictive harms - namely, that we
should test the assertion that they will come to pass - should apply
mutatis mutandis to possible alternatives, prodding us to test the asser
tion that less restrictive alternatives are not available.
CONCLUSION
Changes in the information industries have defied a lot of predic
tions over the years. Some developments that seemed inevitable never
panned out. Others that no one expected rose from obscurity to
prominence. This should not surprise us. Economists, technologists,
legislators, and even law professors may devise sophisticated and care
ful models and formulae, but the complexities of actual events often
do not lend themselves to such prior mapping.269 How should we re
spond when we have reason to believe that a harm will arise in a
speech-related industry if the government does not act now? One pos
sibility is for the government to move proactively to shape events be
fore a harm occurs. Another is to wait and see if the harm develops. In
this Article, I advocate a presumption in favor of the latter approach
as an application of a principle of humility in the face of uncertainty.
But we can apply a humility principle only if we have a baseline or
default position. After all, the injunction "[f)irst, do no harm" provides
little guidance unless we can identify what the "do no harm" position
is.270 The baseline reflected in this Article's treatment of proactive
legislation is a product of two elements. First, predictions are an un
satisfactory alternative to actual events in determining the likelihood
of a harm existing. Second, the First Amendment privileges a status
quo without regulation. Remove either of these factors, and the de
fault position changes. When both exist, though, our baseline produces
a strong presumption against proactive legislation. And that baseline,

269. As a wise man - apparently either Niels Bohr or Yogi Berra - once said, "It is
very difficult to make an accurate prediction, especially about the future." See Henry T.
Greely, Trusted Systems and Medical Records: Lowering Expectations, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1585, 1591 & n.9 (2000) (noting a dispute over whether Yogi Berra or Niels Bohr is rightly
credited with this sentiment).
270. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 778
(1996) (Souter, J., concurring) (suggesting that, in the fast-changing world of telecommuni
cations, judges should heed the admonition, " '[f]irst, do no harm' " (quoting the Hippocratic
Oath)); id. at 787 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Justice Souter
recommends to the Court the precept, 'First do no harm.' The question, though, is whether
the harm is in sustaining the law or striking it down." (internal citation omitted)); see also
Kennard, supra note 82 (stating that, in refraining from mandating that cable Internet com
panies open up their lines to competing ISPs, the FCC is "following advice as old as Western
civilization itself: First do no harm - a high-tech Hippocratic Oath").
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combined with a lack of confidence that courts or legislatures (or any
one else) will make accurate predictions, counsels against deference
and in favor of redundancy. Thus, even on functionalist grounds, a
rather formal approach seems appropriate: When speech regulation is
at issue, we should require cash on the barrelhead rather than prom
ises of future payment.

